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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracting by state 
transportation agencies for the procurement of repetitive construction and maintenance 
services has been growing during the last few years. An IDIQ contract is a multi-project, 
multi-year mechanism to permit an agency to essentially hire a contractor on a stand-by/as-
needed basis to provide a specified set of construction services. A study conducted for the 
development of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 
473: IDIQ Contracting Practices found that at least 32 departments of transportation (DOT) 
are using IDIQ contracts for the procurement of construction and/or maintenance projects. As 
part of the development of Synthesis 473, surveys were sent to all state DOTs asking about 
their IDIQ contracting practices, their perceived benefits and drawbacks, and the challenges 
faced during the implementation of this alternative contracting method. The analysis of 
survey responses showed that state transportation agencies are satisfied with the benefits they 
are obtaining from IDIQ contracts, but they do not know whether or not they are paying a 
premium for its benefits. A close look at the issue revealed that the agencies do not have the 
tools to reliably quantify the cost implication of using IDIQ contracting. This dissertation 
constitutes the first research initiative intended to address this issue through the development 
of an IDIQ project selection framework based on the comparison between the estimated costs 
for a given project if procured under IDIQ versus the costs if traditional Design-Bid-Build 
(DBB) techniques are used.         
The proposed framework combines a qualitative assessment of a candidate project’s 
scope with a stochastic analysis of its construction costs. Once a transportation project’s 
scope is deemed a suitable candidate for IDIQ contracting (qualitative assessment), the final 
decision is made using a comparison between the estimated cost of the IDIQ project and its 
cost if procured through traditional DBB methods (stochastic analysis). Thus, the decision 
making framework proposed in this study provides public transportation agencies with a 
tools to both identify and justify delivering a given scope of repetitive work using IDIQ 
based on the agency’s perception of a reasonable cost for the benefits offered by IDIQ 
contracting. This dissertation also describes research efforts conducted to identify 
xi 
 
  
opportunities to improve IDIQ contracting procedures currently in use by state DOTs to 
increase budget control and optimize project construction costs. It should be noted that many 
of the findings of this research have already been implemented by the Minnesota DOT and 
are currently in use in the field.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Government contracts are notorious for needing excessive amounts of time to be 
developed, advertised, and awarded (Chan and Young 1995; Ahadzi and Bowles 2004). 
Combining the serial nature of the highway construction procurement process with regulations 
that mandate full and open competition and the tyranny of the fiscal year funding system, creates 
an environment that leads to the inefficient use of available public capital and a potential to 
restrict the amount of needed construction and maintenance that can be accomplished in any 
given year (Gransberg et al. 2015a). From a typical DOT perspective, the crux of the issue is the 
pre-contract where a design must be developed and advertised for bids. “Excessive time during 
the pre-contract stages [may] result in huge cost overruns after award” (Ahadzi and Bowles 
2004). Thus, employing an alternative contracting method that allows the DOT to reduce the 
number of times it has to design, advertise, and award a construction contract for a project type 
that is known will be repeated frequently over the course of a given fiscal year accrues the 
benefit associated with a single procurement period and reduces transaction costs for both the 
DOT and the contracting community (Dixon et al. 2005). IDIQ is just such an alternative 
contracting method. 
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracting practices were first used by the 
newly organized General Services Administration (GSA) by the Federal Property and 
Administrative Service Act of 1949. The implementation of these innovative contracting 
techniques was motivated by a longstanding need to accelerate the acquisition of supplies and 
services recurrently procured by federal agencies (GAO 1979; Matchette and Danis 1995; US 
Congress 1951). This method began to be accepted by state and municipal agencies in states like 
Florida, New York and Missouri around 2005. A number of studies have been initiated by the 
Congressional Budget Office on the variations of IDIQ in response of repetitive protests 
claiming contracting agencies were using it to circumvent competitive bidding regulations 
(Sandner and Snyder 2001). The lack of public confidence in IDIQ and other streamlined 
contracting approaches led the Congress to enact the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) in 1994, which regulates the use of federal funds with these contracting techniques, 
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making them more transparent, efficient, and competitive (Sandner and Snyder 2001; US 
Congress 1994).  
Unfortunately, the lessons learned from federal IDIQ experience are not fully transferable 
to state public owners due to the differences between federal and state contracting regulations as 
well as the diversity found among the 50 states’ procurement cultures. Therefore, state 
departments of transportation (DOTs) have been compelled to individually develop their own 
IDIQ contracting programs within their current practices, unique requirements and preferences, 
and applicable state regulations (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a).  
As usually occurs with the implementation of any new practices in any type of business 
or organization, the decision to start using non-traditional contracting methods commonly places 
DOTs into a challenging process, during which these agencies have to face the risk of the 
unknown. IDIQ contracting is just one of the many alternative contracting techniques that have 
arisen during the last few decades as result of the inadequacy of traditional Design-Bid-Build 
(DBB) contracts to cope with the tight deadlines and budgets of today’s construction 
environment. “The difficulty that [state transportation agencies] face then is how to choose 
between the more traditional approach and an alternative contracting strategy for a specific 
contract” (Molenaar et al. 2014). The study conducted for the development of the National 
Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 473 (Gransberg et al. 2015a) 
found that for DOTs, the selection of projects for IDIQ contracting is primarily based on the 
scope of the projects. As general rule, all projects involving recurrent construction and 
maintenance services are suitable for IDIQ contracting. However, by using this rule as the one 
and only criterion for the selection of projects to be performed using this alternative contracting 
method, state transportation agencies may be ignoring the cost implications of using IDIQ 
techniques, hindering their ability to obtain the best value for money from their infrastructure 
construction and maintenance investments.         
NCHRP Synthesis 473 also found three principal factors that motivate the use of IDIQ 
contracts by DOTs; 1) the reduction of project delivery periods, 2) the greater flexibility in 
quantity and delivery scheduling, 3) and the suitability of this contracting approach to respond to 
emergencies (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Likewise, this report mentions two main disadvantages 
pointed out by DOTs; 1) the lack of experience of agencies and contractors on IDIQ contracting 
and 2) the limited ability to conduct complete planning, programming, and budgeting procedures 
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at the contract level. An important observation regarding the benefits and drawbacks perceived 
by state DOTs in the use of IDIQ contracts was the fact that IDIQ construction costs were not 
classified as an advantage or a disadvantage by the respondents to the Synthesis 473 survey. It 
could be inferred from this observation that DOTs believe that either the cost of using IDIQ is 
roughly the same as the cost of using a traditional contracting approach or that if the cost of IDIQ 
contracts is higher, the extra cost is justified by the benefits received by these agencies. 
However, a deeper look into this issue found the problem is rooted in the facts that DOTs do not 
have the tools necessary to quantify the cost implication of using IDIQ contracting, and the 
literature contains very little authoritative research on estimating IDIQ costs. Although most 
alternative contracting methods are reported to produce “positive results by those who used 
them, more implementation experience is needed within the transportation industry to determine 
if they are truly cost-effective in meeting cost performance targets” (Anderson and Damnjanovic 
2008). 
The main contribution of this dissertation is an IDIQ project selection framework that 
includes expected construction costs as a selection criterion. In addition to a qualitative analysis 
of scopes of potential project candidates, this framework includes a comparison between the 
estimated stochastic cost of these projects if procured under IDIQ and their costs if traditional 
DBB techniques are used. The framework presented in this dissertation was specifically 
developed for the IDIQ contracts awarded by the Minnesota DOT (MnDOT), but it could be 
adapted to other agencies. This framework required the creation of multiple nonlinear regression 
models to estimated unit prices, for the pay items most commonly used by MnDOT in its 
construction projects based on a frequency analysis of bid quantities. The analysis used MnDOT 
historical bid data from all projects awarded by MnDOT between January 2008 and April 2015, 
which included 1,713 DBB and 33 IDIQ contracts. 
Additionally, the dissertation analyzes the major aspects affecting construction costs in 
IDIQ contracts and identifies/proposes effective practices to optimize costs and minimize cost 
uncertainty. The major cost-related aspects studied in this dissertation are as follows: 
 Early contractor involvement (ECI) and potential effects of increasing integration among 
different parties involved in the contract, which was analyzed through the comparison of 
a major IDIQ contracting program implemented by the US Department of Defense 
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(DoD) and the highly integrated collaborative alliancing agreement used in Christchurch, 
New Zealand, for reconstruction activities after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011; 
 Price escalation over time, which involved the evaluation of the performance of twelve 
different construction cost indexes (CCIs) in relation to their ability to track changes in 
construction prices over time; and  
 Effective risk management strategies, including practices to reduce the probability of 
occurrence of some cost-risk events and the mitigation of their impact if they actually 
occur.          
 
Content Organization 
This paper-based dissertation consists of the compilation of four archival journal 
publications reporting the findings of research efforts conducted on different IDIQ contracting 
areas. The papers are strategically interconnected to provide the proper foundation and 
understanding required to develop the major contribution of this dissertation: an IDIQ project 
selection framework using stochastic techniques. 
Chapter 2 furnishes the reader with the background information and relevant terminology 
necessary to understand the content of the subsequent chapters. Likewise, this chapter explains 
the facts and issues that motivated this study and clearly defines the problem statement that 
frames the research efforts behind this dissertation. 
Chapter 3 gives and overall description of the methodology and research plan designed 
and implemented for the development of this dissertation, including a description of the process 
used to validate the IDIQ project selection framework. More detailed information about the 
methodology and research tools used in each the publications compiled in this dissertation is 
presented in their respective chapters (Chapter 4 – 7). 
Chapter 4 corresponds to the first paper of this dissertation. This publication makes a 
comparison between two similar multi-billion contracts, both of them involving a fixed group of 
contractors competing for multiple projects during a given period of time. The first is the US Air 
Force Contract Augmentation Program IV (AFCAP IV), a worldwide multiple award IDIQ 
contract awarded by the Department of Defense (DoD), and the second contract is termed the 
Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT). SCIRT comprises a collaborative 
alliance agreement signed by various public owners and contractors for the reconstruction of 
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public infrastructure damaged by the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 in New Zealand. 
The main difference between these two contracting methods lies in the level of integration 
among the parties involved in the contract. This paper presents a systematic comparison of these 
two contracts on five different aspects, including two aspects with a direct impact on 
construction costs:  ECI and incentive/disincentive provisions. The other three comparison 
aspects are general procurement and administration procedures, dispute resolution aspects, and 
documented advantages. The analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these two case 
studies was used by the authors to identify opportunities of improvement in both contracting 
methods, including opportunities to optimize IDIQ construction costs. 
The Chapter 5 paper presents a statistical analysis on the performance of twelve existing 
CCIs in relation to their ability to track changes in construction prices over time. The analysis 
was conducted to determine the most suitable CCI for price adjustment and estimating purposes 
in MnDOT’s IDIQ contracts. However, the analysis determined that the general principles and 
assumptions associated with the development, maintenance, and use of these indexes make 
traditional CCIs unsuitable to be used at the project level in IDIQ contracts. Therefore, an 
alternative construction cost indexing system was designed to overcome the drawbacks found 
during the analysis of the existing CCIs. The proposed indexing system is called Multi-level CCI 
and is described in detail in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 6 holds the third paper of this dissertation, which describes the use of several risk 
management strategies as part of a two-phase risk analysis framework for IDIQ contracts. Phases 
1 and 2 of the framework correspond to risk planning and monitoring/control, respectively. The 
effective risk management strategies in this framework are intended to address eight different 
possible risk situations commonly found in IDIQ contracts that have the potential of affecting 
final construction costs. 
The last article of this dissertation is in Chapter 7. This paper contains the main 
contribution of this dissertation: the stochastic IDIQ project selection framework. The proposed 
framework consists of two parts: an initial qualitative assessment of candidate projects based on 
the scope of work and a quantitative analysis and comparison of stochastic cost estimates 
considering the use of IDIQ or DBB techniques for the same specific scope of work. This 
comparison considers several case scenarios for different distributions of work among various 
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contract periods. The results of all case scenarios is presented to decision makers as a matrix to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results.     
Chapter 8 consolidates the conclusions and limitations of the research articles presented 
in Chapters 4 to 7 and analyzes them as a whole. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the most 
important contributions that have resulted from the research efforts and presents 
recommendations for future research to improve the IDIQ project selection framework described 
in Chapter 7 as well as other aspects of IDIQ contracting.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
This chapter presents and analyzes information obtained through a comprehensive 
literature review on topics related to this study. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
complement and support the information and findings presented in the research articles 
comprised in Chapters 4 to 7. This chapter provides the reader with a better understanding of the 
principles of IDIQ contracting and defines some key terms used throughout this presentation.  
Some of the information and concepts discussed in this chapter are contained in research reports 
and articles associated with previous research projects in which the author has participated. This 
chapter begins with a section summarizing NCHRP Synthesis 473 Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity Contracting Practices (Gransberg et al. 2015a), which describes the IDIQ contracting 
practices used by DOTs across the country and was used as the foundation for this dissertation. 
Furthermore, this chapter describes the main reasons that motivated the research efforts 
documented in this dissertation and the problem statement framing this study.    
 
Background  
 
NCHRP Synthesis 473 – IDIQ Contracting Practices 
The point of departure for this study was the NCHRP Synthesis 473: IDIQ Contracting 
Practices aimed to compile and evaluate effective IDIQ practices implemented by state DOTs 
across the country. The main objective of the synthesis is to “identify and synthesize current 
effective practices that comprise the state-of-the-practice related to the use of IDIQ contracting 
by public transportation agencies for highway design, construction, and maintenance contracts” 
(Gransberg et al. 2015a). The synthesis report covers concepts and practices of IDIQ contracting 
associated with following three main aspects:  
1.  Legal and contractual issues 
2. Procurement policies and procedures, and  
3. Contract administration procedures.  
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Information contained in the report was gathered from the literature and a formal content 
analysis of IDIQ procurement documents, policy and procedure manuals from 32 different state 
DOTs, two local transportation agencies, and 20 federal agencies. Additionally, the analysis 
about legal and contractual issues in IDIQ contracts was conducted using 76 legal cases. This 
analysis was focused on identifying trends in court decisions under different types of conflicts 
and common sources of disputes between contract participants. 
One of the most important sources of information used in the development of the NCHRP 
Synthesis 473 were survey responses submitted from 43 DOTs (84% response rate) and 18 
general contractors doing business in different parts of the country. This information was 
supplemented with four face-to-face structured interviews with general contractors and case 
studies on IDIQ contracts awarded by the Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, and New York State 
DOTs and the Central Federal Lands Highway Division. 
“This study found that IDIQ techniques increase agency capabilities to quickly procure a 
wide range of recurrent construction and maintenance services” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). IDIQ 
contracting proved to be a versatile procurement tool with the ability to be combined with 
different project delivery methods and contracting approaches to address the particular needs of 
each project. “With an appropriate selection of contracting procedures, agencies could 
successfully execute IDIQ contracts for almost all types of projects typically procured by state 
DOTs” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
 Much of the information presented in the following sections of this chapter were obtained 
through the literature review, surveys, and interviews conducted for the NCHRP Synthesis 473. 
It should be noted that the author of this dissertation was the Co-Principal Investigator and co-
author of Synthesis 473.   
 
IDIQ Contracting  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) IDIQ contracting mechanism that “provides 
for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period” 
(FAR 2005). While this definition applies specifically to federally-funded projects, it seems to be 
accepted by state agencies across the country with one slight difference. The decision on whether 
or not to establish “stated limits” on the quantities of work to be ordered under an IDIQ contract 
is optional at the state-level, and depends on either regulatory constraints or agency’s 
9 
 
  
preferences. Thus, this study defines IDIQ as contracting approaches that involve the 
procurement of an indefinite quantity of supplies and/or services on as-needed basis using 
individual orders over a fixed period of time. The unique configuration of IDIQ contracts allows 
public owners to “reduce the need to conduct multiple procurement actions to deliver technically 
similar, repetitive projects to a single transaction” (Gransberg et al. 2015a).  
 
IDIQ Terminology and Key Definitions 
One of the major issues faced by the author when gathering information about current 
IDIQ contracting practices used by DOTs across the country was the lack of consistency in the 
terminology used by these agencies to refer to IDIQ contracts and the work orders issued under 
them. Several of these terms and their definitions are referred in the NCHRP Synthesis 473 
(Gransberg et al. 2015a). The absence of a standard terminology has slowed the evolution of 
IDIQ contracting practices at the state level by hindering the ability of state transportation 
agencies to exchange experiences and lessons learned among them. For example, before the 
publication of the NCHRP Synthesis 473, the Florida DOT did not know that its 6-year-old 
Push-Button contracting program was similar to the Job Order Contracts the New York State 
DOT has been awarded by about a decade; therefore, the Florida DOT had not considered the 
possibility of evaluating the more mature set of contracting practices used by the New York State 
DOT to improve its own contracting procedures given that it was unknown that both programs 
were based on the fundamentals of IDIQ contracting.        
Figure 1 presents the different terms found by the NCHRP Synthesis 473 to refer to IDIQ 
contracts. Even though some of these terms are slightly different from each other, all of them 
meet the following definitions at the contract and project level (Gransberg et al. 2015a): 
 IDIQ: Type of contract that provides for an indefinite quantity of supplies and/or services 
whose performance and delivery scheduling is determined by placing work orders with one 
or multiple contractors during a fixed period of time. 
 Work Order: Every project to be executed within an IDIQ contract is developed under the 
issuance of a work order. A work order becomes the contract document that determines 
location, contract time, and scope of work. Moreover, a work order outlines all required 
pay items, quantities, and unit prices (MnDOT 2014). Also termed Task, Job, or Service 
Order.    
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FIGURE 1  IDIQ terminology. 
 
Based on the previous definitions, it can be said that IDIQ is a general concept that 
covers all terms in Figure 1. The terms in this figure have been either defined in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), used by other authors, or used by some state transportation 
agencies to refer to variations of IDIQ contracts with restrictions either in scope, size, and/or 
number of contractors. Table 1 presents definitions given to some of the contracts contained in 
Figure 3. It is important to understand that these definitions are merely common descriptions for 
these terms and do vary among agencies; however, all meet the generic definition for IDIQ stated 
above. 
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TABLE 1  IDIQ Terminology – Definitions 
Term Definition 
Delivery Order 
Contract 
Contract for supplies whose performance and delivery scheduling is determined by 
placing delivery orders with the contractor or contractors during a fixed period of time 
(FAR 2005).  
Task Order Contract 
Contract for services whose performance and delivery scheduling is determined by 
placing task orders with the contractor or contractors during a fixed period of time (FAR 
2005).  
Job Order Contract 
Contracts for construction services whose performance and delivery scheduling is 
determined by placing work orders (task, delivery and/or job orders) with the contractor 
or contractors during a fixed period of time (Farris 2002).  
On-Call Contract 
Contract that involves a group of undetermined or predetermined small projects usually 
related to professional/engineering services, which are requested by issuing task orders 
(UDOT 2010). Some state DOTs also use this term to refer to construction and 
maintenance/repair contracts (Maine DOT 2011; TDOT 2010).  
Push-Button 
Contract 
Contract with a predetermined scope of work to be performed by the contractor pursuant 
to the agency’s issuance of work orders, which specify location, project description and 
amount of work required (FDOT 2012).  
 
 Figure 2 presents a classification of work orders and IDIQ contracts in accordance with 
the different types of work and services furnished by each of them. The terminology in Figure 2 
is used in this dissertation unless the author is referring to a particular agency, in which case the 
agency’s corresponding terminology is used. The terminology and classification of different 
types of IDIQ contracts illustrated in Figure 2 is based on two main aspects: the distinction as 
outlined by the FAR for supplies (delivery orders) and services (task orders) (FAR 2005), and 
the wide use of the term “Job Order” for construction services (which may include supplies and 
services) (Farris 2002; Rueda and Gransberg 2014a).  
 
 
FIGURE 2 Work order and IDIQ contract classification scheme (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). 
 
IDIQ Generic Models 
Three different IDIQ contracting models used by public owners have been found during a 
previous research conducted by the author for the development of the MnDOT IDIQ 
Implementation Guide (MnDOT 2014). These models are classified in accordance with the 
number of contractors selected to participate in the contract and the expected number of work 
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orders to be issued (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). This classification is illustrated in Figure 3, 
which also highlights the three different IDIQ contracting models. Furthermore, Table 2 
illustrates the structure of each contracting model and describes the most appropriate conditions 
for successfully using each of them.     
 
 
FIGURE 3 Generic IDIQ contracting models (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). 
 
The FAR establishes a clear preference for multiple award IDIQ construction contracts 
over a single award approach for federally funded projects (this preference does not apply to 
architectural/engineering (A/E) services) (FAR 2005). The preference for multiple award IDIQ 
contracts is due to the fact that this type of contract seems to represent more benefits for agencies 
as a consequence of the highly competitive environment (GAO 1979; OFPP 1997). However, 
some authors and agencies agree that this is not always the most appropriate approach (DoD 
1999), which seems to be the case of state transportation agencies. For most DOTs a single 
award approach “seems to better fit their procurement methods and limited resources, and even 
with less apparent benefits, DOTs have perceived an opportunity to improve their contracting 
practices” (Rueda 2013) by executing single award IDIQ contracts. 
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TABLE 2 IDIQ Contracting Models Structure and Typical Use (Gransberg et al. 2015a) 
IDIQ Model Diagram Typical Contract Characteristics 
Single Work 
Order Contract  
 When the agency foresees a future 
necessity which most likely will be 
fulfilled with one work order, but 
cannot fairly determine the total 
quantity of resources that will be 
ultimately required and/or the final 
delivery schedule.  
 Often used for emergency stand-by 
services, like hurricane debris removal. 
Single Award 
Contract  
 
 For repetitive tasks or services 
contained in a narrow scope of work, 
allowing a certain degree of uniformity 
among work orders; 
 When only one contractor has the 
capabilities to perform all work orders 
to be issued under the IDIQ contract; or 
 When the agency considers that the 
ultimate number of work orders to be 
issued under the IDIQ contract will not 
justify award multiple contractors.  
Multiple Award 
Contract 
 
 For repetitive tasks or services 
contained in a broad scope of work, 
making it hard to determine a typical 
composition of work orders; 
 When more than one contractor has the 
capabilities to perform all work orders 
to be issued under the IDIQ contract; 
and 
 When the agency considers that the 
number of work orders to be issued 
under the IDIQ contract will justify 
award multiple contractors.   
 
IDIQ Advantages and Disadvantages 
One of the objectives of the NCHRP Synthesis 473 was to understand the reasons that motivate 
DOTs to implement IDIQ contracting. DOT survey participants were provided with a list of 
potential benefits offered by IDIQ contracts and were asked to select those benefits (all that 
apply) that they consider their agencies are receiving from the use of this alternative contracting 
method. Figure 4 shows the responses to this question.  
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FIGURE 4 IDIQ advantages – survey output. 
 
 Nearly all the DOTs (24 out of 25) recognized that IDIQ techniques provide a quick 
response during emergency situations. However, when survey participants were asked in a 
separate question to indicate the single most important benefit of IDIQ contracts, most of them 
selected acceleration of the project delivery period, followed by flexibility in delivery scheduling 
(see Figure 5). The difference between the responses illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 is explained 
by the fact that the ability to effectively use IDIQ contracting for emergency situation is mainly 
due to the reduction of project delivery periods and the flexibility in delivery scheduling. 
15 
 
  
 
 
FIGURE 5 IDIQ most important advantage for DOTs. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show a wide range of benefits perceived by DOTs in the use of IDIQ 
contracting. However, these figures do not show the relationship between these benefits and the 
contracting practices adopted by these agencies. For example, agencies that selected as an 
advantage the ability of IDIQ contracts to award multiple contractors under a single solicitation 
(see Figure 4) may be those that are either currently using multiple award IDIQ contracts or 
considering this alternative. Different procurement policies and procedures offer different sets of 
benefits for public owners. A cross-reference analysis of the information collected from the 
literature review, the results of the content analysis on IDIQ contract documents, and the 
information shown in Figures 4 and 5 reveal three different levels of advantages related to IDIQ 
generic models presented in Table 2. Table 3 shows the three levels of benefits, indicating those 
attributed to each model. This table also shows how a public owner would benefit as it moves 
from a single work order approach to a multiple award IDIQ contracting model. It is important to 
note that the one advantage that single work order and single award contracts have over multiple 
award IDIQ contracts is the reduced administrative effort for coordinating and supervising a 
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single contractor versus multiple contractors. Therefore, agencies awarding contracts to single 
contractors would require fewer resources to manage these contracts, an important distinction in 
the current environment of shrinking DOT staffs (Molenaar and Yakowenko 2007; Touran et al. 
2009). 
 
TABLE 3 Contracting Advantages of Each IDIQ Model (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a) 
   • Owner only has to deal with one contractor 
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• Owner can keep lower inventory levels  
• Flexibility in quantity and delivery scheduling 
• Supplies and services are ordered when they are really needed 
• Agencies commit only for a minimum or no amount of work to be ordered 
• Owner can direct shipments directly to the users 
 • Shorter project delivery period 
• Lower preconstruction costs  
• Allows contractor involvement in preconstruction activities 
• Fast use of year-end funding 
• Lower cost in future issuance of work orders 
• Useful contracting option during emergencies  
• Increase quality and timeliness of delivery 
  • Reduce potential for graft and corruption 
• Highly competitive 
• Lower bid prices 
• Larger participation of small-size and disadvantaged business  
 
This study also found two main disadvantages in IDIQ contracts regardless of the model 
used. As occurs with most alternative contracting methods, the first disadvantage is related to the 
lack of knowledge and experience of state agencies and contractors to plan, execute, and 
administer IDIQ contracts (Farris 2002). The second disadvantage is a consequence of some of 
the benefits mentioned above. In order to obtain increased flexibility in quantity and delivery 
scheduling and the possibility of assigning funds on a work order basis, public owner must 
sacrifice their ability to conduct the traditional planning, programming, and budgeting 
procedures for each individual work order project in the IDIQ contract. 
 
IDIQ Types of Work 
The research efforts comprised in this paper are mainly intended to get a better understanding of 
IDIQ construction and maintenance contracts as well as to optimize planning, contracting, and 
contract administration procedures in this type of contracts. In spite of the fact that the NCHRP 
Synthesis 473 found several state transportation agencies using IDIQ techniques for the 
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acquisition of design services, contracts for these types of services are not included in the scope 
of this dissertation. Table 4 presents a list of different construction and maintenance services 
found in the literature and provided to DOT survey participants to classify the types of work they 
perform via their IDIQ contracts. 
 
TABLE 4  IDIQ Types of Work – Construction and Maintenance 
Construction Services Maintenance Services 
 Hazardous waste treatment, mitigation, 
removal 
 Erosion control/stormwater mitigation 
 ADA-related improvements (sidewalk 
ramps, etc.) 
 Bike lanes, sidewalks, transportation 
enhancement projects 
 Roadway safety improvements 
 Environmental mitigation 
 Resurfacing 
 Landscaping 
 Traffic signalization 
 Bridge repair/preservation 
 Drainage maintenance 
 Pavement markings 
 Roadside safety hardware 
repair/preservation (e.g., guardrail, impact 
attenuator repair) 
 Roadway repair/preservation 
 Rest area improvements 
 
  
Motivation 
 The use of IDIQ contracting by state DOTs for the procurement of repetitive construction 
and maintenance/repair services has been growing during the last few years (Gransberg et al. 
2015a). Currently, there are at least 32 DOTs using IDIQ contracts for the procurement of 
construction and/or maintenance projects (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Previous research conducted 
on the use of IDIQ contracting has revealed that the principal reason that has led state DOTs to 
incorporate the use of IDIQ contracting into their procurement practices is the reduction of 
project delivery periods, following by a great flexibility in quantity and delivery scheduling, and 
the ability to provide quick response before, during, and after emergency situations (Gransberg et 
al. 2015a). It should be noted that the literature does not cite potential construction cost savings 
as a potential benefit, as is the case for other forms of alternative contracting methods like 
design-build and construction manager/general contractor (Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008; 
Molenaar and Gransberg 2001), nor is it cited as a disadvantage. It seems that construction cost 
savings perceived by DOTs are either not substantial. On the other hand, IDIQ construction costs 
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may actually increase, but the logistical and operational benefits obtained are worth the extra 
costs. Based on comments collected from DOT project engineers and contractors during the face-
to-face interviews conducted for the development of the NCHRP Synthesis 473, the author could 
identify three different lines of thought in regard to public owners cost implications of using 
IDIQ contracting:  
1. Those who think that the possibility of performing work in more than one project should 
work as an incentive for contractor to submit lower bid unit prices;  
2. Those who consider that this incentive may be lost by a high level of uncertainty inherent 
to IDIQ contracts, resulting in higher price proposals; and  
3. Those who think that this alternative contracting approach has the potential to reduce 
project costs, but it is actually increasing construction prices as a result of a poor 
implementation by public owners.  
The fact remains that formal research supporting or opposing any of these opinions is 
almost nonexistent, making the work associated with this dissertation both valuable and timely, 
given the recent interest shown in expanded use of alternative contracting methods, triggered by 
the FHWA Every Day Counts Program (Mendez 2010). 
   
Problem Statement 
The increasing number of alternative project delivery methods and contracting 
approaches in the transportation construction industry is improving the contracting capabilities 
of state transportation agencies, but it is also bringing new challenges and demanding additional 
skills from those is charge of selecting the contracting method to be used on a specific project. 
“To overcome the shortcomings of vital resources, state transportation agencies are adapting by 
using alternative delivery methods and contracting strategies to design and build major road 
infrastructure projects. The difficulty that STAs face then is how to choose between the more 
traditional approach and an alternative contracting strategy for a specific project” (Molenaar et 
al. 2014). One of these alternative contracting strategies is IDIQ contracting. 
The ability to consolidate multiple repetitive projects into a single solicitation, as well as 
the need for greater flexibility in the procurement of some types of construction services, have 
triggered the rapid growth in the number of IDIQ contracting programs among DOTs during the 
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last few years (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Regardless of the benefits provided by IDIQ contracts, 
these agencies are aware that this is not always the most suitable contracting approach. Due the 
small size and low complexity of typical IDIQ projects executed by DOTs, the potential use of 
IDIQ contracting usually competes with traditional DBB techniques. Thus, a major issue faced 
by IDIQ users, and one addressed in this dissertation is how to decide whether to use IDIQ or a 
traditional DBB contracting approach for a given project or group of projects. 
More specifically, this dissertation addresses an issue that is not only confined to IDIQ 
contracts. It is the lack of mechanisms to formally determine the cost implications of alternative 
contracting methods. “[B]ecause no adequate and systematic methods exists to evaluate how 
project delivery methods and contracting approaches have impacted costs, it is difficult to 
validate the financial impacts of their use” (Walewski 2001). Current methods used by state 
transportation agencies for the selection of suitable projects for IDIQ contracting are mainly 
based on the scope of the projects (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Almost any group of projects that 
involves repetitive tasks is a good candidate for IDIQ contracting (FAR 2005).Thus, by 
disregarding the cost-related consequences of this decision, under some circumstances, these 
agencies may be unwittingly overvaluing the benefits offered by IDIQ contracting by paying 
unreasonably high construction prices than those that would be obtained using traditional DBB 
low bid procedures. To address this issue, this dissertation presents an IDIQ project selection 
framework that combines current scope-based selection techniques with a stochastic cost 
analysis of the projects under consideration. The framework was developed and validated via 
the methodology described in the following chapter (Chapter 3 – Research Methodology and 
Validation).           
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND VALIDATION 
 
 This chapter presents an overall description of the methodology followed in the academic 
publications in Chapters 4 to 7 and the validation process designed to evaluate to performance of 
the proposed IDIQ project selection framework. Detailed information about the methodology and 
research tools used in this study is provided in the methodology sections of the articles compiled 
into this dissertation. Since this study is based on previous findings obtained from the NCHRP 
Synthesis 473, there is a section in this chapter that describes the research approach and tools 
used for the development of this synthesis. 
 
Research Methodology 
Figure 6 shows the research methodology followed in study comprised in this 
dissertation. The study began with a supplementary literature review aimed to collect either new 
knowledge or any additional information missed or not available when conducting the NCHRP 
Synthesis 473. Given that the IDIQ project selection framework developed in this study relays on 
the performance of construction cost estimates for both IDIQ and DBB techniques, the next step 
in this study was to analysis different aspects and contracting practices that might help DOTs to 
increase budget control and optimize construction costs. 
Subsequently, the process for the development of the IDIQ project selection framework 
was divided into a qualitative and a quantitative part. The qualitative part identifies and proposes 
effective IDIQ contracting practices, analyzes current IDIQ contracting techniques, and identifies 
any improvement opportunities that may help to optimize IDIQ construction costs. On the other 
hand, during the quantitative part, the author developed construction cost prediction models for 
IDIQ and DBB projects, allowing a comparison of expected construction costs between these 
contracting methods. The decision making framework delivered as a result of this study offers 
the possibility of comparing construction costs for IDIQ and DBB considering several different 
distributions of work among various contract periods. The quantitative part of this study was be 
conducted for a case study agency; the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT). 
Prediction models were be built and validated using MnDOT historical bid data for all project 
awarded between January 2008 and April 2015.    
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FIGURE 6 Research methodology and validation. 
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The findings and observations obtained from the qualitative and quantitative procedures 
were analyzed together to create and overall decision making framework, including an initial 
qualitative assessment (scope-based) for the pre-selection of IDIQ candidates, and a subsequent 
quantitative analysis (cost-based) of these candidates.  
This chapter of the dissertation also includes a further description of two research 
methods that are not fully explained in the academic publications presented in the following 
chapter. The the modified Z-score and  the robust regression and outlier removal (ROUT) 
method are two outlier detection approaches used at different stages during the analysis of 
MnDOT historical bid data. 
 
Modified Z-Score Method 
The modified Z-score method is used in an effort to remove unit prices related to 
unbalanced bids that could compromise the integrity of the study. Unit prices are considered to 
be unbalanced when “each bid item…fails to carry its proportionate share of the overhead and 
profit in addition to the necessary costs for the item. The results are understated prices for some 
items and enhanced or overstated prices for others” (Manzo 1997) Unbalancing is triggered by 
the owner overstating the bid quantities (Gransberg and Riemer 2009) and is so common that any 
research involving the use of DOT bid tabulation data must remove potentially unbalanced unit 
prices from its sample or risk unintentionally skewing the output (FHWA 1988). 
 The Modified Z-Score method was selected based on the fact that the use of the mean 
and sample standard deviation to detect and remove outliers in numerical data-sets (commonly 
used to handle outliers) may not be appropriate for small samples. This is due to the fact that 
these two indicators may be highly affected by one or few extreme values (Seo 2006). It is 
important to remember that the sample sizes subjected to this method are driven by the number 
of bidders in a single project that ranges from 2 to 6 on most MnDOT projects and which has not 
been larger than 13 in any single project awarded by MnDOT during the last seven years.  
 Following Iglewicz and Hoaglin’s (1993) recommendations, the modified Z-score 
method would be a more appropriate method for this study since it works better for small data-
sets. Instead of the mean and sample standard deviation, this method uses the median (?̃?) and the 
absolute deviation of the median (MAD) to calculate the modified Z-score (Mi) for each number 
in the sample as shown below (Seo 2006). 
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𝑀𝐴𝐷 = 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛{|𝑥𝑖 − ?̃?|}                                                     eq.1 
𝑀𝑖 =
0.6745(𝑥𝑖−?̃?)
𝑀𝐴𝐷
                                                             eq.2 
Where: 𝑀𝐴𝐷 = Absolute deviation of the median; 
  𝑥𝑖  = Each number in the data-set; 
  ?̃? = Sample median; and 
  𝑀𝑖 = Modified Z-score for each number in the data-set. 
 
 Following Iglewicz and Hoaglin’s suggestions (1993), all unit prices whose absolute 
modified Z-score was less than 3.5 (|𝑀𝑖| < 3.5) were removed from the data-set. 
 
ROUT Method 
Proposed by Motulsky and Brown (2006), ROUT combines robust regression techniques 
with outlier removal to optimize non-linear regression methods by discarding extreme values that 
significantly differ from the other values in the sample. It allows finding curves that better fit the 
data. In this study, ROUT was used to identify unreasonable low or high unit prices not detected 
by the modified Z-score method. Extreme values not found by the first outlier filter may appear 
as a result of unusual contract requirements, forcing all contractors to bid outside the typical unit 
price ranges, or in contracts that involve only two price proposals. With two-data-point samples, 
the modified Z-score method always finds both values as valid. Both outlier detection methods 
assume that values are normally distributed around the mean value. 
Unlike the traditional least-squares regression, robust regression techniques assign 
weights to the observations, decreasing the weights as observations deviate from the region 
where values are more concentrated. It reduces the impact that potential outliers may have on the 
regression analysis.    
 Commonly used outlier detection methods use the typical 95% confidence interval to 
discard values located on the tails of a Gaussian distribution; however, these methods are also 
often associated to a larger number of false positives mainly when dealing with large data-sets 
(Motulsky and Brown 2006). It should be noted that unlike the modified Z-score method, this 
second outlier filter is to be applied on all bid unit prices recorded for each pay item and included 
in MnDOT available bid data. In some cases, there are more than 1,500 observations for a single 
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pay item. To overcome this issue, Motulsky and Brown (2006) proposed a modified version of 
the False Discovery Rate (FDR) controlling procedure developed by Benjamani and Hochberg 
(1995) to find and eliminate outliers. The Benjamani and Hochberg’s method requires the 
establishment of a maximum desired FDR (Q) which works as a parameter to control the 
efficiency of the procedure. “If Q is set to 1%, you can expect fewer than 1% of the 'statistically 
significant' findings (discoveries) to be false positives, while the rest (more than 99%) are real” 
(Motulsky and Brown 2006). 
 The proposed adaptation of the FDR method first divides the residual of each observation 
by the Robust Standard Deviation of the Residuals (RSDR). This ratio is intended to 
approximate a t-distribution, which is then used to determine a two-tailed p-value. Subsequently, 
it uses FDR techniques to identify significant p-values that correspond to outliers. Motulsky and 
Brown (2006) summarize the ROUT method in three steps: 
1. Find the best fitting curve using robust non-linear regression. 
2. Identify outliers using the residuals of the robust fit and FDR techniques. 
3. Discard identified outliers and perform least squares regression.  
 
NCHRP Synthesis 473 – IDIQ Contracting Practices: Research Methodology 
Information used for the development of the NCHRP Synthesis 473 was gathered using the 
following research instruments: 
 Literature review 
- Comprehensive literature review of previous studies on IDIQ contracting. 
- Formal content analysis following the protocol proposed by Neuendorf (2002) of 
IDIQ related documents from 32 state DOTs, 2 local transportation agencies, and 20 
federal agencies from different sectors.  
 Surveys (surveys were developed using the protocol prescribed by Oppenheim [2000]) 
- Survey responses from 43 state DOTs (84% response rate). 
- Survey responses from 18 members of the Association of General Contractors (AGC) 
and American Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA). 
- Survey responses collected during a previous research project for the development 
of the MnDOT IDIQ Implementation Guide (this responses were also used in the 
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NCHRP Synthesis 473). These responses came from 56 contractors and 
subcontractors, 54 MnDOT staff members involved in the planning, execution, and 
closing of IDIQ contracts, and 39 surety companies doing business in Minnesota  
 Structured interviews (the study used the structured interviewing techniques proposed by 
the US Government Accountability Office [GAO 1991])  
- Four face-to-face interviews with members of the AGC and ARTBA. 
- Face-to-face structure interviews with project engineers from Florida, Minnesota, 
Missouri, and New York State DOTs and the Central Federal Lands Highway 
Division (CFLHD). These structured interviews were part of case study analyses of 
IDIQ contracts executed by these agencies - the cases were collected using Yin’s 
methodology for case study research data collection (1994). 
 
Validation 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the historical bid data from all projects awarded by MnDOT 
between January 2008 and April 2015 is divided into two data-sets; 1) a training data-set used to 
develop the construction cost estimating models for IDIQ and DBB contracts and 2) a validation 
data-set use to evaluate the performance of the cost estimating models. Projects awarded between 
January 2008 and August 2013 constitutes the training data-set, while the remaining projects were 
used for validation (September 2013 – April 2015). Both data-sets were intentionally grouped 
placing older projects in the training data-set since the purpose of this validation process is not 
only to determine the accuracy of the construction cost estimating models, but also the ability of 
bid data from previous projects to estimate current construction costs. More details and the results 
of the validation of the IDIQ project selection framework is presented in Chapter 7.       
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CHAPTER 4 
US MAJOR TASK ORDER CONTRACTING AND NZ COLLABORATIVE 
ALLIANCES COMPARISON 
 
Rueda-Benavides, J.A., E. Scheepbouwer, and D.D. Gransberg, “US Major Task Order 
Contracting and NZ Collaborative Alliances Comparison,” CDR-1878, Proceedings, 2015 
AACE International Annual Meeting, June 28-July 1, 2015, Las Vegas, NV.  
 
Abstract 
Relational contracts which strive to create a project deliver environment that is fully 
integrated are becoming more prevalent in the US and are touted to be the “magic bullet” to 
eliminate disputes and maximize collaboration. Similar contracts have been in use in New 
Zealand for over two decades and are becoming ubiquitous in Australasia for the delivery of 
complex infrastructure construction projects. Alliancing’s key characteristic is a “no sue” clause 
that has led US agencies to shy away from it as impossible to implement under US law. This 
paper argues that the US Department of Defense’s major task order contract is very similar to the 
collaborative alliance contract currently in use to deliver the massive reconstruction program 
estimated at approximately NZ$2.5 billion in Canterbury, New Zealand. The paper compares 
case studies of a US and a New Zealand projects and finds that US public owners can accrue 
most of the advantages provided through an alliance contract without the need to include a “no 
sue” clause.  
 
Introduction 
Despite the US construction industry efforts to catch up with the global trend for the 
implementation of more integrated project delivery methods, the adversarial culture and legal 
regulations framing the business activity of this industry have prevented US public owners from 
attaining the high level of partnering seen in some infrastructure projects overseas (Weston and 
Gibson 1993). It implies than US agencies are unable to take advantage of the benefits frequently 
attributed to fully integrated procurement environments in relation to the achievement of more 
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efficient procedures and superior performance during the construction of capital infrastructure 
projects (Barlow 2000; Van den Berg and Kamminga 2006; Duffield et al. 2014; SCIRT 2014).  
The inability of public owners to create a “no blame” and “no disputes” procurement 
environment through “no sue” clauses is one of the principal aspects that prevent US public 
owners from establishing highly collaborative relationships (Gransberg et al. 2015b). However, 
as a result of the comparison of case studies of a US and a New Zealand projects, this paper 
proves that the US has procurement tools that allow federal agencies to accrue most of the 
advantages provided through collaborative alliancing with the need to include “no sue” clauses. 
The following are the two case studies compared in this study: 
1. Air Force Contract Augmentation Program IV (AFCAP IV): This is an Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) MATOC awarded by the US Department of Defense 
(DoD) as “a rapid response contingency contract tool for use by US Government entities 
needing urgent assistance” (USAF 2014a). It include the delivery of engineering and 
construction services. 
2. Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT):  This is a collaborative 
alliance agreement among public owners and non-owner participants formed for the 
reconstruction of “publicly owned horizontal infrastructure […] damaged by the 
Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011” (SCIRT 2014).  
The paper compares these two contracting mechanism on five aspects: (1) general 
procurement and administration procedures, (2) dispute resolution policies, (3) early contractor 
involvement (ECI), (4) incentive and disincentive provisions, and (5) documented advantages. 
Additionally, the paper identifies some key aspects that should be addressed by regulatory policy 
makers to allow greater collaboration in MATOCs at the level seen in alliance agreements.  
 
Background             
Increasing construction costs, aging infrastructures, stricter construction standards and 
specifications, greater public demands, and limited resources have brought new challenges for 
public owners worldwide (Thomas et al. 2014; Pakkala 2002); challenges that cannot be 
efficiently addressed by traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) practices (Walewski et al. 2001; 
Shrestha et al. 2013; Gransberg et al. 2015a). This situation has moved federal and local agencies 
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to develop and implement alternative project delivery methods and contracting approaches such 
as Design-Build (DB), Construction Manager/General Contractor (CMGC) (also called 
Construction Manager-at-Risk or CMR), and Public Private Partnership (PPP or P3) (West et al. 
2012). Rather than finding a single one-size-fits-all procurement method to replace DBB 
contracts, these alternative project delivery methods are intended to meet those agencies’ needs 
that DBB cannot efficiently fulfil. In other words, “public owners have been expanding their 
procurement toolboxes and increasing their contracting capabilities with flexible sets of 
alternatives to adjust acquisition procedures to the unique needs of each project” (Gransberg et 
al. 2015a). Thus, the selection of the contracting method by the agency or client (in New Zealand 
contracting terms) is aimed to attain the best value-for-money (SCIRT 2014). In the particular 
case of the two contracting models analyzed in this paper, multiple award task order contracts 
(MATOC) and collaborative alliancing, they are specifically intended to procure construction 
services for large and complex projects (Scheepbouwer and Gransberg 2014), which usually 
represent higher risks for all stakeholders, demanding advanced procurement strategies and 
management practices.   
Although both the MATOC and collaborative alliance agreement are mechanisms that 
involve a pool of contractors competing for multiple projects during the contract period, they can 
be considered philosophically different in terms the nature of the relationships among 
stakeholders. While collaborative alliancing promotes a high degree of integration among all 
contracting parties (Scheepbouwer and Gransberg 2014), the level of interaction between the 
owner, contractors, and consultants in a MATOC does not differ from that found in other 
delivery method, depending on the delivery method used at the project level (i.e. DBB, DB, 
CMGC) (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
In addition to those authors already cited in this paper, other researchers have published 
their findings highlighting the benefits of alliancing, and similar techniques that promote 
collaboration and integration among stakeholders, in terms of cost and time savings while 
improving or maintaining project quality (Scott 1995; Hauck et al. 2004; Fortune and Setiawan 
2005; Spang and Riemann 2014). In a more specific study, Rowlinson et al. (2006) highlighted 
an important aspect that should be taken into consideration when using alliancing techniques. 
This research team evaluated the implications of “no sue” clauses in an alliancing agreement 
executed in Queensland, Australia. This study suggests that substantial efforts are required from 
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the alliance board and clients to guaranteed the alliance climate required to maintain all parties 
committed to the “no blame/no disputes” philosophy. About 5% of the labor costs for this project 
were set aside for relationship management expenses, which include the salary of an alliance 
psychology required to maintain positive relationships among stakeholders (Rowlinson et al. 
2006). 
The following two sections present an overall description of the contracting systems 
analyzed in this paper. 
 
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracting 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which comprises the procedures and rules 
that govern the purchase of supplies and/or services by US federal agencies, defines IDIQ 
contracting as a mechanism that “provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of 
supplies or services during a fixed period” (FAR 2005). It is important to mention that this 
definition is only applicable to federal agencies since it has been found that the establishment of 
“stated limits” is not a requirement for many agencies state level (Gransberg et al. 2015a). The 
acquisition of supplies or services is controlled by the owner through the issuance of multiple 
task orders (also called work, delivery, or job orders) to one or multiple contractors. There are 
several different terms used by different agencies to refer to this type of contracts and the task 
orders. However, the discussion of the IDIQ terminology is beyond the scope of this paper. This 
issue has been covered in detail in a previous study conducted by the authors (Rueda and 
Gransberg 2014a; Gransberg et al. 2015a).  
Figure 3 illustrates three different IDIQ contracting models defined based on the number 
of task orders issued under the contract and the number of awardees. Likewise, Table 2 
illustrates the configuration of each model and describes the most suitable conditions for their 
implementation. Figure 3 and Table 2 also present the terminology used in this paper to refer to 
the different elements of IDIQ contracting.  
 
Alliancing Contracting 
The Australian Department of Infrastructure and Transport (ADIT) (2010) defines 
alliancing contracting as a “delivery model where the owner(s), contractor(s) and consultant(s) 
work collaboratively as an integrated team and their commercial interests are aligned with actual 
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project outcomes.” In spite of its increasing popularity, the US construction industry still 
considers “alliancing” as a foreign concept, which must not be equaled to the North American 
partnering concept (Gransberg et al. 2015b). Unlike alliancing agreements, US partnering 
contracts are based on non-binding agreements among contracting parties to adopt a non-
adversarial philosophy (Murdough et al. 2007). In other words, in a US partnering agreement 
“two parties agree to cooperate at a very high level to achieve separate but complementary 
objectives” (Ernzen et al. 2000).       
The alliancing literature presents three different types of alliance agreements; pure, 
competitive, and collaborative alliances. This contracting mechanism was initially used in 
Australia in the form of a pure alliance (Gransberg et al. 2015b). In a pure alliance, the owner or 
client uses Qualifications-Based Selection (QBS) techniques to select the design consultant and 
construction team(s) that will enter into the agreement for the construction of a single project. 
The construction team is usually conformed by two or more firms that team up to bid as a single 
entity. Figure 7 illustrates the generic configuration of a pure alliance.  
 
Alliance 
Agreement
QBS Selection
Design 
Consultant
Construction 
Team
Agency           
as participant
Alliance    
Management Team
Alliance    
Leadership Team
Systems 
Supplier        
(if required)
Operator/
Maintainer        
(if required)
Agency           
as Owner
 
FIGURE 7 Pure alliance agreement (Adapted from Gransberg et al. 2015b).  
 
The Alliance Leadership Team’s (ALT) “primary responsibility is to operate at the high-
level and ensure that the alliance members and the project management team think of the 
collective interests of the project, and not act in their own self-interest” (Gransberg et al. 2015b). 
This team is in charge of making strategic decisions and providing direction to the Alliance 
Management Team (AMT). In a pure alliance agreement, the ALT is formed by representatives 
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of each participant involved in the alliance agreement and led by a member of the owner 
organization. 
The AMT “ensures that the project gets designed and built and is normally composed of a 
members selected for their special expertise and experience” (Gransberg et al. 2015b). This team 
is responsible of providing day-to-day management on delivery operations. The AMT in a pure 
alliance agreement is led by a member of one alliance participants; the Alliance Manager (AM). 
The AM is selected by mutual agreement of all participant organizations. 
 Figure 8 correspond to a competitive alliance agreement. The principal difference with a 
pure alliancing agreement is that in a competitive alliancing the design consultant and the 
construction team are selected through best-value practices. The use for the first time of a 
competitive alliance agreement by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) was motivated 
by political pressure to demonstrate that this agency was obtaining the best value for its 
infrastructure projects (Gransberg et al. 2015b). Another difference between these two models is 
that under a competitive approach the AM is selected from outside of the alliance members’ 
organizations. 
       
Alliance 
Agreement
Shortlist
Shortlisted 
Design 
Consultant
Agency           
as participant
Alliance    
Management Team
Alliance    
Leadership Team
Systems 
Supplier        
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Operator/
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Agency           
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Shortlisted 
Construction 
Team
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Team
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Construction 
Team
 
FIGURE 8 Competitive alliance agreement (Adapted from Gransberg et al. 2015b).  
 
Unlike the pure and competitive alliancing, a collaborative alliance agreement involves 
multiple construction teams competing for multiple projects (see Figure 9). As with IDIQ 
contracts, the total amount of work to be performed by all construction teams cannot be reliably 
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estimated when establishing the alliance agreement. Following the best-for-project principle 
commonly adopted in alliancing contracting (expect for competitive alliances which are focus on 
a best-value approach), the assignation of projects among construction teams is based on past 
performance indicators, which modify the portion of the total quantity of work to be assigned to 
each team. This alliancing model is discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
Alliance 
Agreement
QBS Selection
 Design 
Consultant
Agency           
as participant
Alliance    
Management Team
Alliance    
Leadership Team
Systems 
Supplier        
(if required)
Operator/
Maintainer        
(if required)
Agency           
as owner
Construction 
Team
Construction 
Team
Construction 
Team
Winning 
Construction 
Team
Work Allocated to 
Competing Contractor 
Based on Past Performance
 
FIGURE 9 Collaborative alliance agreement (Adapted from Gransberg et al. 2015b). 
 
Regardless of the alliancing contracting model used, the following key elements are 
usually found in all alliance agreements: 
 Gainshare/Painshare Scheme  
 Task Out-Turn Cost (TOC) 
 “No Disputes” Provisions         
 
Comparison of Case Studies  
While the AFCAP IV is a highly developed version of a contracting mechanism initially 
intended for simple-scoped contracts to facilitate the acquisition of an indefinite quantity of 
supplies or services, the SCIRT was an innovative solution for an unusual, pressing, and 
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challenging situation. The extensive and severe damage caused by the Canterbury earthquakes of 
2010 and 2011, added to the small number of construction firms with the required capabilities to 
participate in the reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure, turned the local construction 
industry on its head with owners competing for the services of the construction companies (Le 
Masurier 2014). This situation led the NZTA and the Christchurch City Council to recommend 
the creation of the SCIRT to concentrate all rebuilding efforts and the administration of the 
limited resources on a single multi-stakeholder organization.  
In spite of the philosophical difference between these two contracting schemes, both are 
intended to deal with broad/complex scopes and indefinite quantities of work. Likewise, both 
mechanisms involve the execution of multiple projects during the contract period and a pool of 
pre-selected construction teams competing for them. A closer look at Table 5 suggest an 
important aspect that differentiate these two approaches. While in the AFCAP IV decisions are 
made on a best-value basis, the collaborative environment of the SCIRT allows the acceptance of 
a best-for-project philosophy by all parties.    
 
TABLE 5 Case Study Summary 
Features/Provisions AFCAP IV SCIRT 
Project Title Air Force Contract Augmentation Program IV Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure 
Rebuild Team 
Contract Type Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
Multiple Award Task Order Contract 
Collaborative Alliance Agreement  
Scope “AFCAP is a rapid response contingency 
contract tool for use by U.S. Government 
entities needing urgent assistance” (USAF 
2014a) 
SCIRT “is a purpose-built organization 
rebuilding publicly owned horizontal 
infrastructure, namely roads, walls and 
bridges, fresh water, wastewater and 
stormwater networks damaged by the 
Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 
2011” (SCIRT 2014) 
Location Worldwide  Christchurch, New Zealand  
Duration Base duration of 1 year, with 9 one-year 
options   
5-year program 
Contract Amount The minimum guaranteed amount per 
contractor is US$2,000, with a maximum total 
contract amount US$5 billion (work 
performed by all contractors)  
Initial program estimate of NZ$2.5 
billion including NZ$1.6 to be paid to 
the construction teams 
Contractor Selection Best-Value Qualifications-Based Selection  
Project Placement 
Procedure 
Best-Value Based on past performance in previous 
alliance work 
Payment Provisions Firm Fixed Price (FFP); Fixed Price Incentive 
Firm (FPIF); Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF); or 
Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) 
Cost Reimbursable with Performance-
Incentivized Fee  
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The following sections compare the AFCAP IV and the SCIRT on five different key 
aspects: (1) general procurement and administration procedures, (2) dispute resolution policies, 
(3) early contractor involvement (ECI), (4) incentive and disincentive provisions, and (5) 
documented advantages. 
 
General Procurement and Administration Procedures 
This section discusses two aspects that form part of the core characteristics of these contracting 
methodologies; selection of construction teams and work assignation procedures. 
 
Selection of Construction Teams     
When comparing the methods used for the selection of the contractors, it is important to 
bear in mind the critical situation of the Christchurch’s construction industry when the SCIRT 
was formed. As mentioned above, it was an unusual situation in which the demand for 
construction services exceeded the capacity of the industry. Thus, making the best attempt to 
meet the demand, the government invited those contractors already engaged in earthquake 
recovery activities to join the alliance (SCIRT 2014). By inviting those contractors who have 
been showing a satisfactory performance, the owners created an expedite QBS mechanism to 
select the non-owner alliance participants. 
Even though the AFCAP IV is also intended to provide quick response to situations that 
require urgent assistance, the selection of the contractors is conducted under less pressing 
conditions. Rather than being used to respond to ongoing emergency situations, the AFCAP IV is 
aimed to address potential future events. It gives the owner more time to conduct a more 
exhausting best-value selection procedure, commonly used by US public owners to award 
complex projects in an effort to guarantee the selection of a contractor with the sufficient 
capabilities to successfully deliver the project for a reasonable cost for the government. In this 
case, the DoD uses the Lowest Price Technical Acceptable (LPTA) source selection procedure 
described in the FAR (USAF 2014b). A LPTA selection process consist of rating non-price 
selection factors “acceptable” or “unacceptable” based on specific parameters described in the 
solicitation documents. Subsequently, the contract is awarded on a low-bid basis, but only 
considering price proposals submitted by technically “acceptable” offerors (FAR 2005). The 
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AFCAP IV is expected to be awarded in May 2015 to up to six contractors (Neyland 2014). 
Figure 10 illustrates the AFCAP IV contractor selection procedure. 
 
 
Scope 
development
RFP issued by the 
agency
Proposal Submitted by 
Contractors  
Past 
Performance 
Questionnaires
Technical 
Proposal
Price Proposal  
(3 sample Task 
Order Scenarios)
Rate each 
contractor as 
“acceptable” or 
“unacceptable”
Contract Award 
Lowest Price 
Technically 
Acceptable (LPTA) 
up to 6 contractors
Determine Total 
Evaluated Price (TEP) 
for each contractor – 
sum of all 3 sample 
task order case 
scenario prices
 
FIGURE 10 AFCAP IV contractors. 
 
Given that the contractors that they are able provide quick response under emergency 
situation worldwide, it is easy to imagine that there are just a few firms with the sufficient 
capabilities to provide these services. In fact, the AFCAP I and II, executed in 1997 and 2002 
(respectively) under a single award task order approach, were awarded through competitive 
procedures to the same firm; Readiness Management Support LC (Grasso 2010). Likewise, this 
company was one of awardees in the third version of the AFCAP, along with other five firms 
(the AFCAP III was the first developed using a MATOC approach). The few number of 
companies with the required capabilities to participate in these contracts places the AFCAP IV in 
a similar situation as the one described by the SCIRT in regard to the size of the market. It can be 
seen as an opportunity for the DoD to promote a collaborative environment and stronger 
relationships among all parties. Le Masurier (2014) argues that one of the aspects that facilitated 
the high level of integration achieve by the SCIRT was the small size of the construction market. 
 
Work Assignation Procedures 
This section discusses the procedures followed in each case study to distribute the work 
among the pre-selected construction teams. As mentioned above, both case studies assign 
upcoming projects on a competitive basis. In the AFCAP IV, the contracting office is granted 
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great flexibility to select the most appropriate task order award approach based on the particular 
scope and requirements of each project. The decision is mainly driven by the type of task order 
used. The AFCAP IV allows the use of four different types of task orders; Firm Fixed Price 
(FFP); Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF); Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF); or Cost Plus Incentive 
Fee (CPIF). Thus, the bid package submitted by contractors to compete for a given task order 
would vary in accordance with its compensation method. The AFCAP IV contract language 
suggests some selection factors that may be used by the contracting officer and allows the use of 
others, at the discretion of the contracting officer. However, the FAR states that the owner must 
“consider price or cost under each order as one of the factors in the selection decision” (FAR 
2005). The following is the list of selection factors suggested to the contracting officer (USAF 
2014b) 
 Past performance in previous task orders; 
 Specific technical/management capabilities; 
 Availability of resources; 
 Proximity to the jobsite; 
 Ability to meet requested deadlines; and 
 Price/Cost. 
The SCIRT mechanism for the assignation of projects among construction team is based 
on a best-for-project scheme. This procedure is based on a Delivery Performance Score (DPS) 
which is computed using 14 non-cost Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) designed to evaluate 
the work delivery by each construction team on five Key Result Areas (KRAs) (Gransberg et al. 
2015b). Table 6 shows the non-cost KPIs with the weighting assigned to each of them. The 
calculation of the DPS also involves a cost performance factor termed “earn value per delivery 
team/cost to date.” The DPS is calculated on a monthly basis using the KPIs of the contractors 
for the last three months. The values obtained each month for all contractors are used to 
determine the distribution of future work among the construction teams. Construction teams with 
higher DPS are entitled to deliver a greater amount of work (in terms of money). Thus, it works 
as an incentive for contractors to provide and outstanding performance under each project. 
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TABLE 6 Non-cost KRAs and Accompanying KPIs (Gransberg et al. 2015b) 
Key Result Area  
(% weighting) 
Key Performance Indicator 
 (% weighting) 
Safety (25%)  Measure of safety Engagement /Awareness (12.5%) 
 Safety Initiatives/Action (7.5%) 
 Protect of Utility Services (5%) 
Value (30%)  Productivity (12%) 
 Construction Quality (9%) 
 Innovations (9%) 
Our Team (15%)  Alignment & Involvement of Team (7.5%) 
 Wellbeing Initiatives (3.75%) 
 Developing a Skilled Workforce (3.75%) 
Customer Satisfaction (20%)  Community & Stakeholder satisfaction with Product (8%) 
 Community & Stakeholder satisfaction with communication (8%) 
 Planning & Execution of Communication Strategies (4%) 
Environment (10%)  Construction Culture & Incident/hazard reports (6%) 
 Waste Minimization (4%) 
 
Dispute Resolution Policies 
The use of “no blame/no disputes” clauses has been recognized as an important factor to 
promote a collaborative environment with open and honest communication among alliance 
participants (Gransberg et al. 2015b; Rowlinson 2006). These provisions usually state that “there 
will be no arbitration or litigation between the Participants on any Alliance Disagreement [and] 
Each of the Participants waives its rights of action against each of the other Participants arising 
out of any act or omission in connection with this PAA (Project Alliance Agreement)” 
(Rowlinson 2006).  
Although the use of binding “no sue” provisions is not authorized by the FAR (Gransberg 
et al. 2015b), and despite the fact that some people in the US construction industry may disagree 
with the use of these clauses, multiple award IDIQ contracts seem to be one step closer to this 
philosophy. Even though MATOC participants do not waive their rights to sue, the FAR imposes 
some post-award limitations on these rights. No protests are allowed in regard to the issuance or 
proposed issuance of a task order (FAR 2005). Protests are mainly limited to deviations on the 
scope of work or increments in the duration or maximum value of the contract. In addition to 
these restrictions, an analysis of 76 legal cases associated to federal IDIQ contracts has shown 
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that this mechanism “has produced a defensible contract form and associated procurement and 
administration processes as evidenced by the finding that the majority of IDIQ protests and 
claims are settled in favor of the government” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Thus, the low risk of 
protest related to this contracting method suggests that this could be a good place to start any 
potential future initiative towards a “no blame/no disputes” philosophy.                  
 
Early Contractor Involvement 
The ability to obtain early constructability reviews during planning and design activities 
has been identified as an important contribution of collaborative alliancing techniques. Having a 
pool of construction teams established before the development of the scope of work of all 
alliance projects allows the earliest possible contractor involvement. The construction industry 
worldwide seems to agree that “the ECI approach increases the opportunity for better 
relationships among the parties, which assist the design process from contractor’s input and 
eventually lead to successful delivery of the project” (Rahman and Alhassan 2012). The 
construction industry in the US seems to be engaged with the development of contracting 
practices that allow ECI. It can be seen ECI, at different levels, in the use of DB and CMGC and 
in some alternative contracting approaches such as alternative technical concepts (ATCs). 
However, in these cases, the earliest possible moment during the preconstruction period to bring 
in the contractors’ input is tied to the award of the contract, which usually occurs after some 
planning, programming, and design efforts by the owner. Rather than detracting from the value 
of the ECI provided by alternative delivery methods currently in use in the US, the latter 
statement is intended to argue that ECI benefits are enhanced in collaborative alliance 
agreements. 
Some may argue that MATOCs provide an opportunity for ECI at the similar level as 
collaborative alliance agreements since construction firms are selected before the development of 
the task orders. However, the typical adversarial relationships between contracting parties in this 
contracts makes it difficult for public owners to handle input from multiple contractors while 
maintaining the sense of transparency and equity among awardees (Gransberg et al. 2015a). A 
single award IDIQ contract may be more suitable for the application of alliance-like ECI 
practices, but it would require the creation of an integrating environment that promotes 
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collaboration, mutual trust, and open communication among all contracting parties; a scenario 
that is not commonly seen in the US construction industry. 
 Although ECI benefits in multiple award IDIQ contracts may be enhanced through the 
use of alternative contracting methods, such as DB, CMGC, and ATCs, the value added at the 
project level would not substantially differ from the benefits obtained by applying these 
alternative contracting methods in non-IDIQ projects (Gransberg et al. 2015a).        
 
Incentive and Disincentive Provisions 
There is a great similarity in the way how the AFCAP IV and SCIRT incentivize 
contractors to provide an outstanding performance on each project. This study identified in both 
case studies two methods to compensate or penalize contractors for exceeding of failing to meet 
expectations stated in terms of costs and technical execution. 
The first method consists in the use of gainshare/painshare schemes where “the profit of 
the parties would be reduced in the case that the Project Target Cost is exceeded and increased in 
the case where the actual costs are less than Project Target Cost, in accordance with agreed 
formulae” (ACA 1999). While in the AFCAP IV the use of this scheme is limited to the issuance 
of FPIF and CPIF task orders, in the SCIRT it is applicable to all work performed under the 
alliance agreement. 
The second incentive/disincentive mechanism refers to the ability of these contracting 
methods to incorporate past performance measurements into the assignation for future work 
under the contract. As mentioned above, the assignation of future projects to a construction team 
may be heavily affected by its poor performance in previous projects. In the AFCAP IV, this 
mechanism is introduced as one of the selection factors, whose relevance in project placement 
procedures would depend on the weighting assigned by the contracting officer to each selection 
factor. On the other hand, KPIs (cost and non-cost) indicators correspond to the only criterion for 
the distribution of work under the collaborative alliance.   
 
Documented Advantages 
Table 7 presents some documented advantages associated to each of the two contracting 
systems discussed in this paper. It evident from Table 7 that the SCIRT offers more advantages 
than the AFCAP VI. It is important to mention that Table 7 is not intended to state that MATOCs 
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do not offer value-for-money. This box was not checked because this is an aspect that has not 
been appropriately addressed in the literature. Information in Table 7 was mainly obtained from 
an interim report published by the SCIRT (2014), a National Cooperative Highway Research 
Program (NCHRP) Synthesis about alliance contracting practice (Gransberg et al. 2015b) and an 
NCHRP Synthesis about IDIQ practices (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
         
 
TABLE 7 Documented Advantages in the AFCAP and SCIRT 
Advantage AFCAP IV SCIRT 
Useful to manage complex projects with broad scopes of work   
Allow quick under emergency situations    
Offer Value-for-Money   
Reduce project delivery period   
Flexibility in quantity and delivery scheduling   
Optimize use of public resources   
Simplicity of decision making framework   
Use of “no disputes” provisions   
  
The last two advantages listed in Table 7 are directly related to the highly integrated 
environment created by a collaborative alliance. Therefore, and despite the flexibility of the 
AFCAP IV, it is unlikely that these two benefits can be offered by a MATOC without a 
substantial change in the UD federal contracting regulations allowing the adoption a “we all win 
or we all lose” philosophy.  
         
Discussion 
Despite the absence of “no sue” provisions in the AFCAP IV and the clear adversarial 
relationship among contracting parties, the previous sections have highlighted several similarities 
among the AFCAP IV and the SCIRT. These similarities correspond to their ability to manage 
complex scopes of work, their operational configuration using multiple contractors for the 
execution of multiple projects, and their incentive and disincentive provisions. Although not as 
extensively applied as in SCIRT, ECI practices have also be used to add value to multiple award 
IDIQ contracts. Additionally, the paper has shown that the AFCAP IV shares most of the 
principal benefits provided by a collaborative alliance agreement. It means that US federal 
agencies have procurement tools flexible enough to emulate the logistical capabilities of the 
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provided by a collaborative alliance. However, this conclusion must not discourage US policy 
makers from seeking options to increase the level of integration among contracting parties. The 
value of alliance-like contracting approaches has been widely proven in the literature. It should 
be noted that this study compares the benefits provided by both case studies in a general manner 
without comparing the magnitude of their impacts. The superiority of the SCIRT over the 
AFCAP in some point of comparisons (i.e. ECI practices, “no disputes” approach, and efficiency 
of decision making procedures), added to the positive attitude of most researchers towards the 
use of alliancing contracting, allows the authors to reasonably conclude that an eventual 
implementation of collaborative alliancing in the US may enhance the already remarkable 
capabilities of the AFCAP and other similar contracts.              
 
Conclusions  
The main objective of this paper was to determine if despite the banning imposed by the 
FAR on the use of some alliancing-related contracting elements, US federal agencies agency 
have procurement tools to obtain most of the benefits frequently attributed to alliance agreement. 
Thus, the authors compared the AFCAP, and MATOC awarded by DoD, and the SCIFT, a 
collaborative alliance agreement formed for the reconstruction of public infrastructure assets 
after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. These case studies were compare on five 
different aspects: (1) general procurement and administration procedures, (2) dispute resolution 
policies, (3) early contractor involvement (ECI), (4) incentive and disincentive provisions, and 
(5) documented advantages. The authors found several similarities in all these aspects. The main 
difference found between these two contracting approaches is related to the absence of “no 
blame/no disputes” clauses in the AFCAP. However, it may be argued that the limitations stated 
by the FAR to the ability to file protests in multiple award IDIQ contracts reduce de need “no 
sue” provisions in these type of contracts. Ultimately, the authors concluded that regardless of 
the absence of “no sue” provisions in major infrastructure projects executed by US federal public 
owners, and despite the typical adversarial relationships among contracting participants, these 
agencies have the procurements mechanisms to accrue most of the benefits provided by a 
collaborative alliance 
 
  
42 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
SUITABILITY ANALYSIS OF EXISTING CONSTRUCTION COST INDEXES FOR 
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS  
 
Rueda-Benavides, J.A., and D.D. Gransberg, “Suitability Analysis of Existing Construction Cost 
Indexes for Minnesota Department of Transportation Construction Projects,” 2015 
Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers, Paper 15-2293, 
National Academies, January 2015, Session 237, 16 pp.  
 
Abstract 
The suitability analysis presented in this paper was conducted during the development of 
an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) implementation guide for the Minnesota 
Department of Transportation (MnDOT) in an effort to find a fair and equitable approach to 
adjust unit prices in multi-year, single award, IDIQ contracts. However, this analysis is not 
restricted to contracts executed using IDIQ alone. This study compares the ability of several 
composite Construction Cost Indexes (CCIs) to reasonably estimate actual overall cost changes 
in MnDOT highway construction projects. The paper presents a qualitative analysis of general 
principles and assumptions associated with the development, maintenance, and use of CCIs. This 
analysis highlights the mismatch and lack of proportionality between CCI components and actual 
project activities as factors that hinder the efficient use of CCIs. The paper also presents a 
statistical analysis of twelve different composite indexes, including one published and 
maintained by MnDOT. All indexes were applied to four different types of projects over a five-
year period. The paper concludes that MnDOT should develop an alternative price escalation 
method since all CCIs yielded values significantly different to those observed in MnDOT 
historical bid data. 
 
Introduction 
Multi-year construction contracts require the contractor to include contingencies for 
construction cost escalation in the out-years (West et al. 2012). To mitigate that risk, public 
agencies will often include escalation clauses that are tied to a particular cost index as a means of 
sharing the risk for escalation of material, equipment, and labor costs over the life of the contract 
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(Gransberg and Riemer 2009). This issue is particularly important to address in contracts such as 
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts where options to extend the contract 
beyond its initial term are routinely included (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). Without such a 
contractual mechanism, the pricing proposed by competing contractors could be so high that 
these contracts may not be able to be awarded. Therefore, the objective of this study is to 
evaluate the suite of available construction cost indexes (CCI) and determine their suitability for 
use in multi-year construction contracts. Specifically, the analysis reported herein will be 
conducted using the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) as the case study 
agency. 
Initially, index numbers were only used in an economic context to measure changes in 
the value of the money (purchasing power) (Fisher 1922; Allen 1975), starting with a simple 
(non-weighted) arithmetic index proposed by Carli in 1766 (Fisher 1922; Walsh 1901). 
Specifically, the first indexes were mainly intended to measure changes in the stock market, 
wholesale/retail prices, and wages (Fisher 1922). It was not until the early ‘20s that this practice 
started to be used by the construction industry (Fisher 1922). An example of this is the Aberthaw 
Index, which measured changes in the construction costs on a standard seven-story reinforced 
concrete factory building, and whose initial index number dates from 1914 (Hubbard 1921; Gill 
1933). Nowadays it is possible to find several construction-related indexes intended to measure 
changes in factors other than money, such as quality (Lee 2013), safety (Du 2013), and 
sustainability indexes (Olson 2013). However, the original purpose of this mathematical 
instrument seems to be preserved with a wide use of CCIs to either forecast future construction 
costs or to adjust unit prices in long-term contracts. 
 Originally, this study was conducted to determine the suitability of twelve different 
composite CCIs for the adjustment of unit prices in multi-year single award IDIQ contracts 
executed by the MnDOT. However, the approach used to carry out the suitability analysis is 
designed to determine how well each CCI represents actual overall cost changes in MnDOT 
highway construction projects regardless of the procurement approach used. Initially, this paper 
presents a general assessment of some common assumptions made by public owners when using 
CCIs to adjust contract unit prices over time. The discussion at this point is mainly centered on 
two key aspects defined in this paper as the matching and proportionality principles, which seem 
to be severely violated when attempting to use a one-size-fits-all index to adjust all unit prices in 
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contracts for any type of work. Although it was found that in traditionally procured contracts 
state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) tend to adjust only some selected items using 
specific indexes for them (Skolnik 2011), the appearance of alternative procurement approaches, 
such as IDIQ techniques, demands for the development of mechanisms that allow the integral 
price adjustment of the contract in order to reduce the greater uncertainty inherent to these 
techniques (Rueda 2013). The use of a single CCI to adjust all unit prices in a construction 
contract has been observed in IDIQs awarded by some state transportation agencies such as 
Florida and New York State DOTs (Gransberg and Riemer 2009). 
 A second part of the paper presents a statistical analysis conducted to measure the 
accuracy of twelve different CCIs, including one published and maintained by MnDOT, to adjust 
prices in different types of construction projects executed by this agency. Likewise, this analysis 
is used to challenge some of the assumptions and validate some findings presented in the paper. 
All indexes were applied to four different sample projects during a five-year period and their 
accuracy was determined by comparing adjusted prices with actual bid prices observed during 
the same period of time. Each of these sample projects is intended to resemble a different type of 
work commonly procured by MnDOT: asphalt pavement, concrete pavement, traffic barriers, 
and drainage. Actual unit prices for these sample projects at various stages during the five-year 
period represent average values for each pay item calculated by using MnDOT historical bid 
data. Historical data used to build the sample projects consists of price proposals from 1,361 
contracts awarded by MnDOT, which corresponds to all contracts awarded by this agency during 
this period of time. 
 Most authors agree that by definition the accuracy of index numbers is an abstract 
concept (Fisher 1922; Allen 1975; Edgeworth 1925; Afrait and Milana 1984; Hansen 1984; 
Samuelson 1974), unless they are used as a variation indicator of a magnitude that can be exactly 
measured. In the case of CCIs, there is not a true number to indicate cost changes in the 
construction industry for a particular region or a given commodity over time. This is evident 
when considering that a variety of widely accepted index formulas yield different values using 
the same input data (Fisher 1922) and the fact that different contractors bid different price 
proposals for the same contract in accordance with their pricing systems. However, it does not 
mean that a public owner cannot evaluate the economic impact that the use of a given CCIs 
would have on the agency or its contractors. In this study, the impact was determined by 
45 
 
  
comparing CCI-adjusted contract costs with the average costs for the same contract obtained by 
using observed bid unit prices. Thus, a CCI-adjusted cost above the average cost means that the 
agency could obtain a more advantageous project cost if awarded or the remaining portion of the 
contract to a new low bidder.  
 This paper uses the ‘one-sample t-test’ to draw conclusions regarding the suitability of 
the twelve evaluated CCIs, yielding values significantly different from the average values 
obtained from MnDOT historical bid data.  
  
Background 
Price indexing literature in the transportation industry is mainly focused on the use of 
CCIs for risk management purposes and to forecast project costs in an attempt to develop more 
accurate estimates. Situations under which CCIs are commonly used as rough indicators. Much 
has been written about the development, implementation, and use of different CCI forecasting 
approaches using different types of techniques such as time series, multiple regression, and 
neural network models (Hanna and Blair 1993; Touran and Lopez 2006; Williams 1994; 
Shandashti 2013). Conversely, little research has been done on effective practices for the use of 
CCIs in price adjustment clauses in highway construction projects and the economic impact of 
these clauses on transportation agencies and contractors. The lack of information on this matter 
was also an issue highlighted by Skolnik in 2011 on a final report for a research project 
conducted on price indexing practices adopted by state DOTs (Skolnik 2011). 
 This study found several criteria for the classification of price indexes. Some of these 
criteria are the mathematical model (e.g. arithmetic, geometric, aggregative), index composition 
and configuration (e.g. simple or unweighted, weighted, composite), frequency of publication 
(e.g. monthly, quarterly, annual), and scope or location(s) (e.g. national, local) (Fisher 1922; 
Allen 1975; Rueda 2013). CCIs may be also classified as input or output cost indexes. Input 
indexes measure the price change in one or more construction components or materials, while 
output indexes indicate observed changes in construction prices, including general costs, 
overhead, profit, risk, and other possible external factors (FHWA 2013; Caltrans 2013). Some of 
the index characteristics mentioned in this chapter are used later in this paper to describe each of 
the twelve evaluated CCIs. 
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 Figure 11 presents a classification of CCIs in accordance with their usage. This 
classification was proposed by the authors to provide readers a better understanding of the 
indexes analyzed and mentioned in the paper. While indexes in Tier 1, which are aimed to adjust 
prices of specific commodities (e.g. fuel, asphalt, cement, steel), are mainly used for price 
adjustment purposes (Skolnik 2011), those in Tiers 2 and 3 are commonly intended to forecast 
total construction costs (Touran 2006; Williams 1994; Shahandashti 2013). Nonetheless, the 
incorporation of single award IDIQ techniques into the alternative contracting method toolbox of 
state DOTs represents a drastic change in this conception. Basically, the principal objective of 
this paper is to find an index in Tier 2 that allows fair and equitable price adjustments in MnDOT 
construction projects. 
 
Commodity A Commodity B Commodity C Commodity D
Building CCI  Highway CCI
General CCI
Tier 3
Overall price change in the 
construction market
Tier 2
Price changes in specific sectors           
of the construction industry
Tier 1
Price changes in specific    
construction-related commodities 
Construction Cost Index (CCI) Classification by Usage
 
FIGURE 11 Construction cost index classification by usage.  
 
 Skolnik found that at least 47 state Departments of Transportation (DOTs) (94%) utilize 
price adjustment clauses using CCIs for one or more construction-related commodities (Skolnik 
2011). On the other hand, the use of general, building, and highway CCIs (see Figure 11) to 
forecast construction costs seems to be a common practice for owners and contractors (Touran 
2006; Williams 1994; Shahandashti 2013). The wide usage of CCIs and the lack of research on 
their effectiveness to measure changes in construction prices over time suggest that a satisfactory 
accuracy of these indexes has been taken for granted, which may be reconsidered in the light of 
the results obtained in this study.  
 
47 
 
  
Construction Cost Index Definition 
By definition, “[a]n index number of prices […] shows the average percentage change of 
prices from point of time to another” (Fisher 1922). Thus, for the purposes of this paper, a CCI is 
defined as an indicator of the average cost movement over time of the construction market, 
specific sectors of the construction industry, or specific construction-related commodities. 
Additionally, it is important to note that all CCIs evaluated in this study are composite weighted 
indexes. It means that these indexes are built up by combining observed cost changes in a few 
significant commodities in accordance with fixed or variable weights associated to each of them.  
 
Methodology 
As mentioned before, this study is part of a larger research project conducted for MnDOT 
aimed to develop an IDIQ implementation guide. Information used for the development of this 
guide was gathered using a number of different research instruments including a comprehensive 
literature review complemented with a detailed content analysis of contract documents, structure 
interviews for the analysis of four case studies, and survey responses from different contract 
participants.  
        
Data Collection, Processing, and Analysis   
 In order to determine the suitability of price adjustment procedures by using CCIs, twelve 
selected indexes, including one published and maintained by MnDOT (not used on IDIQ 
contracts), were applied to four different types of projects over a five-year period, from July 1, 
2008 to July 1, 2013. Unit prices on these four sample projects were adjusted on an annual basis, 
and the results of these adjustments were compared with actual observed prices of the same 
construction activities during the same period of time. Historical bid data used to build up all 
sample projects was shaped into a three-dimensional arrangement based on the pay item 
identification number, letting date, and bid quantity.  
 The types of projects selected for this study are asphalt pavement, concrete pavement, 
traffic barriers and drainage projects. The selection, scoping, and pricing of sample projects for 
these four types of contracts, was conducted following the steps below:   
 Identify types of projects commonly awarded by MnDOT. 
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 From MnDOT historical bid data, select a sample project for each type of contract 
identified in the previous step, in which the most representative items must be 
characteristic of its category. 
 Discard those items whose units are not precisely defined (e.g. each, lump-sum), and 
keep those with consistent and specific characteristics that allow a price comparison over 
time.  
 Determine the participation (%) of each pay item on the total cost of each sample project 
and discard irrelevant pay items that do not have a high impact on the final cost of the 
projects. 
 After checking frequency of occurrence of each pay item in the historical bid data, 
replace those pay items with low frequency by more repetitive similar items whose price 
change over time would be easier to track. 
 Assign the same final total cost to all four sample projects, $1.5 million, which will 
represent the total cost for all projects if performed during the first year. Then, adjust the 
extended price of each pay item (quantity times unit price) in order to keep the same 
proportions of the original contract. Thus, if two different types of asphalt were replaced 
by a type of asphalt that is more commonly used by MnDOT, its participation in the 
project (%) must be equal to the sum of the participation of both discarded pay items. 
There is no specific reason for the selection of $1.5 million as the base total cost (from 
July 1, 2008 to July 1, 2009) for all projects. It is irrelevant to the goals of the study. Regardless 
of its value, it is important to have the same base total cost for all sample projects since it makes 
it easier to compare the impact of the same index on different types of contracts. Quantities and 
unit prices are also irrelevant for the sample projects, since price changes of each pay item will 
be applied to its extended price rather than to its unit price. 
Since a deeper analysis on each pay item on the sample projects indicates that units prices 
in all pay items are inversely proportional to the bid quantity, except in one case (2501603/00124 
Lining Culvert Pipe 24”) in which no relation was found between unit prices and quantity, and 
given that average bid quantities on a single pay item may vary from period to period, it was 
necessary to arrange all recorded bid prices in groups of similar work quantities. Bid quantity 
ranges for each pay item were determined based on the distribution of the bids on a scatter plot 
and the average largest variation between the lowest and largest bids received for the same item 
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for the same contract at the same moment. In other words, this average variation may be 
understood as the average maximum difference between two bids for the same pay item and 
quantity. Figure 12 and Table 8 illustrate the process followed to define the bid quantity ranges 
for a given pay item and the estimation of average unit prices for that item in six-month intervals, 
respectively.  
 
FIGURE 12 Sawing Bituminous Pavement – bid range determination. 
 
TABLE 8 Sawing Bituminous Pavement – Average Unit Price 
Sawing Bituminous Pavement (Full Depth) – Average Unit Price ($/LF) 
                           Time             
 
Quantity (LF) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Jul. 1st 
Apr-Sep 
Jan. 1st 
Oct-Mar 
Jul. 1st 
Apr-Sep 
Jan. 1st 
Oct-Mar 
Jul. 1st 
Apr-Sep 
Jan. 1st 
Oct-Mar 
Jul. 1st 
Apr-Sep 
Jan. 1st 
Oct-Mar 
Jul. 1st 
Apr-Sep 
Jan. 1st 
Oct-Mar 
Jul. 1st 
Apr-Sep 
Range 1  (50 -1,250) $3.24 $3.68 $3.51 $3.71 $3.34 $4.28 $3.83 $3.67 $3.84 $4.54 $4.05 
Range 2  (1,250-31,500) $1.96 $1.98 $1.76 $2.04 $2.00 $1.91 $2.21 $2.11 $2.05 $2.06 $2.10 
 
As will be presented later in this paper, sample projects were adjusted on an annual basis 
since this is a common timeframe used to adjust construction prices. Adjustments in the actual 
total costs of all pay items were performed in six-month intervals. It was made with the intention 
of observing the behavior of the prices between adjustment dates. Actual prices in sample 
projects were estimated each year on January 1st and July 1st, from July 2008 to July 2013. 
Thus, bid unit prices recorded by MnDOT between October and March were used to estimate 
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average unit prices on January 1st and those between April and September were used to estimate 
average unit prices on July 1st (see Table 8). 
The variation in the unit price of each pay item was calculated by computing the 
arithmetic average of the variations of each quantity range between two periods of time, as 
shown in the Equation 3. In order to calculate the unit price variation between two periods in a 
single quantity range, both periods must contain an average price; otherwise, this quantity range 
is not considered to estimate the final price variation. This happens when a pay item is not used 
during a given period. Equation 3 shows the calculation of the variation between July 1st 2008 
and January 1st 2009 for the pay item presented in Table 8. 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 1+𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 2
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠
=
$3.24+$3.68
2
+
$1.96+$1.98
2
2
= $2.71                     eq.3 
        
In an effort to discard unbalance bids, those bids with unit prices equal to $0.00 (zero) 
were excluded from the study. Likewise, outliers were removed from the data by applying the 
modified Z-score method on each quantity range on an annual basis. This outlier identification 
method was selected given that it is more suitable for small samples (Iglewicz and Hoaglin 
1993), which was the case of some quantity ranges in this study. To use only commonly 
procured work quantities in the study, the five percent lowest quantities were discarded and 
quantity ranges were determined until at least 90% of the observations were covered (see Figure 
12). 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
Cost Indexing Practices - Qualitative Analysis 
 Table 9 presents a description of the twelve indexes used in this study, whose use has 
been widely recognized in the building and highway construction industry. This table indicates 
the components used by each cost index, scope of each index based on the area covered by their 
periodical publications, frequency of publication, and type of index (input or output index). Four 
building CCIs were used in this study. The remaining eight correspond to CCIs commonly used 
on highway construction contracts, and others developed by three different state DOT agencies.  
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TABLE 9 Building and Highway Construction Cost Indexes    
INDEX COMPONENTS SCOPE FREQUENCY TYPE 
Building Construction 
RsMeans: 
Construction Cost 
Index (CCI)         
(National & Local) 
 9 types of buildings 
- 66 construction materials 
- Wage rates for 21 different trades 
- 6 types of construction equipment  
 National: 30-city 
average 
 Local: 318 cities  
 Quarterly Input 
Engineering News 
Record: Building Cost 
Index (BCI)       
(National & Local) 
 Cement 
 Structural Steel 
 Lumber 
 Labor 
 National: 20-city 
average 
 Local: 20 cities 
 Monthly Input 
Highway Construction 
Engineering News 
Record: Construction 
Cost Index (CCI)      
(National & Local) 
 Cement 
 Structural Steel 
 Lumber 
 Labor 
 National: 20-city 
average 
 Local: 20 cities 
 Monthly Input 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics: Producer 
Price Index (PPI) – 
Highway and Street 
Construction (BHWY) 
& Other Non-
Residential 
Construction (BONS) 
 BHWY: Material and supply inputs 
for highway and street construction 
 BONS: Material and supply inputs 
for construction related to: 
- Water and sewer lines 
- Oil and gas pipelines 
- Power and communication lines 
- Highway, street and bridge 
construction 
- Flood control 
 National  Monthly Input 
U.S. Federal Highway 
Administration: 
National Highway 
Construction Cost 
Index (NHCCI)  
 Pay items with constant price-
determining characteristics from 45 
U.S. states 
 National  Quarterly Output 
California Department 
of Transportation: 
Price Index for 
Selected Highway 
Construction Items 
(Quarterly & Annual) 
 Roadway excavation 
 Aggregate base 
 Asphalt concrete pavement 
 Portland cement concrete 
(Pavement) 
 Portland cement concrete (Structure) 
 Bar reinforcing steel 
 Structural steel 
 California  Quarterly 
 Last 12 months 
Output 
South Dakota 
Department of 
Transportation: 
Construction Cost 
Index (CCI) 
 Unclassified excavation 
 Liquid asphalt 
 Asphalt concrete 
 Gravel cushion (sub-base and base) 
 Portland cement concrete pavement 
 Class A concrete (structures) 
 Reinforcing steel  
 Structural Steel 
 South Dakota  Annual Output 
Minnesota Department 
of Transportation: 
Construction 
Composite Cost Index 
 Excavation Index 
- Excavation 
 Structures Index 
- Reinforcing steel 
- Structural steel 
- Structural concrete 
 Surfacing Index 
- Bituminous pavement 
- Concrete Pavement 
 Minnesota  Quarterly 
 Annual 
Output 
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Cost Indexing Principles and Assumptions 
Economics and statistics literature mention several parameters that should be met in order 
to validate the applicability of an index. For instance; although his work has been strongly 
questioned by other authors (Eichhorn 1976; Swamy 1965), Fisher proposed seven different 
statistical tests (not discussed in this paper) to measure different properties of price indexes to 
determine their appropriateness (Fisher 1922; Allen 1975; Hansen 1984). Although most authors 
discuss issues that may result in inaccurate index numbers, they are mainly associated with the 
construction and maintenance process of the indexes. For example; Allen highlights three 
different causes for these issues; wrong choice of the index formula, errors of measurement, and 
sampling errors (Allen 1975). These issues may be addressed by an appropriate selection and 
application of an index formula and the implementation of effective data collection techniques. 
Therefore, this study is mainly focused on conceptual issues related to an incorrect interpretation 
of the price index theory by state DOTs. The principal misconception issues identified by the 
authors are related to the mismatch and lack of proportionality between CCI components and 
actual project activities, which are referred to in this paper as the matching and proportionality 
principles. 
 The matching principle refers to the degree of similarity between the commodities used 
for the calculation of index numbers and the actual project activities in CCI-adjusted contracts. 
The probability principle appears once the matching principle has been fairly met. It refers to the 
degree of consistency between the weights of index components and the actual contribution of 
these components to the total cost of CCI-adjusted contracts. Thus, a perfect application of a CCI 
(unlikely situation) implies that each pay item in a given CCI-adjusted contract is represented by 
one commodity in the CCI and the weights used in the calculation of the index numbers are 
exactly proportional to the contribution of their respective pay items to the total project cost. In 
this case, all discrepancies between adjusted and actual costs could be attributed to the three 
types of issues mentioned by Allen. It should be noted that a violation of the first principle 
implies a violation of the second one.              
 The principles mentioned above have been somehow referred to by other authors, who 
agree that perfectly consistent indexes are an unrealistic goal (Fisher 1922; Allen 1975; Hansen 
1984). Below are listed some common assumptions identified in this study related to the use of 
CCIs to integrally adjust contract prices. The first two assumptions present the strongest 
53 
 
  
violation to these principles. Basically, an agency decides to use a single CCI as the 
representation of an overall cost variation in the construction industry and apply this single index 
to adjust prices in different types of projects (assumption 1), making it impossible to match 
commodities and pay items in all potential CCI-adjusted contracts. Then, the agency selects a 
few significant materials, and using fixed or variable weights, calculates this single index 
(assumption 2). The latest statement entails a violation of both principles since not all contracts 
share the same pay items, and even if they do, they would not be equally included (contributing 
same % of total project costs) in all contracts.          
1. Changes in the construction market from period to period have equal or similar impact on 
all kind of construction projects. 
2. Weighted price changes between construction periods in a few significant materials or 
construction components represent an overall construction cost change during the same 
period of time.  
3. Steady quality and production rates over time in construction materials and activities.  
4. Construction prices for the oncoming period follow a trend marked between the base 
period (at letting date) and the last period with known index. 
As mentioned before, the authors do not expect agencies to develop and/or implement 
CCIs that perfectly comply with the matching and probability principles. Therefore, the problem 
now is to determine how much a price adjustment method, using a CCI, can deviate from these 
principles, and how to measure this deviation. The statistical analysis presented in the remaining 
part of this paper is intended to solve these two problems. The evaluation of different CCIs, 
including some published by organizations with several decades of experience in this matter (e.g. 
BLS, ENR, RsMeans), mitigates the risk of errors due to the three types of issues mentioned by 
Allen. Thus, this study assumes that all variations obtained in the next section between CCI-
adjusted prices and actual observed prices are the result of inconsistencies between the index 
commodities and contract pay items. On the other hand, the one-sample t-test was used as an 
instrument to determine the significance of these variations, providing a better interpretation of 
the results. It can be considered that those indexes that showed significant different price 
changes, than those actually observed in MnDOT historical bid data, deviated too much from the 
matching and probability principles and their use should be carefully considered by this agency. 
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Assumption 3 is not discussed in this paper. However, variations in labor productivity 
and quality rates are common issues in the construction industry. Several authors have studied 
different causes and consequences of these variations and have proposed techniques to mitigate 
owners’ risk in relation to this matter (Halligan et al. 1994; Abdel-Razek et al. 2007; Rosen 
1983). Thus, any agency efforts to reduce uncertainty in labor productivity and quality rates 
would help to mitigate the negative impact of this assumption. 
Assumption 4 is related to the fact that unit prices are adjusted using indexes that 
correspond to two previous periods. In other words, next year prices are expected to follow the 
trend set by two previous indexes, preventing the agency from considering multiple potential 
factors that may impact the continuity of this trend.                                       
  
Cost Indexing Practices - Statistical Analysis 
Before comparing the impact of different CCIs on the four sample projects, the actual 
costs of these projects were calculated on six-month intervals and compared with each other. 
Figure 13 illustrates these costs for the five-year period comprised in this study. A five-year 
period was selected based on the fact that this is the largest possible contract period (base 
contract period + contract extensions) in IDIQ contracts already awarded by MnDOT. 
 
 
FIGURE 13 Actual project costs of sample projects – state average. 
 
Figure 13 challenges assumptions 1 and 2 stated before regarding the use of CCIs to 
adjust contract prices. This figure shows how distinct types of projects are differently impacted 
by changes in the construction market during the same period of time. For instance, asphalt 
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pavement projects present a higher volatility, while drainage projects show a seasonal behavior 
due to their cyclical variations. Only once during the ten six-month periods all the variations 
followed the same direction (project costs in all sample projects increased between January and 
July 2011).    
Table 10 shows absolute average variations between CCI-adjusted costs and actual 
observed costs (|1-(adjusted cost/actual cost)|). This table allows a comparison between different 
CCIs performances, providing a general idea of the accuracy of each index. 
 
TABLE 10 Average Variation pre Index and Type of Project  
Cost Indexes 
Average Variation (+/-) 
Asphalt 
Pavement 
Concrete 
Pavement 
Traffic 
Barriers 
Drainage 
Average 
per 
Index 
Building Construction Indexes 
(National) 
        
 
RSMeans - CCI (National) 18.82% 7.93% 6.44% 10.83% 11.00% 
ENR - BCI (National) 18.76% 8.07% 10.25% 10.28% 11.84% 
Average per Type of Project 18.79% 8.00% 8.34% 10.56% - 
Highway Construction Indexes      
ENR - CCI (National) 17.20% 7.72% 11.07% 9.30% 11.32% 
BLS – PPI 26.98% 16.54% 10.62% 17.52% 17.91% 
NHCCI 33.83% 25.16% 20.94% 26.41% 26.58% 
Caltrans (Quarterly) 30.12% 19.96% 26.47% 21.90% 24.61% 
Caltrans (12-M) 27.06% 17.59% 20.56% 18.94% 21.04% 
SDDOT 16.96% 6.48% 12.38% 8.15% 10.99% 
Average per Type of Project 25.36% 15.58% 17.01% 17.04% - 
Minnesota & Minneapolis Indexes      
RSMeans - CCI (Minneapolis) 18.33% 7.63% 11.02% 10.61% 11.90% 
ENR - BCI (Minneapolis) 19.96% 9.40% 9.96% 10.76% 12.52% 
ENR - CCI (Minneapolis) 20.34% 9.46% 10.26% 11.21% 12.82% 
MnDOT - CCI 18.09% 5.50% 12.92% 10.19% 11.68% 
Average per Type of Project 19.18% 8.00% 11.04% 10.69% - 
 
The following observations and conclusions were drawn from a deeper analysis of Table 
10. It is important to note that these observations only apply to MnDOT and the five-year period 
comprised in this study: 
 Unexpectedly, those national construction indexes commonly used to adjust contract 
prices in building construction projects (RSMeans and BCI) presented an overall closer 
relation to actual price changes in MnDOT construction projects. 
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 Regardless of the kind of CCI (building or highway) and the national or local coverage of 
the indexes, these CCIs seem to work best in concrete pavement contracts. Nine out of 
the twelve indexes showed a lower average variation in concrete pavement projects.  
 The South Dakota DOT (SDDOT) CCI showed the lowest overall variation closely 
followed by national RSMeans CCI. However, the low average in the RSMeans index 
seems to be consequence of its considerably low variation in traffic barrier projects. If 
removing the traffic barrier sample project from the study, SDDOT CCI average 
variation would decrease even more (10.53%) followed by the MnDOT CCI (11.26%) 
and the national ENR CCI (11.41%), and sends the RSMeans CCI to the sixth place with 
an average variation of 12.53%. 
 All CCIs presented the largest average variation in asphalt pavement projects, which is an 
important observation given that, as determined in this research, those pay items related 
to these types of projects represent the largest portion of MnDOT average annual 
construction budget (25%) for the period comprised in this study. 
 When considering the actual sign (positive or negative) of each variation, it was found 
that the use of CCIs, as part of escalation clauses, seems to represent a higher benefit for 
MnDOT while allocating more risk to the contractors. 
 In spite of the fact that MnDOT CCI did not show the lowest overall variation, this index 
presented the lowest variation for a single type of project; concrete pavement. 
Additionally, this was the only index that in the case of the concrete pavement project, 
increased when observed prices increased and decreased when they decreased.  
 
One-Sample T-Test  
The one-sample t-test was conducted following the methodology described by Boddy and 
Smith (Boddy and Smith 2009). Table 11 summarizes this statistical test, which is used to make 
objective conclusions about the accuracy of these indexes to predict changes in construction 
prices in MnDOT projects. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates the value estimated using 
that CCI is significantly different to the actual value obtained from MnDOT historical bid data. 
Therefore, it was statistically proven that none of the twelve indexes considered in this study is 
suitable for cost escalation at the project level.  
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TABLE 11 One-Sample T-Test Summary 
Null Hypothesis:  Average Variation = 0.00%   (µ = 0.00%) 
Alternative Hypothesis:  Average Variation ≠ 0.00%   (µ ≠ 0.00%) 
Significance Level = 5% 
Table Value = 3.18 
Construction Cost Indexes Test Value Conclusion 
Building Construction Indexes (National)     
RSMeans - CCI (National) 3.26 Reject Null Hypothesis 
ENR - BCI (National) 4.19 Reject Null Hypothesis 
Highway Construction Indexes    
ENR - CCI (National) 4.71 Reject Null Hypothesis 
BLS – PPI 4.33 Reject Null Hypothesis 
NHCCI 8.09 Reject Null Hypothesis 
Caltrans (Quarterly) 9.57 Reject Null Hypothesis 
Caltrans (12-M) 8.69 Reject Null Hypothesis 
SDDOT 4.18 Reject Null Hypothesis 
Minnesota & Minneapolis Indexes    
RSMeans - CCI (Minneapolis) 4.35 Reject Null Hypothesis 
ENR - BCI (Minneapolis) 4.22 Reject Null Hypothesis 
ENR - CCI (Minneapolis) 4.23 Reject Null Hypothesis 
MnDOT - CCI 3.69 Reject Null Hypothesis 
Significance Level: Probability of wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Table Value: Taken from t-distribution table. 
Test Value: (|mean – null hypothesis| x (sample size)^0.5)/sample standard deviation. 
Conclusion: Test Value > Table Value  Reject null hypothesis; 
                     Test Value < Table Value  Cannot reject null hypothesis. 
    
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Assuming that MnDOT contracting practices do not differ significantly from those 
adopted by other state DOTs, findings obtained by the qualitative and quantitative analyzes 
conducted in this paper may be seen as an indication that the great diversity in types of highway 
construction activities makes these kinds of projects bad candidates for the use of price 
adjustment clauses based on composite CCIs. It means that even if a given CCI can truly 
measure overall construction costs changes in the transportation industry, it would not be 
applicable for price adjustments at the project level. CCIs used in this study could probably be 
used as a decision-making criterion in situations that involve the transportation industry as a 
whole (or their respective construction sectors), but taking into consideration that the use of 
different indexes may lead to different decisions. The different results obtained when measuring 
changes in construction costs with different highway CCIs confirm what has been stated by 
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several authors in regard to the high uncertainty inherent in price indexing techniques. Therefore, 
MnDOT and other public owners should bear that in mind if they decide to implement these 
techniques. 
 In spite of the fact that the use of more specific indexes (e.g. liquid asphalt index, fuel 
index) to adjust one or a few specific pay items was not considered in this study, their narrower 
scope suggests a better compliance with the matching and proportionality. Although further 
research is needed to determine the effectiveness of these price indexes in escalation clauses, 
specifically focused on the economic impact of non-adjusted items, a previous study found a 
generalized acceptance of this practice by state DOTs in traditionally procured contracts. 
Nonetheless, for reasons not discussed in detail in this study, this approach would not fulfill the 
specific price escalation requirements of multi-year single award IDIQ contracts. Previous 
research found that IDIQ techniques require the implementation of escalation clauses that allow 
an integral adjustment of contract prices over time. In view of the results obtained by the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis presented in this paper, the authors recommend MnDOT to 
conduct further research intended to develop of more flexible price escalation approaches to 
adapt to the nature of each contract and with the ability to consider imminent future changes in 
the construction industry. 
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Construction and Maintenance Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracts”, 2016 
Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers, Paper 16-6287, 
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Abstract 
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracting has been used by state 
departments of transportation for decades under a wide variety of names: job order contracts, 
push-button contracts, on-call contracts, master contracts, stand-by contracts, and the list goes 
on. The common factor that makes each of these procurement methods to be generically 
classified as IDIQ agreements is their use of a single procurement transaction to advertise, 
evaluate, and award a contract that provides the capacity to execute multiple projects for a 
quantity of services or products that is not known at the time the contract is signed. The higher 
level of uncertainty resulting from the “indefinite” nature of this contracting methodology brings 
the need for a set of risk management practices that are somewhat different than those used in 
traditional procurement approaches because of the multiple, repetitive nature of IDIQ. This paper 
presents a two-part framework for IDIQ contract risk analysis. The framework suggests the use 
of several risk management strategies during the planning phase (first part) and 
monitoring/control phase (second part) of the risk analysis process. This study is the result of a 
formal content analysis of IDIQ procurement documents, policy and procedure manuals from 
public agencies and the careful examination of survey responses from different types of contract 
participants.  
 
Introduction 
“Risk is pervasive in transportation. Transportation agencies must develop explicit 
enterprise risk management strategies, methods, and tools.” (Curtis et al. 2012). In the past 
several years, state departments of transportation (DOT) and other public transportation agencies 
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have recognized the importance of formally addressing risk in the project development and 
delivery process (Gransberg and Gad 2014). However, as evidenced by the above quotation, 
most risk analysis is conducted at the project level. The advent of enterprise risk management 
seeks to elevate the process to the program level. The one gap in the literature is recognizing risk 
management as applied to Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts. IDIQ is a 
single contract with multiple projects as opposed to enterprise risk management which is 
composed of multiple projects with each having a single contract. One reason the gap exists is 
due to the size of the average DOT IDIQ work order (WO) (Rueda and Gransberg 2014b). As 
commonly applied by state public owners, IDIQ contracts are composed of a series of projects 
whose scopes are nearly identical and whose costs are comparatively low when compared to new 
construction. Nevertheless, IDIQ requires the agency to have specific risk management tools that 
are not present in a single-project/single-contract situation. A major difference is the ability for 
the agency to stop issuing new WOs due to the occurrence (or imminent occurrence) of an 
unfortunate event, such as a contractor whose quality and performance is unsatisfactory. 
In order to attain the ability to effectively terminate a problematic contract without the 
risk of protest or claim by merely not issuing any further WOs, state DOTs must deal with risk 
factors not commonly found in traditionally procured single-project contracts. Thus, this paper’s 
prime purpose is to propose a two-part framework for IDIQ contract risk assessment. The first 
part corresponds to the risk planning phase, where agency’s planners must identify potential risk 
factors and develop a Risk Management Plan (RMP). In order to assist DOTs with these two 
tasks, the authors have developed an IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet containing a series of 
risk management strategies to mitigate, avoid, or transfer the risk related to eight unfavorable 
situations associated with the use of IDIQ contracting practices. It includes some strategies 
proposed by the authors as well as others currently used by different types of government 
agencies and applicable to the transportation construction industry.  
The second part of the framework refers to the risk monitoring and control phase. This 
formalizes the possible anticipated termination of IDIQ contracts through the cessation of issuing 
WOs to eliminate the risk of an imminent or ongoing negative event. The eight risk events in the 
reference sheet are listed below: 
1. Higher than needed project administration costs and efforts. 
2. Disproportion between the number of awardees and quantity of work 
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3. Final product below minimum performance standards. 
4. Work order(s) substantially deviated from contract scope of work. 
5. Erroneous identification of the low-bid. 
6. Estimating, scheduling, and constructability errors found during construction. 
7. Unreasonable compensation of mobilization expenses. 
8. Large contingencies in price proposals due to potential cost escalation. 
 
Background 
IDIQ contracting practices were first used by the newly organized General Services 
Administration (GSA) by the Federal Property and Administrative Service Act of 1949. The 
implementation of these innovative contracting techniques was motivated by the need to 
accelerate the acquisition of supplies and services recurrently procured by federal agencies 
(GAO 1979; Matchette and Danis 1995; US Congress 1951). This method has been used for 
several decades by state and municipal agencies for the acquisition of architect-engineer and 
information technology services. However, it began to be applied to construction and 
maintenance activities only during the last ten years by state and municipal agencies in Florida, 
New York, and Missouri (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). Repetitive protests claiming that 
contracting agencies were using it to circumvent competitive bidding regulations resulted in 
multiple congress studies on different IDIQ contracts (Sandner and Snyder 2001).   
The lack of public confidence in IDIQ and other streamlined contracting approaches led 
Congress to enact the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 1994, which regulates the 
use of federal funds with these contracting techniques, making them more transparent, efficient, 
and competitive (Sandner and Snyder 2001; US Congress 1994). However, many state 
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) have found these statutes are not applicable to their IDIQ 
contracting programs due to the marked difference between contracting practices and policies 
applied at the federal and state level (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). As a result, many DOTs have 
been individually dealing with the new challenges emerging from the execution of IDIQ 
highway construction/management contracts. This has led to the implementation of different sets 
of procedures and risk management practices by each agency.  
This paper is an extension of a larger study conducted at the federal level intended to 
identify and analyze effective practices related to use of IDIQ contracting by state transportation 
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agencies. A complete report of that study is presented in the NCHRP Synthesis 473: Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracting Practices (Gransberg et al. 2015a). In NCHRP 
Synthesis 473 the authors concluded that IDIQ techniques can be used “on virtually all types of 
work as their scope comprises frequently required tasks” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). For this to be 
effective, DOTs need to implement flexible policies that allow for the adjustment of contracting 
procedures to incorporate different sets of risk management strategies based on the scope and 
size of the contract as well as the IDIQ model to be used (Gransberg et al. 2015a).  
 
Motivation 
The high uncertainty inherent in IDIQ contracting has forced contractors to adopt a risk 
profile that is fundamentally different from the one assumed when preparing a proposal for a 
traditionally procured contract (Farris 2002). Contractors participating in this study stated that 
they perceived IDIQ contracting as a high risk procurement mechanism in comparison with 
traditional approaches. Nonetheless, they were also clear at stating that this negative perception 
was not enough to prevent them from bidding IDIQ contracts since this higher risk is mitigated 
by including larger contingencies in the price proposals. This has resulted in DOTs requiring to 
develop and implement effective practices to reduce the uncertainty and risk contained in IDIQ 
contracts (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
Transportation agencies seem to be fully aware of the negative perception of IDIQ 
techniques (in terms of risk) among contractors and the effect that it may be having on price 
proposals. However, the increasing use of IDIQ contracts by DOTs suggest that the benefits 
outweigh the negative perception from contractors. These benefits include the reduction of 
project delivery periods, the flexibility in quantity and delivery scheduling, the ability to provide 
quick response under emergency situations, and the potential reduction in contract administration 
costs and efforts (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a; Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
In spite of having proven its capacity to handle large contracts with broad scopes at the 
federal level (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a; USAF 2014b), most state transportation agencies 
have relegated the use of IDIQ contracting to minor construction and simple maintenance/repair 
activities. The NCHRP Synthesis 473 (Gransberg et al. 2015a) found that, in addition to local 
regulatory restrictions, the limited use given to these contracts by DOTs is due to the lack of 
suitable tools to handle the non-traditional risk factors present in IDIQ contracts. Larger and 
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more complex contracts require the implementation of superior risk management procedures 
given the higher risk perceived by the different contract participants (Morris 2006; Touran and 
Lopez 2006). The ability of federal agencies to use IDIQ for broad and complex scopes of work 
may be explained by the mature set of procedures and policies available as a result of decades of 
experience of all US federal organizations (Rueda and Gransberg 2014b). Additionally, the 
diversified procurement practices found among state transportation agencies have hindered the 
standardization of IDIQ contracting procedures nationwide.  
A critical factor that has prevented the exchange of experiences and lessons learned 
among DOTs is the use of different contract terminology. This is unique at almost every agency. 
Using different names to refer to IDIQ contracts and WOs not only has prevented the 
comparison of policies and procedures among agencies, but also within each of these 
organizations. There are some DOTs in the process of developing IDIQ programs for 
construction and maintenance projects unware of the existence of similar programs used by other 
offices within the same agency. For example; concurrently with this study, the California DOT 
(Caltrans) was planning for the development of a Job Order Contracting (another name for IDIQ) 
program for highway construction/maintenance projects. In doing so, this agency was interested 
in analyzing similar initiatives implemented by other DOTs. Nonetheless, this study found that 
Caltrans had already been successfully executing three-year multiple award IDIQ contracts for 
the removal of underground hazardous materials under the name of multi-provider agreements. 
These agreements are intended to provide services at an “on-call and as-needed basis” (Caltrans 
2014) within different geographic regions established in the contract documents. 
By definition, an IDIQ is “the type of contract that provides for an indefinite quantity of 
supplies and/or services whose performance and delivery scheduling is determined by placing 
work orders with one or multiple contractors during a fixed period of time” (Gransberg et al. 
2015a). The list below corresponds to different terms used by various federal and state agencies 
to refer to contracting approaches that meet this definition. The recognition of the similarities 
among these types of contracts and the thorough analysis of these approaches have given the 
authors a unique perspective of the state of the practice of IDIQ contracting by public 
transportation agencies. It has allowed for an unprecedented nationwide compilation of effective 
risk management practices and the identification of opportunities for improvement applicable to 
all contracting mechanisms listed below: 
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 Task Order Contract 
 Job Order Contract 
 Delivery Order Contract 
 On-Call Contract 
 Push-Button Contract 
 Term Agreement 
 Master Contract 
 Framework Contract 
 
Fundamentals of IDIQ Contracting 
As defined above, IDIQ contracting refers to a procurement approach that allows for the 
acquisition of an indefinite quantity of supplies and/or services during a fixed period of time and 
whose delivery schedule is determined by placing WOs with one or multiple contractors 
(Gransberg et al. 2015a; Rueda 2013). The following are the definitions of three IDIQ generic 
models currently identified in previous studies. These IDIQ contracting models will be 
repeatedly mentioned throughout this paper.  
 Single Work Order IDIQ: “A single contract is awarded to single contractor. Once the 
need to issue the WO arises, the contractor then performs the desired services or 
furnishes the requisite supplies” (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a).  
 Single Award IDIQ: “A single contract is advertised and awarded to a single contractor 
who then is awarded WOs based on the pricing furnished in the initial bid package” 
(Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). 
 Multiple Award IDIQ: “A single contract is advertised and a pool of qualified contractors 
is selected. Only those selected are subsequently allowed to bid on WOs. In most cases 
the WOs are awarded to the lowest bidder among the contractors in the pool” (Rueda and 
Gransberg 2014a).  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which regulates procurement procedures 
conducted by federal government organizations, establishes a clear preference for multiple award 
IDIQ contracts stating “the contracting officer must, to the maximum extent practical, give 
preference to making multiple awards of indefinite-quantity contracts” (FAR 2005). This 
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preference however does not apply to architect-engineer services. It has been found that the 
highly competitive environment provided by multiple award approaches offer greater benefits to 
public owners (GAO 1979; OFPP 1997). However, some authors and practitioners agree that this 
may not always be the most suitable approach (Gransberg et al. 2015a; DoD 1999). Figure 14 
presents a framework to guide DOT planners in the selection of IDIQ contracting models based 
on the scope of work, the expected number of WOs, and the availability of contractors with the 
required capabilities to perform all projects to be executed under the contract. As will be 
explained later in this paper, RMPs should be adjusted based on the IDIQ contracting model. Not 
all risk management strategies presented herein are applicable to all models. 
 
FIGURE 14 IDIQ model selection (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
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As occurs with traditionally procured single-project contracts, in IDIQ contracts 
procurement and administration procedures are strategically selected to handle different types of 
risk factors. For example; a design-build WO could be used to transfer to the contractor the risk 
associated with potential cost overruns resulted from design inconsistencies or omissions 
discovered during construction; a two-step best-value selection approach could be used in a 
technically complex WO to ensure the selection of a contractor with the required capabilities to 
complete the project for a reasonable price; or cost reimbursable provisions may help to deal 
with projects whose prices and quantities of work are difficult to estimate. Some of the risk 
management strategies discussed in this paper are directly related to the proper selection of these 
project delivery methods and contracting approaches. However, the applicability of these 
strategies would depend on the contract language. Ideally, IDIQ contract provisions should allow 
for the use of all procurement/administrative procedures commonly used by the agency (in IDIQ 
and single-project contracts) in order to give contract officers the ability to customize WOs in 
accordance with their scope and in the best interest of the agency.     
 
Research Methodology   
Firstly this study conducted an extensive literature review and a detailed content analysis 
of IDIQ procurement documents, policy and procedure manuals collected from 64 public 
agencies. Literature studied was from different sectors of the construction industry and related to 
procurement practices used by different types of agencies, including non-transportation 
organizations. Content analysis techniques were conducted following the protocols outlined by 
Neuendorf (2002).  
This study also included the careful examination of survey responses from 43 state DOTs 
and 18 industry representatives from the Associated General Contractors (AGC) and The 
American Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA) members. Four face-to-face 
structured interviews with selected contractors were conducted in order to allow for an in-depth 
discussion on some key aspects associated with IDIQ contracting. These interviews were 
designed and conducted in accordance with the procedures used by the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO 1991). 
Information gathered through each research instrument was individually analyzed and 
then cross-examined. Intersections of trends found in two or more of these tools were used as the 
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major factor to develop conclusions. Trends observed in more than one data-set helped identify 
effective IDIQ risk management practices and opportunities for improvement. 
 
IDIQ Risk Management Framework 
Figure 15 illustrates the two-part IDIQ risk management framework developed in this 
research. The risk planning phase (the first part) occurs before contract advertise/award activities 
and concurrently with other planning and preconstruction tasks. During this phase, DOTs could 
also use the IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet, shown in Table 12, to aid the identification of 
potential risk factors and the development of the RMP. The RMP should include all relevant 
information related to risk management tools and strategies, the frequency of periodic risk 
reviews, and any guidelines and formats to be used for the preparation of the risk reports 
(Kendrick 2015).  
The IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet (Table 12) is not intended to work as a sole 
reference during the risk planning process; instead, it is just aimed to facilitate the identification 
of IDIQ-specific risk factors/strategies and their incorporation into regular risk planning 
activities. This sheet must be seen as a preventive tool. It can be used to help reduce the 
probability of occurrence for unfortunate events and minimize the impact on the project and 
stakeholders if they happen by supporting decision-making during planning activities at the 
contract and WO level.  
The Risk Planning Reference Sheet provides strategies to handle eight different IDIQ 
contract risk events and suggest the type of response for this risk (i.e. mitigate, avoid, or 
transfer). Additionally, Table 12 describes the causes and effects related to each of these eight 
potential situations and shows the extension of the effects (at the contract [C] and/or the WO 
level). Finally, the last column in this table indicates the IDIQ models (single work order and 
single award IDIQ [SA]; and multiple award IDIQ [MA]) that are more susceptible to that type 
of risk. The eight risk events and their respective management strategies are described in the next 
sections.  
A generic response plan to put into action upon occurrence (or imminent occurrence) of 
unfavorable situations is illustrated in the second part of the flow chart, during the risk 
monitoring and control phase (see Figure 15). Essentially, the agency should reserve the 
termination of the IDIQ contract, by stopping issuing any further WOs, only if the risk cannot be 
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addressed without modifying contract provisions or specifications. The interruption of the 
contract allows the agency to make any required changes before re-procuring the contract, if it is 
still required. 
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FIGURE 15 Two-part IDIQ risk management framework.
  
  
TABLE 12 IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet 
No. Risk Event Causes Effects R
es p
. 
Risk Management Strategy Extent 
IDIQ 
Model 
1 
Higher than needed 
project administration 
costs and efforts 
 Little experience with IDIQ 
 Attachment to traditional 
procurement practices 
 Strict and inflexible agency’s policies 
and applicable regulations  
 Decrease in agency’s 
production capacity 
 
M
it
ig
at
e 
 Streamlined/simplified procurement procedure (e.g. oral 
proposals, minimum submittal requirements) 
 Training sessions with in-house staff and pre-bid 
meetings with bidders 
C & WO 
Level 
All IDIQ 
models 
2 
Disproportion between 
the number of awardees 
and quantity of work 
 Poor planning skills 
 Too small/large WOs  
 Inadequate selection of IDIQ model   
 Too many contractors: Poor 
performance  
 Few contractors: Negative 
impact on agency’s reputation; 
& high change for disputes. 
M
it
ig
at
e 
 Determine the number of contractors correlating 
historical data with scope, complexity, expected number 
and size of WO, and required resources 
 
C Level 
All IDIQ 
models 
3 
Final product below 
minimum performance 
standards   
 Inadequate project delivery method 
and/or contractor(s) selection 
procedures 
 Inadequate selection of IDIQ model 
 Reduced serviceability and 
useful life of assets 
 Negative impact on agency’s 
reputation   M
it
ig
at
e 
 Strategically select advertise/award approach (e.g. best-
value selection for large and complex projects)  
 Advertise contract along with first WO 
 Include key performance indicators as a factor to award 
WO 
C Level SA IDIQ  
C & WO 
Level 
MA IDIQ 
4 
WO(s) substantially 
deviated from contract 
scope of work 
 Poor planning skills 
 Unplanned use of contract to use 
year-end funds or to emergencies  
 Higher construction prices 
 High chance for disputes  
M
it
ig
at
e  Training sessions with in-house staff 
 Use historical data to define scope and to forecast future 
needs 
 Include contingency pay items (SA IDIQ) 
WO 
Level 
All IDIQ 
models 
5 
Erroneous identification 
of the low-bid  
 The introduction of work items with 
negotiated unit prices not originally 
included in the contract and not used 
in the selection of the low bid.  
 Significant disproportion between bid 
quantities and total actual quantities 
of work  
 Higher total contract cost 
 
M
it
ig
at
e 
 Use historical data to define contract scope of work and 
determine pay items and bid quantities  
C Level SA IDIQ 
A
v
o
i
d
 
 Consider using MA or not using IDIQ 
6 
Estimating, scheduling, 
and constructability 
errors found during 
construction 
 Design errors and omissions 
 Complex scope of work with 
quantities and prices difficult to 
estimate 
 Delay of the project and cost 
overruns 
 
M
it
ig
at
e  Take advantage of the preselected contractors to create 
opportunities for early contractor involvement 
 Use cost reimbursable WO for WOs that are difficult to 
estimate 
WO 
Level 
All IDIQ 
models 
7 
Unreasonable 
compensation of 
mobilization expenses 
 Typical high uncertainty in IDIQ 
contracts due to the location and 
quantity of work  
 Higher project costs 
 
M
it
ig
a
te
 
 Include multiple mobilization pay items in the contracts 
considering all possible project locations C Level SA IDIQ 
8 
Large contingencies in 
price proposals due to 
potential cost escalation 
 Use of inappropriate or no price 
adjustment provisions   
 Higher project costs 
 
M
it
ig
at
e  Develop or select an existing construction cost index 
suitable for the scope of the project 
Contract 
Level 
SA IDIQ 
T
ra
n
sf
er
  Use AxE bidding 
6
9
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1. Higher than Needed Project Administration Costs and Efforts 
Federal and state public owners seem to agree that the implementation of this contracting 
method represents savings in administration costs and efforts for the agency (Rueda and 
Gransberg 2014b; Sandner and Snyder 2001; OFPP 1997). It is almost intuitive when 
considering that IDIQ allows for the execution of multiple similar projects under a single 
solicitation, eliminating the need for re-procuring every new project. However, this benefit may 
be hindered by strict and inflexible contracting regulations by requiring large amounts of 
contract documents and complex procurement procedures (Thornton 2002).  
Proposal submittal requirements should be adjusted according to the complexity and a 
level risk associated with the scope of contract or WO (the latter in the case of multiple award 
IDIQ contracts). Given that most DOTs are utilizing IDIQ for simple and small projects, it is 
highly recommended that these agencies consider the use of streamlined and simplified 
contracting techniques such as limiting proposal submittal requirements to a minimum (in terms 
of pieces of information to be submitted by contractors and number of pages) and oral proposals 
and WOs. Such procurement techniques have already been proposed for IDIQ contracts by other 
authors and government organizations (Sandner and Snyder 2001; OFPP 1997; AFMC 1999; 
Dunston and Reed 2000). 
Since IDIQ techniques are relatively new for the acquisition of construction and 
maintenance services by DOTs, and as usually occurs with the implementation of any new 
procedure, the lack of experience and familiarity of DOT staff members and contractors has been 
hindering the utilization of this procurement method resulting in an inefficient use of agency 
resource (e.g. money and staff hours) (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). Thus, it is recommended for 
DOTs to conduct training sessions with in-house staff and pre-bid meetings with potential 
bidders to educate all involved about this alternative contracting approach. 
 
2. Disproportion between the Number of Awardees and Quantity of Work 
According to Thomsen (Thomsen 2006), “by far the most important incentive [to do a 
high quality work] that an owner has is the promise of repeat work.” The use of this type of 
incentives in traditional procurement systems would require making a connection between past 
performance and the contractor ability to compete for future contracts, which usually implies that 
the agency must surmount statutory barriers (Thomsen 2006; Gransberg and Shane 2010). The 
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multi-project nature of IDIQ contracting and the high similarity among projects provides a 
suitable environment for the establishment of this connection. However, the use of key 
performance indicators as a factor to assign WOs in multiple award IDIQ contracts may not be 
enough to encourage a good performance. This is the case when the contractor perceives a low 
probability of performing more WOs due to the large number of contractors competing. 
Additionally, if too many firms are awarded, contractors may be tempted to bid higher than 
normal prices given the lower expectations for future profits (Rueda 2013). 
On the other hand, too many WOs assigned to a few contractors may increase the risk of 
complaints from unsuccessful bidders and regulatory entities claiming an inappropriate use of 
public funds (Rueda 2013). Thus, DOTs should, to the maximum extent possible, find a balance 
between the number contractors in a multiple award IDIQ and the expected number of WOs to 
be issued under the contract. It will give contractors a good opportunity to win WOs beyond a 
stated minimum guaranteed amount, if any. “The appropriate number of awardees is a function 
of project scope and complexity; expected number, frequency, and duration of work orders; and 
required resources for a contractor to perform all the types of work described in the contract 
documents” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). The correlation between these factors and the number of 
awardees should be established by a careful review of historical data from previous projects. 
 
3. Final Product below Minimum Performance Standards 
As mentioned above, poor contractor performance may be caused by an inappropriate 
determination in the number of contractors selected to enter into a multiple award IDIQ contract. 
Nonetheless, it was included as a separate factor in the IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet in 
order to address other possible causes. These are: the use of an inadequate project delivery 
method or contractor selection procedure; and the erroneous selection of the IDIQ contracting 
model. 
As in traditional procuring methods, the selection of the advertise/award approach and 
project delivery methods is dictated by the scope and complexity of the project and the risk 
profile of the agency. The selection of these procurement procedures (in IDIQ contracts) among 
those commonly used in highway construction projects follows the same principles applied by 
DOTs on non-IDIQ contracts. The benefits and risk management capabilities typically attributed 
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to these project delivery methods and contracting approaches remain unchanged when they are 
used in IDIQ contracts. 
Other risk management strategies mentioned in Table 12 refer to the use of key 
performance indicators for the assignment of WOs and the advertisement of the contract along 
with the first WO. The latter is mainly related to the use of best-value selection procedures in 
contracts with complex scopes of work, where the first project may help to determine the 
qualifications and technical capabilities of the bidders. It means that in addition to all other 
proposal submittal requirements, bidders must submit price and technical proposals for the first 
WO. It would ensure that all selected contractors would have the required capabilities to 
complete subsequent WOs.     
     
4. WO(s) Substantially Deviated from Contract Scope of Work 
This study found two main reasons that may lead DOTs to the issuance of WOs 
substantially deviated from the scope of work: poor planning skills; and the unplanned use of 
IDIQ contracts to quickly obligate year-end funds or to provide a quick response under 
emergency situations. The first of these causes might be addressed, to some extent, by the 
training sessions mentioned above in this paper. Rather than intentional deviations from the 
original contract scope of work, this situation may be the result of a failure of the planners to 
identify two key elements: the scope(s) of future needs to be fulfilled through the contract; 
and/or the work items required to address these needs. Thus, in this training sessions, DOT staff 
members should be instructed in the use of historical data from similar previous projects to gain 
a better understanding of the contract scope and a better idea of the work items usually required 
to complete these types of projects.  
The risk related to the appearance of new pay items not originally included in the contract 
is higher in single award IDIQ contracts. Price proposals submitted by contractors in a single 
award IDIQ usually consist of a series of unit prices for a list of pay items included by the 
agency in the solicitation documents. Upon the award of the contract, these pay items and the 
unit prices submitted by the successful contractor are incorporated into the contract and used to 
define and price all WOs. Therefore, once awarded the contract, the agency must enter into 
negotiations with the contractor to determine a price for work items not included in the original 
price proposal. “The post-award negotiation of prices in a non-competitive environment, what 
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would happen in a single award contract, would leave the agency in a vulnerable situation by 
increasing the contractor’s bargaining power” (Gransberg et al. 2015a), allowing for the 
negotiation of disadvantageous prices for the agency.                 
A “voluntary” deviation from the original contract scope of work may be related to the 
decision of using an active non-emergency IDIQ contract during an emergency situation or 
motivated by the ability of IDIQ contracts to rapidly obligate available year-end funding. IDIQ 
contracting offer the possibility of performing work without engaging in a complete procurement 
process, making it a valuable response tool under these pressing situations. However, it may be a 
problem for the agency if work items used in this unplanned WOs were not originally included in 
the contract. Thus, DOTs are encouraged to plan for these situations and include in their contract 
documents a series of contingency pay items (only applies to single award IDIQ contracts). 
Contingency pay items are services or supplies that the contractor may be requested to furnish 
under special circumstances (Gransberg et al. 2015a). These items are not expected to be used in 
regular WOs.      
     
5. Erroneous Identification of the Low-Bid 
This risk event refers to the award of a single award IDIQ contract to the bidder that 
submitted the lowest price proposal, but which will potentially not result in the lowest cost for 
the agency at the end of the contract. It may happen when new work items, with post-award 
negotiated unit prices, are included into the contract. Under this circumstances, the agency may 
find it difficult to sustain or demonstrate the validity of its decision since these items were not 
used in the selection of the contractor. However, the closure or termination of the contract 
without adding any new work items does not guarantee an appropriate selection of the 
contractor. It would also depend on the degree of proportionality between bid quantities and 
actual quantities of work for all WOs at the end of the contract. Bid quantities in solicitation 
documents are used primarily for selection purposes and do not necessarily have to correspond to 
the expected total quantities of work. In fact, four DOT survey participants indicated that in the 
selection of the low-bid they use estimated quantities for a single typical WO. Other four 
agencies reported the use of standard quantities of work for all WOs. Regardless of the approach 
used to determine these quantities, the award decision may be sustained as long as “the bid 
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quantities will be in the same proportion as the quantities of anticipated work required 
throughout the life of the contract” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
The high sensitivity of low-bid contractor selection methods in single award IDIQ 
contracts, which is the usual approach in this type of contracts, implies that DOTs should try to 
keep the scope of the contract as uniform as possible. It would help to maintain a consistent use 
of the same work items and a fair proportionality between bid and actual quantities of work, 
regardless of the number of WOs to be issued. Thus, the selection of the low-bid would be 
guaranteed even after a premature termination of the contract. This conclusion supports the IDIQ 
model selection framework illustrated in Figure 14, which opposes to the use of single award 
IDIQ contracts for broad and not clearly defined scopes of works. In those cases, the framework 
recommends the use of multiple award IDIQ or not using IDIQ.               
 
6. Estimating, Scheduling, and Constructability Errors Found During Construction 
This risk event is considered by planners in almost all construction-related RMPs, 
regardless of the delivery method and contracting approaches to be used. Likewise, the causes 
and effects of estimating, scheduling, and constructability errors in IDIQ contracts are 
fundamentally the same as those in non-IDIQ agreements. The whole purpose of including this 
factor in the IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet is to alert DOT planners of the remarkable 
ability of IDIQ contracts to facilitate contractor’s involvement in the design and other 
preconstruction phases. Researchers and practitioners worldwide seem to agree with the positive 
impact of early contractor involvement practices in different types of contracting approaches 
(Rueda et al. 2015). 
Having the contractor(s) selected before development of the scope of WOs allows for the 
earliest possible contractor involvement. Given the implications of handling inputs from multiple 
contractors during the design of WOs, the formal participation of contractors in preconstruction 
activities is more suitable for single award IDIQ contracts (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
Nevertheless, certain degree of integration of design and construction phases may be achieved in 
multiple award IDIQ contracts by combining this methodology with other alternative contracting 
methods such as design-build, construction manager/general contractor, and alternative technical 
concepts (Gransberg and Shane 2010). The advantages and disadvantages usually attributed to 
these contracting techniques are realized in IDIQ contracts at the WO level. Although in these 
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methods contractors’ input cannot be brought on as early as in IDIQ contracts, this input is still 
considered very valuable for agencies and contractors (Gransberg and Shane 2010).  
   
7. Unreasonable Compensation of Mobilization Expenses 
The literature review and a case study analysis conducted on a previous study (Rueda and 
Gransberg 2014b) led the authors to conclude that the compensation of mobilization expenses is 
a key issue that must be fully addressed in order to succeed in the use of single award IDIQ 
contracts. The use of a multiple award approach eliminates this need since contractors are 
requested to bid a lump sum mobilization price on a WO basis. This issue is the result of the high 
uncertainty inherent in IDIQ contracting in regard to the actual locations of future WOs and the 
contractors’ equipment and personnel that will be required to complete all projects throughout 
the contract. Responses from DOT and industry survey/interview participants and effective 
practices found in the literature review have allowed the authors to conclude that a suitable 
mobilization compensation approach would be one in which contractors are required to bid fixed 
prices on multiple mobilization pay items. These items should correspond to different potential 
locations and scopes of work, as applicable.  
 
8. Large Contingencies in Price Proposals due to Potential Cost Escalation 
Price escalation in multi-year single award IDIQ contracts was another major issued 
identified in this study. As a result of the absence of competition in the assignation of WOs, the 
contractor is either required to maintain unit price for more than one year (no price escalation 
clauses) or rely on fair adjustments in contract prices made on a regular basis in accordance with 
observed price changes in the construction market. The first option was discarded given the high 
risk that it represents for both owners and contractors. The volatility of some construction 
material prices and the uncertainty regarding actual quantities of work make it difficult for 
contractors to estimate unit prices for multi-year IDIQ contracts. “Contractors are willing to bid 
on multi-year IDIQ contracts even without escalation clauses, although it would represent higher 
construction costs for the agency” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Therefore, the next step to address 
this issue was to identify suitable price escalation clauses to adjust contract prices on a regular 
basis. Annual adjustments were found to be an effective practice. 
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Following a similar process as the one described above to find a suitable mobilization 
compensation method, DOT and industry representatives were asked their opinions about 
different types of price escalation clauses. This study found that the adjustment of contract prices 
using existing national or local construction cost indexes was an accepted practice for owners 
and contractors. However, if using construction cost indexes, DOTs should bear in mind that 
price indexing techniques also involve high levels of uncertainty (Rueda and Gransberg 2015). 
The complexity of the construction market and the great diversity in types of highway 
transportation activities make it difficult to find a construction cost index applicable at the 
project level (Rueda and Gransberg 2015). 
During a previous study conducted for the Minnesota DOT (MnDOT) (Gransberg and 
Rueda 2014), it was found that even though contractors doing business with this agency seem to 
accept the use of external construction cost indexes for price adjustment purposes, it was not 
their preferred option. The contractors that participated in this study showed a clear preference 
for the use of a fixed annual adjustment rate bid by them (%). This fixed percentage would be 
intended to adjust contract prices over time and would be factored into the selection of the low-
bid. Since such a method did not exist at that moment, the authors decided to create it. Using 
information provided by MnDOT, the authors developed a method call A times E (AxE) bidding. 
More information about this innovative bidding approach may be found in the NCHRP Synthesis 
473 (Gransberg et al. 2015a); however, the following quotation provides a good overview of this 
method: 
 
“Similar to A+B contracting, in an IDIQ AxE contract contractors are 
required to bid in two different parts; A and E. In part A, contractors must 
submit unit prices for those pay items and bid quantities advertised by the 
agency; items that are expected to be repeatedly used in different work 
orders throughout the contract and bid quantities that are intended to be in 
proportion with typical work orders. In part E, bidders are required to 
submit a fixed annual adjustment rate to be used to modify bid unit prices 
on the anniversary date of the letting of the contract. This adjustment rate is 
then transformed into an escalation multiplier (E), which along with the 
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price proposal (A), compose the selection formula (AxE) used to determine 
the low bid” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
 
Conclusions  
The identification of several types of IDIQ contracting mechanisms in use by state transportation 
agencies allowed to overcome the terminology barriers that had prevented the sharing of 
experiences and effective practices among DOTs. It allowed for the development of this unique 
and comprehensive study on the identification of effective risk management practices in IDIQ 
contracts. Several risk management strategies currently used by DOTs and others proposed by 
the study have been brought together into a single IDIQ Risk Planning Reference Sheet to assist 
DOTs in the identification of risk factors and the development of RMPs. The paper explained 
how the strategies in this sheet help transportation agencies to mitigate, avoid, or transfer the risk 
associated with eight potential unfortunate situations identified in the use of this alternative 
procurement method. The paper also presented a framework to guide DOTs during the risk 
monitoring and control phase in IDIQ contracts, explaining decision makers how to take 
advantage of some exceptional risk management tools provided by this type of contracts. 
By the implementation of the IDIQ risk management framework and the planning 
reference sheet presented in this paper, DOTs will be able to optimize and increase the 
capabilities of their IDIQ contracting programs. However, this is still an area where further 
research is highly needed. Future research could help DOTs to exploit the great versatility of 
IDIQ techniques. Giving its ability to be used for virtually any type of project and to be 
combined with almost all contracting approaches commonly used by DOTs, IDIQ could be used 
by these agencies as a valuable customizable tool, filling gaps traditional procurement cannot 
address.    
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CHAPTER 7 
STOCHASTIC COST-BASED DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
SELECTION OF SUITABLE PROJECTS FOR IDIQ CONTRACTING 
 
Rueda-Benavides, J. A., D.D. Gransberg, and B. Gardner. Stochastic Cost-Based Decision 
Making Framework for the Selection of Suitable Projects for IDIQ Contracting (to be submitted 
for publication in the Journal for Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE, in 2016). 
 
Abstract 
The search for shorter project delivery periods and greater flexibility in delivery 
scheduling has triggered a rapid growth in the use of Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ) techniques by state departments of transportation (DOTs) during the last few years. Even 
though these agencies are satisfied with the benefits obtained from IDIQ contracts, it is clear for 
them that IDIQ is not always the most suitable option. Thus, a major issue faced by these DOTs, 
and the one addressed in this paper, is how to decide whether to use IDIQ or a traditional 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) contracting approach for a given project or group of projects. Current 
methods used to make this decision are mainly scobe-based, ignoring the cost implications of 
using IDIQ contracting. This study proposes a decision making framework that includes 
expected construction costs as an IDIQ project selection criterion. This framework combines the 
use of historical bid data, a multi-level construction cost index, non-linear regression techniques, 
and Monte Carlo simulation to develop both IDIQ and DBB stochastic construction cost 
estimates. The selection of the contracting approach is then based on the comparison of these 
stochastic values and the cost, if any, that the agency considers reasonable to pay for the benefits 
offered by IDIQ contracting. The use of this framework is illustrated using the Minnesota DOT 
IDIQ contracting program as a case study and historical bid data from all IDIQ and DBB projects 
awarded by this agency between January 2008 and April 2015 (1,746 projects). The study 
confirmed that the framework produced a statistically significant improvement in cost estimate 
accuracy over current practices.      
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Introduction  
For many years, traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) contracting techniques were 
considered as a one-size-fits-all procurement tool for the acquisition of construction services. 
However, public owners and contractors in different construction sectors have realized that DBB 
procurement systems do not always offer the required means to cope with the tight deadlines and 
even tighter budgets of today’s construction environment (Gransberg et al. 2015a). This situation 
has forced federal and state agencies to improve their contracting capabilities by expanding their 
procurement toolboxes with alternative project delivery methods and contracting approaches 
(Molenaar and Yakowenko 2007; Walewski et al. 2001; Sanvido and Konchar 1998). The 
implementation of non-traditional contracting methods by these agencies is usually a challenging 
process, which frequently leads to an inefficient use of public resources due to a “trial and error” 
approach (Gransberg and Shane 2010). One of the major challenges is how to choose between an 
alternative contracting method and a traditional approach for a specific project (Molenaar et al. 
2014; Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008; Ghavamifar and Touran 2008). “Selecting the wrong 
project delivery method is often a significant driver of project failure” (Touran et al. 2009). This 
paper is focused on mitigating this risk from a financial perspective when the decision is limited 
to two alternatives: Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracting or traditional DBB 
techniques.   
Table 13 presents the main benefits attributed to IDIQ contracting, responsible for the 
increasing use of this alternative contracting method by DOTs, and the disadvantages associated 
with its implementation. It should be noted from Table 13 that the literature does not cite 
potential construction cost savings as a potential benefit of IDIQ contracting, but unreasonably 
high construction costs are not mentioned as a disadvantage either.  
TABLE 13 Advantages and Disadvantages in IDIQ Contracting 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 Shorter project delivery periods (Dunston and Reed 
2000; Sandner and Snyder 2001; Farris 2002).  
 Greater flexibility in quantity and delivery 
scheduling (Dunston and Reed 2000; Fleeger 2011; 
Ferris 2002). 
 Useful contracting option during emergencies 
(Jeffrey and Menches 2008; Gransberg and Rueda 
2015; Thornton 2002). 
 Lack of experience of agencies and 
contractor (Farris 2002; Rueda and 
Gransberg 2014a). 
 Limited ability to conduct complete 
planning, programming, and budgeting 
procedures at the contract level (Gransberg 
et al. 2015a). 
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As a co-author of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 
Synthesis 473: IDIQ Contracting Practices (Gransberg et al. 2015a), a report that compiles and 
analyzes current IDIQ contracting practices used by states DOTs across the country, the author 
of this paper had the opportunity to interview project engineers from DOTs and contractors in 
the transportation construction industry. Based on the opinions expressed by the interviewees, 
the author could identify three different lines of thought in regard to public owners cost 
implications of using IDIQ contracting:  
1. Those who think that the possibility of performing work in more than one project should 
work as an incentive for contractor to submit lower bid unit prices;  
2. Those who consider that this incentive may be lost by a low level of pricing certainty due 
to the multi-year (as long as 5 or more years) nature of IDIQ contracts, resulting in higher 
price proposals; and  
3. Those who think that this alternative contracting approach has the potential to reduce 
project costs, but it is actually increasing construction prices as a result of a poor 
implementation by public owners.  
A review of the existing literature revealed no formal research supporting or opposing 
any of these three opinions. The lack of a formal method to evaluate construction costs of IDIQ 
contracting in comparison with a more traditional approach has prevented state DOTs from 
validating any of the three statements listed above. Likewise, the absence of these mechanisms 
does not permit the use of expected construction costs as an IDIQ project selection criterion. 
Current methods used to make this decision are mainly based on the scope of work, ignoring the 
cost implications of using IDIQ contracting. To fill this gap in the body of knowledge, this paper 
presents a cost-based decision making framework for the selection of projects appropriate for 
IDIQ contracting.  
The framework uses historical bid data, an alternative cost indexing system called 
Multilevel Construction Cost Index (MCCI), non-linear regression, and Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques to develop both IDIQ and DBB stochastic construction cost estimates for each project 
or group of projects. The selection of the contracting approach is then based on the comparison 
of these two stochastic construction cost estimates, the risk profile of the agency, and the cost, if 
any, that the agency considers reasonable to pay for the benefits offered by IDIQ contracting. 
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The framework can be used either to make the initial decision to utilize IDIQ contract for 
a group of foreseen projects or to decide whether or not to execute a given project as a work 
order of an active IDIQ contract. The use of this framework is illustrated using single award 
IDIQ contracts awarded by the Minnesota DOT (MnDOT) and historical bid data from all IDIQ 
and DBB projects awarded by this agency between January 2008 and April 2015 (1,746 
projects). 
           
Background 
  The lack of mechanisms to factor construction cost estimates into the selection of the 
contracting approach is not just a problem in IDIQ contracting. This issue has been cataloged by 
some authors as a widespread problem in the realm of alternative contracting methods 
(Walewski et al. 2001; Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008; Miller 1997). “[B]ecause no adequate 
and systematic method exists to evaluate how project delivery methods and contracting 
approaches have impacted costs, it is difficult to validate the financial impacts of their use” 
(Walewski et al. 2001). However, the benefits perceived by the users of these methods (e.g. 
better budget control, increased quality, shorter project duration) seem to be sufficient to 
disregard the cost implications of their use (Sanvido and Konchar 1998; FHWA 1998). 
         Existing literature includes research efforts directed to compare construction costs 
associated with different alternative contracting methods. Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw 
general conclusions out of these studies since it is easy to find different authors obtaining 
opposite results from the study of the same contracting methods. For example, a study conducted 
by Roth (1995) for the comparison of construction costs between 6 DBB and 6 Design-Build 
(DB) projects found that unit costs are statistically significantly lower when DB contracting 
methods are used. On the other hand, a similar study done by Konchar and Sanvido (1998) and a 
research project sponsored by the state of Florida (FHWA 1996) found no significant difference 
between DB and DBB construction costs. The 351 building projects studied by Konchar and 
Sanvido showed unit costs for DB projects 6% lower than those for DBB projects, but this 
difference did not prove to be significantly different. In the same study, Konchar and Sanvido 
also found that even though the unit cost for construction management at risk (CMR) projects 
showed to be less than that in DBB, this difference was not statistically significant either. 
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Most studies intended to compare cost performance among alternative contracting 
methods focus on cost growth, which is defined “as the difference between the cost at the 
completion of the project and the original budget” (Ibbs et al. 2003). Based on this cost-related 
metric, some authors like Hale et al. (2009), Warne (2005), and Shrestha et al. (2007) have 
concluded that DB outperforms DBB from a cost perspective. In contrast to these findings, Ibbs 
et al. (2003) have found from the analysis of 67 construction projects (most of them between $25 
and $75 million) that “while timesaving is a probable benefit for using DB as a project delivery 
strategy, the benefits in cost savings [measured in terms of cost growth] are debatable” (Ibbs et 
al. 2003). This statement was supported three years later by the Design-Build Effectives Study 
conducted by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA 2006). From the comparison of 9 and 
11 Db and DBB projects, respectively, the FHWA found a lower cost growth in DBB projects 
(4.3%) than that in DB contracts (8.1%). 
A federal research project conducted by Anderson and Damnjanovic (2008) for the 
development of the NCHRP Synthesis 379: Selection and Evaluation of Alternative Contracting 
Methods to Accelerate Project Completion evaluated de performance of 17 different contracting 
strategies aimed to reduce project duration, including DB, CMR, and Public Private Partnership. 
Even though the results of this study were not conclusive regarding the cost-related impacts of 
using alternative contracting methods, Anderson and Damnjanovic found evidence indicating the 
use of these methods often increase cost. Thus, these authors concluded that further study is 
necessary on this matter and “more implementation experience is needed within the 
transportation industry to determine if they are truly cost-effective in meeting cost performance 
targets” (Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008).   
Since the cost-based decision making framework proposed in this study uses only 
historical bid data, it is neither possible nor necessary to incorporate cost growth as an IDIQ 
project selection criterion. Cost growth is a post-construction performance metric and not highly 
germane to the selection of a project delivery method (Hinze 2012). Thus, since the typical IDIQ 
contract is for construction services only as is DBB, it can be reasonably inferred that expected 
cost growth would be similar in both cases. The single award IDIQ contracting approach 
(defined in the next section) adopted by MnDOT can be described as a contract for multiple 
DBB projects awarded to the same contractor under a single solicitation during a given period of 
time (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Therefore, the relationship, roles, and responsibilities among the 
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all parties involved in the contract remain fundamentally unchanged if IDIQ is used instead of 
DBB. Likewise, the same benefits usually attributed to DBB contracts are expected to be found 
at the work order level in an IDIQ contract (Gransberg et al. 2015a). After reviewing the most 
common factors responsible for cost overruns in the construction industry (i.e. fluctuations in 
prices of materials, financial difficulties faced by contractors, poor site management and 
supervision, mistakes and errors in design, etc.) (Rahman et al. 2013), the authors found no 
reasons to believe that the impact of these factors would be substantially different between IDIQ 
and DBB projects.                 
The NCHRP Synthesis 379 (Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008) also analyzes existing 
formal processes used by DOTs for the selection of contracting methods. Although most state 
transportation agencies that participated in this study indicated the use of no systematic processes 
for the selection of contracting methods, Anderson and Damnjanovic found five DOTs that have 
developed formal procedures to select suitable project delivery methods and contracting 
approaches for their construction project. All these DOTs have business units strictly dedicated 
to develop and implement innovative contracting practices (Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008). 
These agencies are:  
 Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) 
 California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) 
 Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) 
 Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) 
 Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) 
A review of these contracting methods selection procedures by the authors of this paper 
revealed that the decision making systems used by these five agencies are based on a qualitative 
analysis of scopes of work, project objective, and benefits/drawbacks usually associated with the 
different contracting alternatives under consideration. None of these systematic processes 
quantifies the cost implications of the available contracting options. The problem with this 
methods, as stated by Touran et al. (2009), is that they rely on benefits identified across a 
population of projects rather than on an individual analysis of each project. “[T]he reporting of 
benefits found in the literature should not be misconstrued as advocating on project delivery 
method over another. All project delivery methods have yielded both successes and failures” 
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(Touran et al. 2009), which explains the opposite findings from the studies mentioned above. 
The cost-based decision making framework presented in this paper was designed having in mind 
that contracting methods “should be selected on the basis of each project’s unique 
characteristics” (Touran et al. 2009). Thus, stochastic construction cost estimates in this 
framework are calculated based on the specific construction activities constituting the project 
under consideration. 
The Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report 131: A Guidebook for the 
Evaluation of Project Delivery Methods (Touran et al. 2009) proposes a three-tiered project 
delivery selection framework that bases the decision on the analysis of the benefits offered by the 
available options at the project level. This analysis is performed according to the specific 
characteristics of each project. Table 14 describes and presents the primary objectives at each 
tier.   
 
TABLE 14 Three-tiered Project Delivery Selection System (Adapted from Touran et al. 2009) 
Tier 1 – Analytical Delivery Decision Approach 
Tier 1 provides a framework for agencies to use in defining project goals and examining the 
advantages/disadvantages of each delivery method within the context of these goals. It helps 
agencies understand project delivery method attributes and helps them determine whether their 
specific project goals align with the attributes of a particular delivery method. 
Tier 2 – Weighted-Matrix Delivery Decision Approach  
Tier 2 provides a framework for agencies to use in prioritizing their project goals and selecting 
the project delivery method that best aligns with these goals. Priorities for project goals and 
critical selection issues are unique to each project. 
Tier 3 – Optimal Risk Based Approach  
Tier 3 consists of two phases. The first phase involves a qualitative analysis: developing a risk-
allocation matrix that clearly portrays an owner’s risk under competing delivery methods. 
Through review of these risks, the owner will have an opportunity to decide whether a specific 
delivery method is more appropriate than others. If the qualitative analysis does not provide a 
definitive answer to the delivery selection question, the second phase—a quantitative 
analysis—should be considered. 
  
When using the three-tiered decision making system described in Table 14, transit 
agencies start with the framework provided at Tier 1. If there is not a clear and logical choice 
after using this framework, decision makers then move to Tier 2. If after following the 
procedures from Tier 2, the agency still has not identified a best choice, decision makers proceed 
with Tier 3, which is divided into both a qualitative and a quantitative assessment. The Tier 3 
quantitative analysis compares stochastic construction cost estimates for competing contracting 
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approaches, which is quite similar to the one presented in this paper for highway projects. 
However, in the decision making system proposed by Touran et al. (2009), the 
qualitative/quantitative assessment is the last step for the transit agency delivery method 
selection process. The stochastic analysis is only used if no decision can be made at Tier 1 or 2, 
or during the qualitative analysis at Tier 3. The quantitative is left to last because this is 
described as the most complex and time consuming part of the system. This analysis is “a major 
undertaking that requires hundreds of person-hours over the course of several weeks” (Touran et 
al. 2009). 
The difficulty of the quantitative analysis proposed by Touran et al. (2009) lies in the fact 
that it consists of the comparison of stochastic early construction cost estimates, when there this 
still little information about the project. Ideally, this analysis is to be conducted during the 
project scoping process. The reason for conducting this analysis early during the project planning 
phase is that this decision making system is intended to deal with project delivery methods that 
have substantially different project life cycles (DBB, DB, CMR, and Design-Build-Operate-
Maintain). Thus, a later selection of the contracting approach may prove to hold little value. The 
similarity of the project life cycle configurations of single award IDIQ contracts and DBB 
projects avoids this problem.  
As mentioned before, single award IDIQ contracts used by MnDOT are fundamentally a 
group of DBB projects executed under a single solicitation. IDIQ and DBB projects have a 
similar sequence of project phases and configuration of preconstruction activities. Therefore, the 
decision of whether or not to use IDIQ or DBB can be made upon completion of the solicitation 
documents and after determining the bid quantities. The detailed designs for all anticipated IDIQ 
work order projects do not need to be known.  
The following sections present a brief description of the DBB and the IDIQ contracting 
models used by MnDOT. The sections provide the reader with the necessary background to 
understand the proposed decision making framework. 
 
IDIQ Contracting  
An IDIQ contract “provides for an indefinite quantity of supplies and/or services whose 
performance an delivery scheduling is determined by placing work orders with one or multiple 
contractors during a fixed period of time” (Gransberg et al. 2015a). Previous studies of IDIQ 
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practices identified three different IDIQ contracting models classified in accordance with the 
number of contractors selected to participate in the contract and the expected number of work 
orders to be issued (Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). Figure 3 (see Chapter 2) illustrates this 
classification and highlights the different IDIQ contracting models. The description of each of 
these models is presented below. Table 2 (see Chapter 2) shows the configuration of these 
models and describes the most appropriate conditions for the successful use of each of them. 
 Single Work Order Contract: A single contract is awarded to a single contractor. Once 
the need to issue the work arises, the contractor then performs the desired services or 
furnishes the requisite supplies (a single work order issued during the contract period) 
(Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). 
 Single Award IDIQ: A single contract is advertised and awarded to a single contractor 
who then is awarded work orders based on the pricing furnished in the initial bid package 
(Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). 
 Multiple Award IDIQ: A single contract is advertised and a pool of qualified contractors 
is selected. Only those selected are subsequently allowed to bid on work orders. In most 
cases the work orders are awarded to the lowest bidder among the contractors in the pool 
(Rueda and Gransberg 2014a). 
In an attempt to maximize competition (GAO 1979; OFPP 1997), the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR 2005) establishes a clear preference for multiple award IDIQ construction 
contracts for federally-funded IDIQ contracts. However, a multiple award approach is not always 
the most suitable option (DoD 1999), which appears to be the case for transportation agencies 
(Gransberg et al. 2015a). For DOTs, the single award IDIQ contracts seem to “better fit their 
procurement methods and limited resources, and even with less apparent benefits, DOTs have 
perceived an opportunity to improve their contracting practices” by executing single award IDIQ 
contracts (Rueda 2013). The MnDOT IDIQ contracting program is limited to a single award 
approach and that is the contracting model used for the development of the framework presented 
in this paper. 
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Design-Bid-Build 
In this method, design must be fully accomplished by either in-house or consultant 
designers before proceeding with the advertisement and award of a separate construction contract 
(Gransberg and Shane 2010). In other words, design and construction activities are contracted 
separately, so that, there is no contractual relationship between the designer and the contractor as 
shown in Figure 16. 
 
FIGURE 16 Design-Bid-Build (Gransberg et al. 2015a). 
 
 Even though DBB contracts are usually awarded to the low bid responsive contractor, 
they can also be awarded on a best-value or negotiated basis in order to mitigate risks related to 
the selection of a contractor who has submitted a low price proposal inconsistent with the 
construction documents (Gransberg and Shane 2010; Scott et al. 2006).      
  
Methodology 
Figure 17 illustrates the research methodology followed for this study. The point of 
departure for this study was the NCHRP Synthesis 473: IDIQ Contracting Practices. This is a 
report developed by the authors of this paper aimed to compile and evaluate effective IDIQ 
practices implemented by state DOTs across the country. The study began with a supplementary 
literature review aimed to collect either new knowledge or any additional information missed or 
not available when developing the synthesis. The study is then divided into a qualitative and a 
quantitative process.  
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FIGURE 17 Research methodology.  
 
Rather than replacing the current scope-based IDIQ project selection method used by 
DOTs, the decision making framework presented in this paper is intended to supplement existing 
practices to reduce the risk associated with an inappropriate selection of contracting methods. 
Thus, during the qualitative part of the study, the authors conducted a formal content analysis on 
contract documents, journal articles, research reports, and other written sources of information 
related to IDIQ contracting collected from the literature review. The study helped to identify 
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effective IDIQ contracting practices and opportunities for improvement that were used to 
improve and formalize current scope-based project selection procedures. Content analysis 
techniques were applied following the methods proposed by Neuendorf (2002).  
On the other hand, the quantitative part of Figure 16 refers to the development of 
construction cost prediction models for IDIQ and DBB projects. The prediction models are 
developed and their outputs are compared with each other using historical bid data, an alternative 
indexing system developed by the authors, non-linear regression techniques, and Monte Carlo 
simulation. The MnDOT IDIQ contracting program was used to develop the prediction models 
and to validate the overall decision making framework. The first step in the quantitative part of 
this study was to collect and clean bid data from all projects awarded by MnDOT between 
January 2008 and April 2015. Table 15 describes this data and shows how it was divided into 
training and validation data-sets. 
 
TABLE 15 MnDOT Historical Bid Data  
Type of 
Contract 
MnDOT Historical Bid Data – Number of Contracts 
January 2008 – April 2015 
Training Data-set 
January 2008 – August 2013 
Validation Data-set 
September 2013 – April 2015 
Total Number 
of Contracts 
IDIQ 22 11 33 
DBB 1,361 352 1,713 
       
The training data-set was used to develop the construction cost prediction models and 
projects in the validation data-set were used to evaluate the performance of these models. 
MnDOT historical bid data was intentionally divided placing older projects in the training data-
set since the purpose of this validation process is not only to determine the accuracy of the 
construction cost estimating models, but also the ability of bid data from previous projects to 
estimate current construction costs. 
Subsequently, the results and observations from both the qualitative and quantitative parts 
of this study were combined and analyzed together to create and overall decision making 
framework. The framework initiates with a qualitative assessment (scope-based) for the pre-
selection of IDIQ candidates, which are then moved forward for a quantitative analysis (cost-
based). Finally, the overall decision making framework and preliminary conclusions are 
subjected to validation before disclosing the results of the study.     
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Decision Making Framework – IDIQ vs. DBB  
Although the analytical development of the decision making framework described in this 
paper uses a fixed training data-set and fixed construction cost prediction models, the objective 
of this study is to provide DOTs with a standard set of procedures that can be repeated as often 
as needed to evaluate candidate projects using the most recent bid data. This framework uses 
data currently being collected and stored in a digital form by DOTs. Therefore, the process can 
be fully automated to facilitate the decision making process. Figure 18 illustrates the decision 
making framework. Each of the elements in this framework in described in detail in the 
following sections. 
 
IDIQ Candidate 
with Quantities 
of Work
Scope-Based 
Decision Analysis 
Approved 
for
IDIQ?
Use DBB
No
IDIQ Construction 
Cost Prediction 
Model
DBB Construction 
Cost Prediction 
Model
Yes
Collect Recent 
Bid Data
Clean & 
Process Data
Outliers Elimination:
- Modified Z-score
- ROUT
Monte Carlo;
Non-linear Regression;
& MCCI
Comparison:
IDIQ vs. DBB
Make Decision
Decision 
Making Matrix 
 
FIGURE 18 Decision making framework – IDIQ vs. DBB 
    
Scope-Based Decision Analysis 
Figure 14 (see Chapter 6) corresponds to the improved scope-based project selection 
framework proposed by the author. Besides being used to determine the suitability of a given 
project (or group of projects) for IDIQ contracting, the project scope (along with main project 
objectives) is analyzed to suggest the most suitable IDIQ contracting model for the specific 
project (i.e. single work order, single award, or multiple award). This scope-based decision 
analysis proposes three different scenarios to reject the use of an IDIQ contract: 
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1. When the scope of the contract does not constitute repetitive, technically similar work;  
2. When the scope does not meet the owners’ IDIQ policies or other applicable regulations; 
or 
3. When the scope is broad and the size of the project is not great enough to justify awarding 
to multiple contractors. 
As suggested in the NCHRP Synthesis 473 (Gransberg et al. 2015a), single award IDIQ 
contracts should be only used for narrow scopes of work when all work orders executed under the 
contract are expected to be fairly similar. It increases budget control and reduces the risk of an 
erroneous selection of the apparent low bidder. Broader scopes of work involving different types 
of work orders are better handled by multiple award IDIQ contracts. Therefore, MnDOT’s IDIQ 
contracts are restricted to narrow scopes of work since this agency use a multiple award approach 
in its IDIQ contracting program.       
  
Data Collection, Cleaning, and Processing  
Although MnDOT estimators are already estimating construction costs for IDIQ and 
DBB contracts, the heavy reliance of the proposed decision making tool proposed in this paper 
on the accuracy of these estimates led the authors to invest efforts in the improvement of these 
estimates. The concept of “accuracy,” as used in this study, refers to the degree to which the 
estimated unit prices conform to the actual values in the lowest bid. To improve the performance 
of these estimates, the author used the available historical bid data to develop non-linear 
regression equations (power series regression) for MnDOT’s most frequently used pay items. For 
each regressed pay item, the agency has an equation to calculate the unit price for this pay item 
in terms of its bid quantity.   
Figure 19 illustrates the process to develop the non-linear regression equations. This 
process was separately used to develop equations for both IDIQ and DBB contracts. The only 
difference in the process lies on the input data, which must come only from their respective types 
of contracts (IDIQ model will use only data form IDIQ contracts and DBB model will use only 
data from DBB contracts). Figure 20 shows how the available historical bid data was used to 
develop non-linear regression equations for IDIQ and DBB contracts and how these equations, 
together with MnDOT current estimating practices for non-regressed pay items, make up the 
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construction cost estimating models. It should be noted that the process shown in Figure 19 was 
only applied to the training data-set. 
 
Collect MnDOT 
historical bid data
Clean and organize 
data                    
(Raw Data Matrix)
Identify and eliminate 
outliers and unit prices = 
$0.00 on a per project basis 
(Modified Z-Score Method)
Develop Non-linear Regression Equations
Low-Bid 
Unit Prices
Average Bid 
Unit Prices
All Bid Unit 
Prices
This process is to be developed for each of the three approaches 
Create scatter plots 
for most commonly 
used pay items
Create power series 
equations for each 
scatter plot                
(U = A + BX^D + CX^E)
Identify and 
eliminate outliers 
from scatterplots 
(ROUT Method)
Create final power 
series equations for 
each scatter plot 
(without outliers)
Validate equations at 
the pay-item level 
Discard pay-item 
equations with 
average errors > 
than engineer s 
average error  
Combine pay-item 
equations and 
validate at the 
project level
Select the approach (Low-
Bid, Average, All Bid Unit 
Prices) that shows the 
lowest average error 
Define training 
and validation 
data sets
Identify most 
commonly used 
pay items 
Estimates                        
with selected pay-item 
equations more accurate 
than engineer s              
estimates?  
NO
Final set of unit 
price estimating 
equations 
 
FIGURE 19 Quantitative data processing. 
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FIGURE 20 DBB and IDIQ construction cost estimating models.   
 
The substantially lower amount of IDIQ contracts awarded by MnDOT in comparison 
with DBB is due to the fact that the tool is new to that agency. Therefore, the available amount 
of data from IDIQ contracts is less than for DBB. As such, only 19 non-linear regression 
equations were developed for IDIQ while 133 pay items were regressed for DBB. Not only must 
the regressed pay items be commonly used by MnDOT, but they must also show a strong 
relationship between historical bid unit prices and bid quantities to improve the accuracy 
observed when using MnDOT current estimating methods.  
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The use of power series models in the form U = AXB + CXD (where U is the unit price, A, 
C, and D are constant values calculated as a result of a power regression, and X is the total 
quantity of work estimated for a given pay item) was selected from a group of non-linear 
regression alternatives since this is the one that best fits the historical data in most pay items. A 
shorter version of this equation (U = AXB) was more suitable for some pay items. 
Table 16 shows the results of the validation of IDIQ and DBB construction cost 
estimating models. For both models the results of the validation were positive and statistically 
significant (using two-sample t-test) at both the project and the agency level. The performance at 
the project refers to the reduction in the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) when using the 
proposed models instead of current MnDOT estimating practices for all pay items. The MAPE is 
the absolute arithmetic average of the errors (%) of all projects. On the other hand, the 
performance at the agency level was quantified by comparing the total estimated cost for all 
projects against the aggregated price proposals submitted by successful bidders in all contracts 
([Σsuccessful actual bid prices – Σestimated bid prices]/ Σsuccessful actual bid prices).  
 
TABLE 16 Construction Cost Estimating Model – Validation Results  
Estimating 
Model 
Validation of Construction Cost Estimating Models 
MAPE Reduction at the  
Project Level 
Absolute Error Reduction at the         
Agency Level 
IDIQ 54% 54% 
DBB 10% 64% 
   
Outlier Detection Methods  
Figure 19 also shows two different outlier detection methods. The first method is the 
modified Z-Score method and is applied prior to regression as a mechanism to purge anomalies 
due to the ever-present unbalancing of bid tabulation unit prices in the initial data set. It finds 
outliers at the pay item level by comparing bid unit prices submitted for the same item in the 
same contract. The modified Z-Score method to eliminate materially unbalanced data points, 
along with the elimination of those where the bid unit prices equal to $0.00 (zero), are required 
to preserve the integrity of the construction cost estimating models. The modified Z-Score 
method is typically used for analyses involving small sample sizes (Seo 2006; Iglewicz and 
Hoaglin 1993), such as those that may result when one to three contractors are competing for a 
given contract.  
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The second method used to detect outliers is robust regression and outlier removal 
(ROUT) approach, which is applied to the scatter plots (Quantity vs Unit Price) developed for 
each of the selected pay items. The ROUT method allows for the identification of outliers in 
non-linear regression models such as the power series regressions used in this study (Motulsky 
and Brown 2006). The purpose of this second data filter is to discard significantly low or high 
unit prices that may result from unusual project conditions. For example; if all the competing 
unit prices submitted for a structural concrete pay item on the same contract are fairly similar, 
they will not be discarded by the modified Z-Score method; however, an unusual project 
requirement, which in this example is a requirement to place the concrete in the winter 
necessitating construction of a temporary enclosure, heater, and 24-hour watchman, forces all the 
competing contractors to greatly increase the bid price for this item in comparison with its 
normal price range, which in turn causes these particular values would be discarded by the 
ROUT method. The same would be true if the condition made the bid prices substantially lower 
than normal. 
 
Use of Construction Cost Estimating Models 
Figure 21 shows two ways to use the unit price estimating models under two different 
decision-making scenarios. The first scenario involves a decision about grouping similar 
potential projects into a single IDIQ contract or executing these projects under individual DBB 
contracts. On the other hand, the second case scenario refers to a single project and the decision 
of whether using an existing IDIQ, with known fixed unit prices, or awarding a new DBB. It 
should be noted that the first case scenario uses both construction cost estimating models (IDIQ 
and DBB) to compare the total expected cost of a single IDIQ against multiple DBB contracts. 
The second scenario only requires the estimation DBB construction cost for the given project, 
which is compared against the cost if the existing IDIQ with its already stated unit prices is used. 
Figure 21 illustrates both case scenarios using four hypothetical pay items. Bid quantities for pay 
items A, B, C, and D (case scenario 1) are assumed to represent total expected quantities of work 
to be ordered under an IDIQ contract. On the other hand, bid quantities for items a, b, c, and d 
(case scenario 2) refer to a single project.   
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FIGURE 21 Use construction cost estimating models. 
 
An initial deterministic total construction cost is calculated by adding the estimated 
extended prices of all pay items. However, since construction cost estimating models are 
developed using data from previous projects, their direct outputs are not in current dollars. 
Initially, the authors considered the use of an existing construction cost index (CCI) to address 
this problem. CCIs track changes in the construction market over time; thus, they can be used to 
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compare construction prices between two points in time or to bring construction costs from past 
to present.  
A previous study of CCIs conducted by the author uncovered a major issue in the use of 
these indexes at the project level. That study found that it was unreasonable to believe that a 
single index number can be used to adjust all types of projects due to the nearly unpredictable 
impact that dynamic changes in the construction material commodities market have on different 
types of projects; for example, concrete bridge projects versus asphalt paving projects (Rueda 
and Gransberg 2015). The study also found that the least accurate adjustments obtained when 
using CCIs on MnDOT projects were on asphalt paving projects, which is the most common type 
of work done by MnDOT (Rueda and Gransberg 2015). This situation led the authors to develop 
an alternative indexing system to overcome the limitations and lack of flexibility of the existing 
indexes: a Multi-level CCI (MCCI). 
The MCCI is a group of indexes organized in a multi-level arrangement. Each pay item is 
individually adjusted using its corresponding index from the MCCI. Therefore, different projects 
are adjusted with different indexes according to the unique characteristics of each project. The 
development and characteristics of the MCCI are described in detail in a research report done for 
MnDOT by Gransberg and Rueda (2014).       
Construction costs calculated with the models illustrated in Figure 20 are assumed to be 
estimates at the midpoint of the training data-set. These estimates are brought forward to the 
present letting date using the MCCI. For both contracting methods these estimates are expected 
to be effective only for one year. A review of the project durations of a randomly selected sample 
of 10% of all DBB in the available bid data found no contracts with an expected duration of 
more than one year. Therefore, construction cost estimates performed from this data should not 
be considered for periods longer than a year. Likewise, unit prices submitted by the successful 
contractor in an IDIQ are adjusted on an annual basis in accordance with the IDIQ price 
escalation clause used by MnDOT: 
“To compensate for the potential of this Contract to extend over several construction 
seasons the Department will adjust the Unit Prices of all items on the TOIL by 2% once 
per year on the anniversary date of the letting of this Contract. Items not listed on the 
TOIL will not be adjusted. Fuel escalation will not be paid for items where the Inflation 
Index for cost increase is utilized” (MnDOT 2013)     
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Most IDIQ contracts awarded by MnDOT are multi-year contracts with a maximum 
duration of three years. Thus, it was also necessary in this framework to forecast construction 
processes for a potential second or third year. While changes in IDIQ prices are subject to the 
contract price escalation provision, which in the case of MnDOT is a fixed annual adjustment of 
2% in all pay items, DBB prices will be affected by actual fluctuations of construction prices. It 
should be noted that DBB contracts are advertised and awarded as the funding for the projects 
becomes available. Thus, DBB projects awarded in two or three years from today will be priced 
by bidders based on the current construction prices at their letting dates. To estimate construction 
prices for the next two or three years, the authors used Monte Carlo techniques to simulate 
values for the MCCI. From this point forward, the paper is focused on case scenario 1 in Figure 
22, which refers to the most complex situation of the two decision-making scenarios.   
Figure 22 shows the steps to move construction prices from past to future by first using 
the MCCI to bring them to present, and then simulate index values to project them into the 
future. This process is simpler for IDIQ contracts given the 2% fixed annual adjustment rate used 
by MnDOT (see Figure 23). It does not require the use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques. As 
shown in Figure 21, the decision-making scenario 1 depends on the distribution of work among 
the different contract periods. Thus, if the bid quantities in Figures 22 and 23 are assumed to be 
the total amount of work for all projects under the IDIQ contract; the total bid schedule is the 
stochastic value of the sum of all extended unit prices in the contract; and a%, b%, and c% are 
the estimated percentages of work to be performed during the first, second, and third year, 
respectively, the stochastic construction cost estimates used to compare IDIQ vs. DBB can be 
calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 1𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 × 𝑎% + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 2𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 × 𝑏% + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 3𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 × 𝑐%        eq. 4 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 1𝐷𝐵𝐵 × 𝑎% + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 2𝐷𝐵𝐵 × 𝑏% + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 3𝐷𝐵𝐵 × 𝑐%         eq. 5 
 
Where: 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 
 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐵𝐵 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 1𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄 = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 1𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑄  
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑆 3𝐷𝐵𝐵 = 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 3𝑟𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐵𝐵  
  𝑎% = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 1𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 𝑏% = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 2𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
 𝑐% = 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 3𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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FIGURE 22 Development of construction cost estimate – DBB.  
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FIGURE 23 Development of construction cost estimate – IDIQ. 
 
Once calculated the stochastic cost estimates for IDIQ and DBB, the next step is to 
compare these estimates using Monte Carlo simulation. For example; Figure 24 shows the IDIQ 
and DBB stochastic estimate for a three-year contract with an expected distribution of work of 
50%, 40%, and 10% during the first, second, and third year of the contract. Thousands of 
iterations were run generating and comparing pairs of values under each iteration; one value for 
each distribution. The decision maker can see a distribution of the differences between the two 
random values under each iteration: IDIQ Bid Price – DBB Bid Price (probability density 
function top right corner of Figure 24). Likewise, at the end of this simulation, the decision 
maker can see that there is a 56% probability of having a lower cost if using IDIQ contracting for 
the projects under consideration and with the given distribution of work. 
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FIGURE 24 Comparison of stochastic values.  
 
Due to the fact that a reliable distribution of work among different contract periods might 
be difficult to determine in an IDIQ contract, an effective decision making framework should 
conduct a sensitivity analysis considering multiple potential distributions of work. It must also 
clearly communicate the results of this analysis to the decision makers to facilitate de selection 
of the contracting method. Having this in mind, the authors designed the Decision Making 
Matrix shown in Figure 25, summarizing all possible distributions of work for up to three-year 
contracts. 
Each cell in the Decision Making Matrix shows the probability of having a lower IDIQ 
bid price for a different distribution of work. Figure 25 highlights the cell for the same example 
shown in Figure 24. The horizontal and vertical axis of the matrix correspond to the percentage 
of work conducted during the first and second contract periods, respectively. The percentage of 
work for the third year is incidental to values of the vertical and horizontal axis (100% - %work 
year 1 - %work year2).    
102 
 
 
 
FIGURE 25 Decision Making Matrix – IDIQ vs. DBB. 
 
The quantitative analysis in Figure 25 was conducted on a real micro-surfacing IDIQ 
contract awarded by MnDOT on June 2014. This was actually a two-year contract, which means 
that MnDOT would have increased its chances of achieving lower construction prices for IDIQ 
by performing at least 70% of the work during the first year. Regardless of the high uncertainty 
attributed to IDIQ in comparison with DBB contracting, which has led some to assume higher 
construction costs for IDIQ contracts due to higher contingencies considered by contractors, 
Figure 25 shows that for this specific project more than 90% of all possible distributions of work 
IDIQ outperforms DDB in terms of cost. Finding this in a single project does not make it 
conclusive argument, but it is something they might warrant further research. 
Rather than pointing out the “best” alternative to the agency, the decision making 
framework and matrix proposed in this paper are aimed to provide DOTs with tools to make 
better informed decision when selecting projects for IDIQ contracting. These tools are also 
intended to provide a base for discussion on the cost implications of using IDIQ contracting and 
the reasonable price (if any) to be paid for its benefits.  
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Conclusion 
During the last few decades, owners and contractors in the construction industry have 
invested considerable efforts in the development and implementation of alternative contracting 
as a measure to deal with the tighter schedules and budgets of today’s construction industry. 
Research has shown that implementing alternative contracting methods in the transportation 
construction industry has improved the contracting capabilities of DOTs by expanding the 
flexibility with which individual project requirements can be better addressed during 
procurement (Oyetunji and Anderson 2006). However, alternative contracting has also brought 
new challenges that if not effectively addressed, could prevent these agencies from taking full 
advantage of the benefits accrued via these methods. The increased number alternative 
contracting methods has expanded the options available to DOTs when determining the most 
suitable approach to deliver a given project. This paper’s objective is to add structure to that 
process by proposing a decision making framework to choose between IDIQ or a traditional 
DBB contracting. 
The proposed framework combines qualitative (scope-based) and quantitative (cost-
based) methods for the selection of suitable projects for IDIQ. The quantitative analysis was 
illustrated in this paper using the MnDOT IDIQ contracting program as a case study. This 
analysis combines bid data from previous projects, an alternative construction cost indexing 
system, non-linear regression, and Monte Carlo simulation techniques to stochastic develop cost 
models and compare IDIQ and DBB stochastic construction cost estimates for the same project. 
The analysis described in previous sections showed a statistically significant improvement in the 
accuracy of the stochastic estimates when compared with MnDOT’s current deterministic 
construction cost estimating methods. 
  The results of a sensitivity analysis conducted on the comparison of the stochastic 
estimates for IDIQ and DBB are presented to decision makers in a matrix, considering different 
distributions of work among various contract periods. The purpose of this matrix is to facilitate 
the interpretation of the framework’s output and provide DOTs with valuable information to 
make better decisions when selecting for IDIQ contracting.  
Finally, the analysis demonstrated that there is no clear answer to the question of whether 
the use of IDIQ contracting costs the DOT more or less than DBB. However, it did clearly prove 
the longstanding conventional wisdom in construction estimating: it depends on the specifics of 
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the given project, which also validates the construct articulated by Touran et al. (2009): “The 
project delivery method should be selected on the basis of each project’s unique characteristics.” 
Hence the primary contribution to the body of knowledge in this paper is a framework which 
structures IDIQ decision making process and furnishes improved quantitative output upon which 
a public agency can decide whether the costs of this alternative outweigh the benefits accrued by 
reducing the procurement process to a single transaction. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONSOLIDATED CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The literature review showed that current methods used to determine the suitability of 
projects for IDIQ contracting are mainly based on a qualitative assessment of the scope of the 
projects without regard to potential costs. Almost any group of projects that involves repetitive 
tasks is a good candidate for IDIQ contracting. The literature review also revealed that the lack 
formal tools to determine the cost consequences of the selection of procurement strategies for a 
given project is a common issue in the realm of alternative contracting methods. This dissertation 
presented an IDIQ project selection framework that incorporates a cost-related criterion through 
the stochastic comparison of estimated IDIQ construction costs for a project or a group of 
projects against the expected costs if a traditional DBB is used. This framework has been 
presented in Chapter 7 using data from both MnDOT’s traditional DBB and its newly adopted 
IDIQ program. 
The construction cost estimating process for both IDIQ and DBB was conducted using 
estimating models proposed by the author, which have statistically proven to be significantly 
more accurate than MnDOT current estimating practices. The development and comparison of 
stochastic construction cost estimates for both alternatives involves the use of historical bid data, 
a construction cost indexing system created by the author, non-linear regression techniques, and 
Monte Carlo simulation. In order to simplify the communication of the results of the stochastic 
comparison to the decision makers, and to increase the “user friendliness” of this framework, the 
framework’s output has been organized into a Decision Making Matrix. Rather than work as a 
sole decision-making criterion, the framework and final matrix are intended to inform the 
decision making process of the potential cost implications of using IDIQ, which in turn can be 
assessed against the benefits provided by this alternative contracting method.  
Before developing the framework, the author studied various aspects impacting budget 
control and IDIQ construction costs. The first aspect was the degree of early contractor 
involvement (ECI) in IDIQ contracts, which was evaluated through a comparison of a worldwide 
multiple-award IDIQ contract awarded by the US Department of Defense and the fully integrated 
collaborative alliance agreement use in New Zealand for the reconstruction work after the 
earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 (Chapter 4). This study found that regardless of the similarities 
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between these two contracting approaches, the lower level of integration of all parties involved 
in a multiple award IDIQ contract is limiting the use of ECI practices. In fact, it was found that 
single award IDIQ contracts are more suitable for the application ECI practices. 
Because of the multi-year format of IDIQ, the research evaluated the applicability of 
twelve existing construction cost indexes (CCIs) in IDIQ contracts (Chapter 5). Eight years of 
MnDOT historical bid data were used to test the efficacy of the existing CCIs. The evaluation 
found that contrary to conventional engineering economic theory, using a single CII to model 
future escalation in construction prices at the project level fails to furnish a reliable outcome 
when using these indexes to adjust unit prices in IDIQ contracts. This is due to the fact that 
relative volatility in the different commodities used in a single project is high. Use of a single 
index to adjust unit prices for all types of projects incorrectly assumes that changes in the 
construction market have the same impact on prices for all types of work. The study proved that 
this assumption actually made estimates of asphalt paving projects the least accurate, which, 
unfortunately, is the most common type of work done by state transportation agencies. The 
contribution here is to demonstrate the need for alternative tools to adjust unit prices in IDIQ, as 
well as all multi-year contracts.  
The higher level of uncertainty on IDIQ contracts due to their “indefinite” nature creates 
new risk management challenges for state transportation agencies. Recognizing the need for 
research in this area, an IDIQ risk management framework was developed to guide DOTs on risk 
planning and monitoring activities on this type of contracts (Chapter 6). This framework includes 
a Risk Planning Reference Sheet which describes eight common risk events in IDIQ contracts. 
The reference sheet explains the causes and effects of these potential risk situations as well as 
provides DOTs with different strategies to mitigate, avoid, or transfer this risk. 
In addition to the research limitations stated in each of the papers contained in this 
doctoral dissertation, it should be noted that the stochastic IDIQ project selection framework and 
all other findings obtained from using the data provided by MnDOT are only applicable to 
construction/maintenance projects executed by this agency. The framework is intended to be 
flexible enough to be used by other transportation agencies; however, the outcome will be 
always constrained by the data source and the quantity, quality, and other characteristics of the 
data.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
This chapter discusses the main findings drawn during the elaboration of this dissertation 
and the most relevant contributions from the four academic articles compiled in this document. 
Furthermore, this chapter presents some recommendations for future research aimed to improve 
the stochastic IDIQ project selection framework proposed in this dissertation as well as other 
aspects of IDIQ contracting. Further research should be also focused on looking for opportunities 
for the implementation of this framework with other agencies and alternative contracting 
methods. 
 
Contributions 
The main contribution of this dissertation is a stochastic decision making framework for 
the selection of suitable highway construction projects for IDIQ contracting. Additionally, the 
final dissertation document will include an assessment of current IDIQ contracting practices in 
the transportation industry, as well as some effective practices and improvement opportunities 
that may help to optimize IDIQ construction costs. Other important contributions are mentioned 
below. 
 
 Benefits of Implementing and Alliance-like Contracting Approach in the US: The 
comparison made in Chapter 4 between a major IDIQ contract awarded by the US 
Department of Defense and the Collaborating Alliance Agreement use in NZ revealed 
substantial similarities between these two contracting approaches. However, the author 
found that in some aspects the collaborating alliancing agreement outperforms the major 
task order contracts used in the US. This study could be used to support the arguments 
made by those advocating for the implementation for enhanced integration in contracting 
practices in the US or by policy makers when evaluating the possibility and potential 
benefits of implementing alliancing-like contracts in the US.     
 Analysis of existing construction cost indexes: The analysis of existing construction cost 
indexes presented in Chapter 5 to evaluate their performance tracking changes in the 
construction market at the project level offers a better understanding of the capabilities 
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and limitations of this tools. A full understanding the matching and proportionality 
principles introduced by the author in this paper can be used to develop construction cost 
indexing systems for specific agencies that furnish enhanced flexibility and accuracy. 
 IDIQ Risk Management Framework: The IDIQ risk management framework proposed in 
Chapter 6 is intended to be used by DOTs as a reference to create their own risk 
management programs for IDIQ contracting. This framework explains how to take 
advantage of some unique characteristics of IDIQ contracting to improve risk monitoring 
and control activities in this type of contracts. 
 IDIQ Planning Reference Sheet: As part of the IDIQ risk management framework, the 
planning reference sheet presented in Chapter 6 can be used by state transportation 
agencies to evaluate the causes and effects of eight potential risk events in IDIQ 
contracts. Likewise, this reference sheet suggests different risk mitigation strategies for 
each of the eight risk events. 
 Data-driven Construction Cost Estimating Models: The non-linear regression equations 
developed in Chapter 7 to model the relationship between bid quantities and unit prices in 
transportation construction contracts are an example of the potential benefits DOTs could 
obtain from an appropriate use of the large amounts of bid data collected and stored by 
these agencies.     
 
Recommendation for Future Research 
 
The rapid growth in the use of IDIQ contracting techniques by state DOTs during the last 
few years and the little existing literature on this matter have increased the need for further 
research intended to gain a better understanding of the benefits, disadvantage, and implications 
of using IDIQ contracts. An effective implementation of IDIQ contracting techniques requires an 
adequate understanding of this contracting approach. The following list of future research topics 
suggested by the author are expected to fill gaps in the body of knowledge, optimizing and 
providing a better understanding of IDIQ contracting practices. This list also includes 
recommendations for future research not directly related to IDIQ that arose from the 
development of this dissertation as well as some ideas of how to apply the findings of this 
dissertation to other contracting methods and industries. 
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 Stochastic IDIQ project selection framework preliminary implementation: A case study. 
 A comprehensive data-driven analysis of the cost implications of using IDIQ contracting. 
 Analysis of the applicability of the stochastic IDIQ project selection framework in 
multiple award IDIQ contracts. 
 Analysis of the applicability of the stochastic IDIQ project selection framework in other 
state DOTs, federal agencies, and other industries. 
 A guidebook for multiple-award IDIQ contracting for state DOTs. 
 “No blame/no disputes” in the US construction industry: a feasibility study.      
 Combination of major task order contracts used by the US Department of Defense into a 
single collaborative alliancing agreement: a feasibility study 
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APPENDIX A 
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HISTORICAL BID DATA 
 The historical bid data collected from MnDOT website and used in this dissertation 
corresponds to all contracts awarded between January 2008 and April 2015. There was a total of 
1,746 contracts awarded throughout that period of time, and were distributed as presented below 
in Table A.1 and Table A.2.  
TABLE A.1  Contract Distribution by Year 
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS = 1361 
 Annual 
1st 
Half 
2nd 
Half 
Quarter 
1 
Quarter 
2 
Quarter 
3 
Quarter 
4 
2008 163 126 37 45 81 24 13 
2009 287 208 79 88 120 45 34 
2010 224 167 57 66 101 34 23 
2011 219 167 52 71 96 29 23 
2012 238 185 53 74 111 26 27 
2013 294 242 52 75 167 16 36 
2014 240 152 88 56 96 36 52 
2015 81 81 - 67 14 - - 
    
TABLE A.2  Contract Distribution by District 
 
District No. of Contracts 
1 171 
2 127 
3 204 
4 142 
6 576 
7 244 
8 150 
Metro 132 
Total 1746 
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APPENDIX B 
INDEFINITE DELIVERY/INDEFINITE QUANTITY SAMPLE PROJECTS 
 
 
 This appendix presents the sample projects used in Chapter 5 and the original MnDOT 
contracts used to form these sample projects. A further explanation about how these sample 
projects were selected and form is presented in Chapter 5. This appendix also contains the actual 
unit price for each sample project calculated from MnDOT historical bid data. The four sample 
projects are presented as shown below: 
 
 B.1  Asphalt Pavement Project 
 B.2  Concrete Pavement Project 
 B.3  Traffic Barriers Project 
 B.4  Drainage Project 
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B.1  Asphalt Pavement Project 
 
TABLE B.1.1  Asphalt Pavement - Original Contract 
Original Contract 
Description 
Bituminous Surfacing, Aggregate 
Shouldering, Guardrail 
Contract ID 80117 
S.P. Number 1213-10 
Letting Date 06/06/2008 
District 8 
 
TABLE B.1.2  Asphalt Pavement - Original Contract Pay Items 
Item 
Number 
Item ID Description Units 
% of 
Total Cost 
1 2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS 2.08% 
2 
2051501/00010 
MAINT AND RESTORATION OF HAUL 
ROADS   LS Removed 
3 2104509/00055 REMOVE TWISTED END TREATMENT   EACH 0.09% 
4 2104521/00220 SALVAGE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F 0.08% 
5 2104601/01011 HAUL SALVAGED MATERIAL   LS 0.05% 
6 2105501/00010 COMMON EXCAVATION   C Y 0.07% 
7 2221501/00010 AGGREGATE SHOULDERING CLASS 1   TON 3.20% 
8 2221604/00010 AGGREGATE SHOULDERING   S Y 0.17% 
9 2232501/00040 MILL BITUMINOUS SURFACE (1.5")   S Y 0.38% 
10 2232602/00010 MILLED RUMBLE STRIPS   EACH 0.44% 
11 
2357606/00010 
BITUMINOUS MATERIAL FOR 
SHOULDER TACK   GAL 0.07% 
12 
2360501/22200 
TYPE SP 12.5 WEARING COURSE 
MIXTURE (2,B)   TON 87.15% 
13 2411507/00060 CONCRETE END POST EACH Removed 
14 2540602/00150 MAIL BOX SUPPORT EACH Removed 
15 2554501/00001 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN SPECIAL   L F 0.69% 
16 2554501/02007 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN B8307   L F 0.33% 
17 2554501/02038 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN B8338   L F 0.58% 
18 2554521/00020 ANCHORAGE ASSEMBLY-PLATE BEAM   EACH 0.12% 
19 2554523/00028 END TREATMENT-TANGENT TERMINAL   EACH 0.25% 
20 2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS 1.01% 
21 2580603/00010 INTERIM PAVEMENT MARKING   L F 0.39% 
22 
2582501/03008 
PAVEMENT MESSAGE (STOP AHEAD) 
EPOXY   EACH 0.15% 
23 2582502/41104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-EPOXY   L F 2.17% 
24 2582502/41524 24" STOP LINE WHITE-EPOXY   L F 0.03% 
25 2582502/42104 4" SOLID LINE YELLOW-EPOXY   L F 0.25% 
26 2582502/42204 4" BROKEN LINE YELLOW-EPOXY   L F 0.23% 
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TABLE B.1.3  Asphalt Pavement – Sample Project 
Item ID Description Units 
% of 
Total 
Cost 
Items 
Represented 
2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS   2.08% 1 
2104501/00042 REMOVE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F  0.09% 3 
2104521/00220 SALVAGE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F  0.13% 4-5 
2105501/00010 COMMON EXCAVATION   C Y  0.07% 6 
2211503/00050 AGGREGATE BASE (CV) CLASS 5   C Y  3.37% 7-8 
2232501/00040 MILL BITUMINOUS SURFACE (1.5")   S Y  0.38% 9 
2232603/00025 MILLED RUMBLE STRIPS   L F  0.44% 10 
2356505/00010 BITUMINOUS MATERIAL FOR SEAL COAT   GAL  0.00% 0 
2360501/23200 
TYPE SP 12.5 WEARING COURSE MIXTURE 
(3,B)   TON  87.23% 11-12 
2554501/02038 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN B8338   L F  1.97% 15-19 
2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS   1.01% 20 
2582502/11104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-PAINT   L F  0.39% 21 
2582502/41104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-EPOXY   L F  2.34% 22-24 
2582502/42104 4" SOLID LINE YELLOW-EPOXY   L F  0.25% 25 
2582502/42204 4" BROKEN LINE YELLOW-EPOXY   L F  0.23% 26 
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TABLE B.1.4  Asphalt Pavement – Actual Unit Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2021501/00010 2104501/00042 2104521/00220 2105501/00010 2211503/00050 2232501/00040 2232603/00025 2360501/23200 2554501/02038 2563601/00010 2582502/11104 2582502/41104 2582502/42104 2582502/42204
LS  L F L F C Y C Y S Y L F TON L F LS  L F L F L F L F 
Year Period Quantity 1 385 364 63 2533 1518 74905 31410 1467 1 101038 177221 14059 16914
Unit price 31,231.25$       3.65$                 5.37$                 17.47$               19.97$               3.76$                 0.09$                 41.66$               20.19$               15,104.01$       0.06$                 0.20$                 0.27$                 0.21$                 
Extension 31,231.25$       1,402.90$         1,954.57$         1,102.91$         50,599.18$       5,704.64$         6,554.20$         1,308,392.26$ 29,614.42$       15,104.01$       5,917.92$         35,127.76$       3,802.86$         3,491.12$         1,500,000.00$ 
Unit price 38,408.07$       3.47$                 5.77$                 17.68$               18.34$               4.14$                 0.09$                 52.46$               18.20$               18,574.85$       0.09$                 0.19$                 0.19$                 0.23$                 
Extension 38,408.07$       1,333.93$         2,101.36$         1,115.89$         46,469.39$       6,280.66$         6,939.09$         1,647,868.63$ 26,695.56$       18,574.85$       9,001.51$         33,254.66$       2,688.38$         3,962.04$         1,844,694.02$ 
Unit price 31,765.85$       3.50$                 6.94$                 16.90$               21.31$               3.49$                 0.12$                 43.59$               18.41$               15,362.55$       0.08$                 0.23$                 0.25$                 0.23$                 
Extension 31,765.85$       1,347.62$         2,526.91$         1,066.73$         53,974.78$       5,295.46$         8,911.31$         1,369,002.33$ 27,004.79$       15,362.55$       8,224.76$         40,924.84$       3,448.61$         3,947.80$         1,525,675.93$ 
Unit price 38,149.35$       3.23$                 6.44$                 21.71$               20.84$               4.40$                 0.10$                 53.49$               17.50$               18,449.73$       0.07$                 0.22$                 0.26$                 0.27$                 
Extension 38,149.35$       1,241.01$         2,343.75$         1,370.45$         52,805.59$       6,677.05$         7,441.59$         1,679,966.14$ 25,672.84$       18,449.73$       7,033.92$         39,565.49$       3,590.38$         4,559.87$         1,832,268.10$ 
Unit price 38,869.51$       3.25$                 11.58$               20.93$               20.26$               4.83$                 0.07$                 54.56$               17.65$               18,798.01$       0.09$                 0.22$                 0.30$                 0.24$                 
Extension 38,869.51$       1,250.36$         4,215.27$         1,321.28$         51,323.63$       7,323.10$         5,561.61$         1,713,804.36$ 25,889.18$       18,798.01$       8,790.54$         39,181.53$       4,214.11$         3,981.63$         1,866,856.58$ 
Unit price 36,959.62$       3.49$                 10.28$               16.40$               21.83$               5.19$                 0.09$                 51.06$               18.24$               17,874.35$       0.10$                 0.27$                 0.31$                 0.31$                 
Extension 36,959.62$       1,343.87$         3,742.66$         1,035.26$         55,299.24$       7,883.71$         7,069.07$         1,603,704.77$ 26,748.44$       17,874.35$       10,486.81$       48,084.47$       4,428.34$         5,300.21$         1,775,126.85$ 
Unit price 39,789.12$       3.78$                 11.88$               23.04$               23.10$               5.78$                 0.09$                 55.16$               19.94$               19,242.75$       0.13$                 0.26$                 0.33$                 0.28$                 
Extension 39,789.12$       1,452.92$         4,322.63$         1,454.45$         58,532.11$       8,775.40$         6,628.95$         1,732,710.35$ 29,253.63$       19,242.75$       12,874.89$       45,604.86$       4,607.48$         4,806.66$         1,911,024.34$ 
Unit price 40,418.65$       3.02$                 12.41$               33.41$               22.27$               7.39$                 0.09$                 55.58$               18.05$               19,547.20$       0.17$                 0.32$                 0.48$                 0.38$                 
Extension 40,418.65$       1,160.83$         4,518.24$         2,109.24$         56,423.92$       11,215.88$       6,948.50$         1,745,841.34$ 26,471.68$       19,547.20$       17,480.08$       55,891.73$       6,792.08$         6,406.34$         1,941,259.87$ 
Unit price 46,993.15$       3.82$                 15.78$               28.15$               23.22$               6.67$                 0.15$                 64.72$               19.09$               22,726.75$       0.26$                 0.38$                 0.52$                 0.35$                 
Extension 46,993.15$       1,470.58$         5,742.04$         1,776.95$         58,818.52$       10,127.43$       11,566.59$       2,032,823.84$ 28,008.87$       22,726.75$       26,042.63$       67,446.91$       7,309.29$         5,891.78$         2,257,025.43$ 
Unit price 45,508.79$       3.25$                 12.37$               25.42$               25.84$               7.21$                 0.18$                 62.35$               18.18$               22,008.89$       0.23$                 0.37$                 0.45$                 0.41$                 
Extension 45,508.79$       1,249.16$         4,501.98$         1,604.60$         65,472.99$       10,947.40$       13,527.24$       1,958,341.18$ 26,668.63$       22,008.89$       23,724.74$       66,444.47$       6,374.59$         6,876.39$         2,185,733.38$ 
Unit price 48,501.11$       3.11$                 13.59$               26.18$               28.05$               7.63$                 0.14$                 65.66$               18.83$               23,456.03$       0.40$                 0.43$                 0.91$                 0.57$                 
Extension 48,501.11$       1,198.09$         4,946.95$         1,652.93$         71,050.11$       11,578.05$       10,637.09$       2,062,343.74$ 27,616.95$       23,456.03$       40,277.84$       75,607.61$       12,832.91$       9,708.27$         2,329,450.54$ 
Item Number
Units
Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2012 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2013
Q2-Q3
TOTAL
Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2009 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2010 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2011
2008
1
3
8
 
1
2
3
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B.2  Concrete Pavement Project 
 
TABLE B.2.1  Concrete Pavement - Original Contract 
Original Contract 
Description Concrete Pavement 
Contract ID 120038 
S.P. Number 2770-01 
Letting Date 03/23/2012 
District Metro 
 
TABLE B.2.2  Concrete Pavement – Original Contract Unit Prices 
Item 
Number 
Item ID Description Units 
% of Total 
Cost 
1 2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS 10.79% 
2 2104501/00022 REMOVE CURB AND GUTTER   L F 6.23% 
3 2104505/00120 REMOVE BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT   S Y 3.74% 
4 
2104513/00011 
SAWING BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT (FULL 
DEPTH)   L F 1.91% 
5 2104523/00004 SALVAGE CASTING   EACH 0.76% 
6 2105501/00010 COMMON EXCAVATION   C Y 3.09% 
7 2105525/00030 TOPSOIL BORROW (CV)   C Y 1.36% 
8 2301511/00010 STRUCTURAL CONCRETE   C Y 30.83% 
9 2301538/00010 DOWEL BAR   EACH 5.53% 
10 2301541/00404 INTEGRANT CURB DESIGN D4   L F 5.66% 
11 2301604/03080 PLACE CONCRETE PAVEMENT 8.0"   S Y 24.87% 
12 2506503/00010 RECONSTRUCT DRAINAGE STRUCTURE   L F Removed 
13 2506516/00010 CASTING ASSEMBLY   EACH Removed 
14 2506521/00010 INSTALL CASTING   EACH Removed 
15 
2531501/02000 
CONCRETE CURB & GUTTER DESIGN 
SPECIAL   L F 
Removed 
16 2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS 2.61% 
17 2563602/00002 RAISED PAVEMENT MARKER TEMPORARY   EACH 0.05% 
18 2573530/00010 STORM DRAIN INLET PROTECTION   EACH Removed 
19 2575555/00010 TURF ESTABLISHMENT   LS Removed 
20 
2581501/00010 
REMOVABLE PREFORMED PLASTIC 
MARKING   L F 1.15% 
21 
2581603/00020 
REMOVABLE PREFORMED PLASTIC MASK 
(BLACK)   L F 0.54% 
22 2582502/41104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-EPOXY   L F 0.88% 
  
 
 
125 
 
 
TABLE B.2.3  Concrete Pavement – Sample Contract 
Item ID Description Units 
% of 
Total 
Cost 
Items 
Represented 
2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS 10.79% 1 
2104501/00022 REMOVE CURB AND GUTTER   L F 6.23% 2 
2104505/00120 REMOVE BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT   S Y 3.74% 3 
2104513/00011 
SAWING BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT (FULL 
DEPTH)   L F 1.91% 4 
2104521/00220 SALVAGE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F 0.76% 5 
2105501/00010 COMMON EXCAVATION   C Y 3.09% 6 
2105522/00030 SELECT GRANULAR BORROW (CV)   C Y 1.36% 7 
2301511/00010 STRUCTURAL CONCRETE   C Y 61.36% 8,10-11 
2401541/00011 REINFORCEMENT BARS (EPOXY COATED)   LB 5.53% 9 
2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS 2.66% 16-17 
2582502/31104 
4" SOLID LINE WHITE-POLY PREFORM 
(GROUND IN)   L F 1.69% 20-21 
2582502/41104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-EPOXY   L F 0.88% 22 
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TABLE B.2.4  Concrete Pavement – Actual Unit Prices 
 
 
2021501/00010 2104501/00022 2104505/00120 2104513/00011 2104521/00220 2105501/00010 2105522/00030 2301511/00010 2401541/00011 2563601/00010 2582502/31104 2582502/41104
LS  L F S Y L F L F C Y C Y C Y LB  LS  L F L F 
Year Period Quantity 1 31543 23950 14634 1923 4399 1187 10582 44512 1 7401 46297
Unit price 161,833.97$    2.96$                 2.34$                 1.96$                 5.91$                 10.54$               17.19$               86.98$                 1.86$                 39,895.16$      3.43$                 0.28$                 
Extension 161,833.97$    93,510.90$      56,079.25$      28,677.90$      11,363.27$      46,359.63$      20,405.60$      920,470.54$      82,897.13$      39,895.16$      25,369.96$      13,136.69$      1,500,000.00$  
Unit price 179,400.08$    2.19$                 2.18$                 2.10$                 6.35$                 10.66$               16.98$               103.98$               1.57$                 44,225.54$      3.41$                 0.27$                 
Extension 179,400.08$    69,082.11$      52,239.87$      30,736.31$      12,216.66$      46,905.07$      20,157.78$      1,100,375.04$   69,827.79$      44,225.54$      25,213.57$      12,436.21$      1,662,816.01$  
Unit price 190,950.55$    2.41$                 2.24$                 1.94$                 7.64$                 10.19$               18.94$               111.60$               1.46$                 47,072.95$      4.14$                 0.33$                 
Extension 190,950.55$    75,932.58$      53,687.70$      28,340.57$      14,690.70$      44,838.74$      22,479.54$      1,180,945.22$   64,952.82$      47,072.95$      30,678.54$      15,304.62$      1,769,874.54$  
Unit price 180,934.32$    2.98$                 2.65$                 2.15$                 7.09$                 13.10$               19.00$               100.78$               1.35$                 44,603.76$      3.71$                 0.32$                 
Extension 180,934.32$    93,975.22$      63,420.11$      31,391.87$      13,625.86$      57,605.38$      22,550.55$      1,066,416.88$   60,222.20$      44,603.76$      27,494.10$      14,796.26$      1,677,036.50$  
Unit price 167,611.26$    2.78$                 3.03$                 2.02$                 12.75$               12.63$               21.43$               88.84$                 1.49$                 41,319.37$      3.82$                 0.32$                 
Extension 167,611.26$    87,584.36$      72,613.64$      29,562.29$      24,506.32$      55,538.42$      25,443.26$      940,162.14$      66,270.29$      41,319.37$      28,284.30$      14,652.68$      1,553,548.33$  
Unit price 174,275.12$    3.04$                 2.89$                 2.26$                 11.32$               9.89$                 19.76$               94.25$                 1.53$                 42,962.14$      3.76$                 0.39$                 
Extension 174,275.12$    95,820.26$      69,100.44$      33,003.22$      21,758.72$      43,515.91$      23,458.41$      997,398.24$      68,231.14$      42,962.14$      27,808.27$      17,982.10$      1,615,313.96$  
Unit price 176,394.32$    3.79$                 3.28$                 2.32$                 13.07$               13.90$               20.70$               90.48$                 1.57$                 43,484.56$      3.77$                 0.37$                 
Extension 176,394.32$    119,413.72$    78,645.90$      33,879.91$      25,130.48$      61,136.26$      24,574.91$      957,499.18$      69,853.48$      43,484.56$      27,888.79$      17,054.80$      1,634,956.31$  
Unit price 208,408.73$    3.68$                 4.07$                 2.22$                 13.66$               20.16$               18.24$               110.14$               1.75$                 51,376.72$      3.39$                 0.45$                 
Extension 208,408.73$    116,120.75$    97,570.59$      32,441.77$      26,267.71$      88,659.37$      21,651.70$      1,165,475.83$   77,741.77$      51,376.72$      25,073.51$      20,901.77$      1,931,690.23$  
Unit price 197,870.35$    3.51$                 4.08$                 2.23$                 17.36$               16.98$               21.88$               102.65$               1.68$                 48,778.81$      3.48$                 0.54$                 
Extension 197,870.35$    110,835.69$    97,623.18$      32,699.78$      33,382.47$      74,692.10$      25,977.93$      1,086,218.30$   74,987.07$      48,778.81$      25,723.77$      25,223.05$      1,834,012.49$  
Unit price 205,170.61$    3.44$                 4.14$                 2.45$                 13.61$               15.33$               20.11$               109.57$               1.69$                 50,578.46$      3.43$                 0.54$                 
Extension 205,170.61$    108,446.98$    99,196.53$      35,799.95$      26,173.17$      67,447.68$      23,873.47$      1,159,441.25$   75,297.80$      50,578.46$      25,402.77$      24,848.17$      1,901,676.84$  
Unit price 221,792.98$    3.93$                 4.11$                 2.34$                 14.96$               15.80$               25.09$               120.06$               1.55$                 54,676.19$      3.63$                 0.61$                 
Extension 221,792.98$    124,039.43$    98,442.86$      34,233.47$      28,760.08$      69,479.19$      29,788.05$      1,270,482.92$   68,912.10$      54,676.19$      26,863.39$      28,274.90$      2,055,745.57$  
Item Number
Units
2011 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2012 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2013
Q2-Q3
TOTAL
2008
Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2009 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2010 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
1
2
6
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B.3  Traffic Barriers Project 
 
TABLE B.3.1  Traffic Barriers - Original Contract 
Original Contract 
Description Tension Cable Guardrail 
Contract ID 80115 
S.P. Number 0282-28 
Letting Date 06/06/2008 
District Metro 
 
TABLE B.3.2  Traffic Barriers – Original Contract Unit Prices 
Item 
Number Item ID Description Units 
% of 
Total 
Cost 
1 2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS   2.96% 
2 2104501/00018 REMOVE PIPE SEWERS   L F  0.03% 
3 2104501/00042 REMOVE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F  0.77% 
4 2104509/00106 REMOVE CATCH BASIN GRATE CASTING   EACH 0.02% 
5 2105523/00010 COMMON BORROW (LV)   C Y  0.08% 
6 2105603/00010 MINOR GRADING   L F  0.29% 
7 2211501/00050 AGGREGATE BASE CLASS 5   TON  0.13% 
8 2501569/02912 12" RC SAFETY APRON   EACH 0.05% 
9 2503541/90122 12" RC PIPE SEWER DESIGN 3006   L F  0.11% 
10 2506522/00011 ADJUST FRAME & RING CASTING   EACH 0.03% 
11 2506602/00024 CONNECT INTO EXISTING CATCH BASIN   EACH 0.03% 
12 2506602/00034 GRATE CASTING NO 716   EACH 0.07% 
13 
2533507/00010 
PORTABLE PRECAST CONCRETE BARRIER 
DESIGN 8337   L F  0.58% 
14 2554501/00001 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN SPECIAL   L F  0.54% 
15 2554501/00040 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN BULLNOSE   L F  3.52% 
16 2554501/02038 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN B8338   L F  13.72% 
17 2554521/00020 ANCHORAGE ASSEMBLY-PLATE BEAM   EACH 0.37% 
18 2554523/00028 END TREATMENT-TANGENT TERMINAL   EACH 2.92% 
19 2554602/00005 IMPACT ATTENUATOR BARRELS   EACH 0.39% 
20 2554602/00040 T-BARRIER BRIDGE CONN DES 8318   EACH 0.05% 
21 2554603/00080 TENSION CABLE GUARDRAIL   L F  69.87% 
22 2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS   3.47% 
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TABLE B.3.3  Traffic Barriers – Sample Contract 
Item ID Description Units 
% of Total 
Cost 
Items 
Represente
d 
2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS 2.96% 1 
2104501/00016 REMOVE SEWER PIPE (STORM)   L F 0.03% 2 
2104501/00042 REMOVE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F 0.77% 3-4 
2105522/00030 SELECT GRANULAR BORROW (CV)   C Y 0.08% 5-6 
2211503/00050 AGGREGATE BASE (CV) CLASS 5   C Y 0.13% 7 
2501511/20180 18" CS PIPE CULVERT   L F 0.05% 8 
2503541/90122 12" RC PIPE SEWER DESIGN 3006   L F 0.11% 9-12 
2554501/02038 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN B8338   L F 22.09% 13-20 
2554603/00080 TENSION CABLE GUARDRAIL   L F 69.87% 21 
2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS 3.47% 22 
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TABLE B.3.4  Traffic Barriers – Actual Unit Prices 
 
 
 
2021501/00010 2104501/00016 2104501/00042 2105522/00030 2211503/00050 2501511/20180 2503541/90122 2554501/02038 2554603/00080 2563601/00010
LS  L F L F C Y C Y L F L F L F L F LS  
Year Period Quantity 1 42 3998 318 75 12 86 16410 49374 1
Unit price 44,426.36$       10.69$               2.98$                  17.19$               26.39$               63.43$               42.18$               20.19$               21.23$               52,055.02$       
Extension 44,426.36$       444.91$             11,913.53$       5,471.15$         1,990.18$         773.17$             3,642.78$         331,300.44$     1,047,982.45$ 52,055.02$       1,500,000.00$   
Unit price 44,863.43$       12.03$               2.83$                  16.98$               24.23$               49.95$               36.96$               18.20$               22.19$               52,567.14$       
Extension 44,863.43$       501.06$             11,327.88$       5,404.70$         1,827.75$         608.87$             3,191.90$         298,646.87$     1,095,817.39$ 52,567.14$       1,514,756.98$   
Unit price 42,168.70$       10.98$               2.86$                  18.94$               28.15$               65.58$               32.46$               18.41$               20.38$               49,409.68$       
Extension 42,168.70$       456.97$             11,444.07$       6,027.21$         2,122.95$         799.43$             2,803.09$         302,106.18$     1,006,434.45$ 49,409.68$       1,423,772.73$   
Unit price 40,776.77$       10.06$               2.64$                  19.00$               27.54$               47.80$               42.17$               17.50$               19.80$               47,778.74$       
Extension 40,776.77$       418.79$             10,538.78$       6,046.25$         2,076.96$         582.74$             3,641.97$         287,205.49$     977,709.57$     47,778.74$       1,376,776.07$   
Unit price 44,443.19$       10.77$               2.66$                  21.43$               26.77$               55.08$               43.37$               17.65$               22.08$               52,074.74$       
Extension 44,443.19$       448.31$             10,618.17$       6,821.85$         2,018.67$         671.44$             3,745.17$         289,625.68$     1,090,100.93$ 52,074.74$       1,500,568.15$   
Unit price 42,582.64$       11.84$               2.85$                  19.76$               28.84$               50.95$               43.01$               18.24$               20.69$               49,894.71$       
Extension 42,582.64$       492.93$             11,412.22$       6,289.67$         2,175.04$         621.14$             3,714.51$         299,238.42$     1,021,327.74$ 49,894.71$       1,437,749.02$   
Unit price 52,371.28$       10.88$               3.09$                  20.70$               30.53$               49.80$               36.70$               19.94$               26.37$               61,364.20$       
Extension 52,371.28$       453.21$             12,338.29$       6,589.02$         2,302.20$         607.13$             3,169.69$         327,264.26$     1,301,790.82$ 61,364.20$       1,768,250.10$   
Unit price 51,587.47$       12.46$               2.47$                  18.24$               29.43$               63.81$               45.56$               18.05$               26.54$               60,445.79$       
Extension 51,587.47$       518.73$             9,857.90$         5,805.25$         2,219.28$         777.82$             3,934.22$         296,142.28$     1,310,496.85$ 60,445.79$       1,741,785.58$   
Unit price 52,548.93$       13.44$               3.12$                  21.88$               30.67$               67.31$               51.40$               19.09$               26.72$               61,572.36$       
Extension 52,548.93$       559.40$             12,488.32$       6,965.20$         2,313.46$         820.50$             4,438.31$         313,338.94$     1,319,202.88$ 61,572.36$       1,774,248.32$   
Unit price 41,228.35$       13.54$               2.65$                  20.11$               34.15$               64.46$               39.33$               18.18$               19.84$               48,307.87$       
Extension 41,228.35$       563.62$             10,607.97$       6,400.95$         2,575.20$         785.74$             3,395.98$         298,345.60$     979,811.89$     48,307.87$       1,392,023.17$   
Unit price 40,723.06$       15.54$               2.54$                  25.09$               37.05$               85.02$               45.68$               18.83$               19.26$               47,715.81$       
Extension 40,723.06$       647.08$             10,174.26$       7,986.77$         2,794.56$         1,036.46$         3,944.87$         308,954.55$     950,985.28$     47,715.81$       1,374,962.70$   
Item Number
Units
2011 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2012 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2013
Q2-Q3
TOTAL
2008
Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2009 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2010 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
1
2
9
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B.4  Drainage Project 
 
TABLE B.4.1  Drainage - Original Contract 
Original Contract 
Description Drainage Structures and Pipe Culverts 
Contract ID 100129 
S.P. Number 0303-62 
Letting Date 06/04/2010 
District 4 
 
TABLE B.4.2  Drainage – Original Contract Unit Prices 
Item 
Number Item ID Description Units 
% of 
Total 
Cost 
1 2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS   5.65% 
2 
2051501/00010 
MAINT AND RESTORATION OF HAUL 
ROADS   LS   Removed 
3 2104501/00022 REMOVE CURB AND GUTTER   L F  0.05% 
4 2104505/00120 REMOVE BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT   S Y  0.06% 
5 2104509/00013 REMOVE PIPE APRON   EACH 0.86% 
6 2104509/00102 REMOVE CATCH BASIN   EACH 0.10% 
7 2104509/00105 REMOVE CASTING   EACH 0.04% 
8 
2104513/00011 
SAWING BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT (FULL 
DEPTH)   L F  0.09% 
9 2105522/00010 SELECT GRANULAR BORROW (LV)   C Y  0.14% 
10 2105601/00010 DEWATERING   LS   12.01% 
11 
2360501/23200 
TYPE SP 12.5 WEARING COURSE MIXTURE 
(3,B)   TON  0.41% 
12 2501511/90249 24" RC PIPE CULVERT CLASS V-JACKED   L F  41.64% 
13 2501511/90309 30" RC PIPE CULVERT CLASS V-JACKED   L F  22.43% 
14 2501515/90240 24" RC PIPE APRON   EACH 0.88% 
15 2501515/90300 30" RC PIPE APRON   EACH 0.58% 
16 2501569/01024 24" CS SAFETY APRON   EACH 1.26% 
17 2501569/02924 24" RC SAFETY APRON   EACH 0.44% 
18 2501602/00011 PLUG & ABANDON PIPE CULVERT   EACH 3.76% 
19 2501603/00124 LINING CULVERT PIPE (24")   L F  6.82% 
20 
2506501/00070 
CONSTRUCT DRAINAGE STRUCTURE 
DESIGN G   L F  0.44% 
21 2506516/00010 CASTING ASSEMBLY   EACH 0.19% 
22 2519607/00010 CLSM LOW DENSITY   C Y  Removed 
23 2531501/02320 CONCRETE CURB & GUTTER DESIGN B624   L F  Removed 
24 2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS   2.15% 
25 2573502/00040 SILT FENCE, TYPE MACHINE SLICED   L F  Removed 
26 2575555/00010 TURF ESTABLISHMENT   LS   Removed 
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TABLE B.4.3  Drainage – Sample Contract 
Item ID Description 
Unit
s 
% of Total 
Cost 
Items 
Represented 
2021501/00010 MOBILIZATION   LS   5.65% 1 
2104501/00022 REMOVE CURB AND GUTTER   L F  2.46% 3, (1/5 of 10) 
2104505/00120 REMOVE BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT   S Y  2.47% 4, (1/5 of 10) 
2104501/00042 REMOVE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM   L F  3.40% 5-7, (1/5 of 10) 
2104513/00011 
SAWING BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT (FULL 
DEPTH)   L F  2.49% 8, (1/5 of 10) 
2105522/00030 SELECT GRANULAR BORROW (CV)   C Y  2.54% 9, (1/5 of 10) 
2360501/23200 
TYPE SP 12.5 WEARING COURSE MIXTURE 
(3,B)   TON  0.41% 11 
2501511/90242 24" RC PIPE CULVERT   L F  42.96% 12,14,17 
2501511/90302 30" RC PIPE CULVERT   L F  23.01% 13,15 
2501511/20180 18" CS PIPE CULVERT   L F  1.26% 16 
2501603/00124 LINING CULVERT PIPE (24")   L F  11.21% 18-21 
2563601/00010 TRAFFIC CONTROL   LS   2.15% 24 
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TABLE B.4.4  Drainage – Actual Unit Prices 
 
 
 
2021501/00010 2104501/00022 2104505/00120 2104501/00042 2104513/00011 2105522/00030 2360501/23200 2501511/90242 2501511/90302 2501511/20180 2501603/00124 2563601/00010
LS  L F S Y L F L F C Y TON L F L F L F L F LS  
Year Period Quantity 1 12422 15793 20468 19049 2215 73 10496 3404 299 2479 1
Unit price 84,778.44$      2.96$                 2.34$                 2.49$                 1.96$                 17.19$               84.00$               61.40$                101.38$            63.43$               67.85$               32,184.32$      
Extension 84,778.44$      36,825.24$      36,980.46$      51,016.54$      37,329.18$      38,072.97$      6,158.13$         644,407.94$      345,114.47$    18,968.00$      168,164.32$    32,184.32$      1,500,000.00$   
Unit price 78,458.32$      2.19$                 2.18$                 2.37$                 2.10$                 16.98$               105.79$            60.32$                63.84$               49.95$               88.35$               29,785.02$      
Extension 78,458.32$      27,205.01$      34,448.65$      48,508.65$      40,008.55$      37,610.57$      7,755.92$         633,132.06$      217,332.75$    14,937.23$      218,994.29$    29,785.02$      1,388,177.02$   
Unit price 82,868.23$      2.41$                 2.24$                 2.39$                 1.94$                 18.94$               87.89$               64.86$                58.20$               65.58$               102.40$            31,459.15$      
Extension 82,868.23$      29,902.77$      35,403.39$      49,006.22$      36,890.08$      41,942.55$      6,443.40$         680,748.59$      198,128.49$    19,612.12$      253,797.29$    31,459.15$      1,466,202.28$   
Unit price 73,797.42$      2.98$                 2.65$                 2.20$                 2.15$                 19.00$               107.86$            54.23$                49.55$               47.80$               95.59$               28,015.61$      
Extension 73,797.42$      37,008.09$      41,821.26$      45,129.56$      40,861.87$      42,075.03$      7,906.99$         569,205.58$      168,673.41$    14,296.22$      236,919.83$    28,015.61$      1,305,710.87$   
Unit price 91,939.85$      2.78$                 3.03$                 2.22$                 2.02$                 21.43$               110.03$            71.90$                73.15$               55.08$               104.02$            34,903.00$      
Extension 91,939.85$      34,491.32$      47,883.77$      45,469.51$      38,480.37$      47,472.29$      8,066.26$         754,692.01$      249,023.61$    16,472.24$      257,813.86$    34,903.00$      1,626,708.07$   
Unit price 86,016.61$      3.04$                 2.89$                 2.39$                 2.26$                 19.76$               102.96$            59.21$                66.03$               50.95$               127.23$            32,654.37$      
Extension 86,016.61$      37,734.68$      45,567.05$      48,869.82$      42,959.32$      43,768.93$      7,548.06$         621,412.85$      224,775.27$    15,238.07$      315,362.10$    32,654.37$      1,521,907.11$   
Unit price 108,542.86$    3.79$                 3.28$                 2.58$                 2.32$                 20.70$               111.24$            95.45$                57.70$               49.80$               124.16$            41,205.98$      
Extension 108,542.86$    47,025.94$      51,861.64$      52,835.45$      44,100.49$      45,852.10$      8,155.24$         1,001,803.67$  196,441.90$    14,894.59$      307,748.30$    41,205.98$      1,920,468.15$   
Unit price 95,675.84$      3.68$                 4.07$                 2.06$                 2.22$                 18.24$               112.08$            68.75$                67.98$               63.81$               139.42$            36,321.29$      
Extension 95,675.84$      45,729.15$      64,341.19$      42,213.84$      42,228.50$      40,397.95$      8,217.04$         721,599.23$      231,433.32$    19,081.85$      345,570.43$    36,321.29$      1,692,809.63$   
Unit price 111,218.25$    3.51$                 4.08$                 2.61$                 2.23$                 21.88$               130.51$            83.63$                76.54$               67.31$               158.89$            42,221.63$      
Extension 111,218.25$    43,647.86$      64,375.86$      53,477.94$      42,564.34$      48,469.87$      9,567.77$         877,719.48$      260,577.77$    20,129.02$      393,834.38$    42,221.63$      1,967,804.16$   
Unit price 94,634.00$      3.44$                 4.14$                 2.22$                 2.45$                 20.11$               125.73$            68.36$                63.49$               64.46$               135.95$            35,925.77$      
Extension 94,634.00$      42,707.16$      65,413.38$      45,425.84$      46,599.74$      44,543.35$      9,217.20$         717,523.23$      216,131.19$    19,276.36$      336,978.92$    35,925.77$      1,674,376.15$   
Unit price 111,574.23$    3.93$                 4.11$                 2.13$                 2.34$                 25.09$               132.40$            84.79$                72.91$               85.02$               157.12$            42,356.77$      
Extension 111,574.23$    48,847.58$      64,916.38$      43,568.58$      44,560.71$      55,578.84$      9,706.70$         889,917.11$      248,215.31$    25,427.09$      389,433.38$    42,356.77$      1,974,102.70$   
Item Number
Units
2011 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2012 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2013
Q2-Q3
TOTAL
2008
Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2009 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
2010 Q2-Q3
Q4-Q1
1
3
2
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APPENDIX C 
COST INDEXES AND ADJUSTED PRICES FOR SAMPLE PROJECTS 
 
 This appendix contains the twelve cost indexes analyzed in Chapter 5. Indexes presented 
below correspond to the last known index on July 1st each year from 2008 to 2013. The Producer 
Price Indexes (PPIs) Highway and Street Construction (BHWY) and Other Non-residential 
Construction (BONS) are used as a single index in Chapter 5 since the BHWY was discontinued 
in 2010 and combined with other indexes into the BONS. The RSMeans 20-city average index 
and National Highway Construction Cost Index (NHCCI) were not published or available at the 
moment of this study. More information about these indexes may be found in Table 9, Chapter 5.  
TABLE C.1  Cost Indexes 
Adjustment Dates Jul-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 
RSMeans 
20-City Average 180.4 180.1 183.5 191.2 194.6 - 
Minneapolis 190.6 203.1 203.8 208.1 214.7 216.3 
PPI 
BHWY 234.4 208.7 217.1 - - - 
BONS - - 100.0 110.4 110.1 111.3 
NHCCI 1.2938 1.0901 1.0671 1.0691 1.1468 - 
CCI 
20-City Average 8185 8578 8805 9053 9291 9542 
Minneapolis 9662.41 9745.02 10081.54 10177 10561.49 10852.11 
BCI 
20-City Average 4640 4771 4888 5059 5170 5286 
Minneapolis 4850.69 4885.99 5113.2 5213.9 5296.68 5415.65 
Caltrans Quarterly 95.4 74.5 79.3 85.2 84.6 129.8 
Caltrans 12-month 90.7 92 79.1 78.9 81.3 110.3 
SDDOT 268.045 276.101 286.363 289.484 307.761 332.369 
MnDOT Annual 212.88 234.22 225.32 229.17 245.95 257.36 
BCI = Building Cost Index – Engineering News-Record; BHWY = Highway and Street Construction Index – Bureau 
of Labor Statistics; BONS = Other Non-residential Construction Index – Bureau of Labor Statistics; Caltrans = 
California Department of Transportation; CCI = Construction Cost Index – Engineering News-Record; MnDOT = 
Minnesota Department of Transportation; NHCCI = National Highway Construction Cost Index – Federal 
Highway Administration; PPI = Producer Price Index – Bureau of Labor Statistics; SDDOT = South Dakota 
Department of Transportation  
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This appendix also contains the adjusted cost of the sample projects in July 1st each year, 
since 2008 until 2013. Given the base price for all sample project was the same ($1,500,000.00) 
and since these indexes are equally applied to all contracts, adjusted prices for each period are 
the same for all sample projects. 
TABLE C.2  Adjusted Contract Prices 
 
 
  
Jul-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13
RsMeans 
National
$1,500,000.00 $1,497,505.54 $1,525,776.05 $1,589,800.44 $1,618,070.95 -
RsMeans 
Minneapolis
$1,500,000.00 $1,598,373.56 $1,603,882.48 $1,637,722.98 $1,689,664.22 $1,702,256.03
PPI $1,500,000.00 $1,335,537.54 $1,389,291.81 $1,533,778.16 $1,529,610.28 $1,546,281.78
NHCCI $1,500,000.00 $1,263,835.21 $1,237,169.58 $1,239,488.33 $1,329,571.80 -
CC              
NationaI
$1,500,000.00 $1,572,021.99 $1,613,622.48 $1,659,071.47 $1,702,687.84 $1,748,686.62
CCI      
Minneapolis
$1,500,000.00 $1,512,824.44 $1,565,066.07 $1,579,885.35 $1,639,573.87 $1,684,689.95
BCI             
National
$1,500,000.00 $1,542,349.14 $1,580,172.41 $1,635,452.59 $1,671,336.21 $1,708,836.21
BCI     
Minneapolis
$1,500,000.00 $1,510,915.97 $1,581,177.11 $1,612,317.01 $1,637,915.43 $1,674,705.04
Caltrans     
Quarterly
$1,500,000.00 $1,171,383.65 $1,246,855.35 $1,339,622.64 $1,330,188.68 $2,040,880.50
Caltrans            
Last 12 months
$1,500,000.00 $1,521,499.45 $1,308,158.77 $1,304,851.16 $1,344,542.45 $1,824,145.53
SDDOT $1,500,000.00 $1,545,081.98 $1,602,508.91 $1,619,974.26 $1,722,253.73 $1,859,961.95
MnDOT       
Annual
$1,500,000.00 $1,650,366.40 $1,587,655.02 $1,614,782.98 $1,733,018.60 $1,813,416.01
Adjustment Dates
Cost Indexes
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APPENDIX D 
QUANTITY RANGES PER PAY ITEM 
 
 This appendix contains the quantity ranges used for each pay item in the sample projects 
to arrange and analyze MnDOT historical bid data. Besides the quantity ranges, this appendix 
presents the scatter plot with all bids received by MnDOT for each pay item (Quantity vs. Unit 
Price) and the regression used in the determination of the ranges. The pay item list shown in 
Table D.1 does include neither Mobilization nor Traffic Control since those items were handles 
in a different way. See Chapter 5 for more information about these quantity ranges. Pay items in 
this appendix are presented as shown below: 
 
TABLE D.1  Sample Projects Pay Item List 
 
No. Item ID Description
1 2104501/00016 REMOVE SEWER PIPE (STORM)  
2 2104501/00022 REMOVE CURB AND GUTTER  
3 2104501/00042 REMOVE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM  
4 2104505/00120 REMOVE BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT  
5 2104513/00011 SAWING BITUMINOUS PAVEMENT (FULL DEPTH)  
6 2104521/00220 SALVAGE GUARD RAIL-PLATE BEAM  
7 2105501/00010 COMMON EXCAVATION  
8 2105522/00030 SELECT GRANULAR BORROW (CV)  
9 2211503/00050 AGGREGATE BASE (CV) CLASS 5  
10 2232501/00040 MILL BITUMINOUS SURFACE (1.5")  
11 2232603/00025 MILLED RUMBLE STRIPS  
12 2301511/00010 STRUCTURAL CONCRETE  
13 2356505/00010 BITUMINOUS MATERIAL FOR SEAL COAT  
14 2360501/23200 TYPE SP 12.5 WEARING COURSE MIXTURE (3,B)  
15 2401541/00011 REINFORCEMENT BARS (EPOXY COATED)  
16 2501511/20180 18" CS PIPE CULVERT  
17 2501511/90242 24" RC PIPE CULVERT  
18 2501511/90302 30" RC PIPE CULVERT  
19 2501603/00124 LINING CULVERT PIPE (24")  
20 2503541/90122 12" RC PIPE SEWER DESIGN 3006  
21 2554501/02038 TRAFFIC BARRIER DESIGN B8338  
22 2554603/00080 TENSION CABLE GUARDRAIL  
23 2582502/11104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-PAINT  
24 2582502/31104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-POLY PREFORM (GROUND IN)  
25 2582502/41104 4" SOLID LINE WHITE-EPOXY  
26 2582502/42104 4" SOLID LINE YELLOW-EPOXY  
27 2582502/42204 4" BROKEN LINE YELLOW-EPOXY  
PAY ITEMS
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1. 2104501/00016 Remove Sewer Pipe (Storm) 
 
 
2104501/00016 
Average Variance 101% 
Range 1 (LF) 10-350 
Range 2 (LF) 350-12200 
 
 
 
 
2. 2104501/00022 Remove Curb And Gutter 
 
 
2104501/00022 
Average Variance 115% 
Range 1 (LF) 20-600 
Range 2 (LF) 600-18000 
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3. 2104501/00042 Remove Guard Rail-Plate Beam   
 
 
2104501/00042 
Average Variance 37% 
Range 1 (LF) 50-220 
Range 2 (LF) 220-990 
Range 3 (LF) 990-4400 
Range 4 (LF) 4400-19500 
 
 
 
 
4. 2104505/00120 Remove Bituminous Pavement   
 
 
2104505/00120 
Average Variance 121% 
Range 1 (SY) 60-1500 
Range 2 (SY) 1500-37500 
Range 3 (SY) 37500-937500 
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5. 2104513/00011 Sawing Bituminous Pavement (Full Depth) 
 
 
2104513/00011 
Average Variance 120% 
Range 1 (LF) 50-1250 
Range 2 (LF) 1250-31500 
 
 
 
   
6. 2104521/00220 Salvage Guard Rail-Plate Beam   
 
 
2104521/00220 
Average Variance 26% 
Range 1 (LF) 25-55 
Range 2 (LF) 55-120 
Range 3 (LF) 120-260 
Range 4 (LF) 260-570 
Range 5 (LF) 570-1250 
Range 6 (LF) 1250-2750 
Range 7 (LF) 2750-6000 
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7. 2105501/00010 Common Excavation   
 
2105501/00010 
Average 
Variance 93% 
Range 1 (CY) 40-570 
Range 2 (CY) 570-8200 
Range 3 (CY) 8200-118000 
Range 4 (CY) 118000-1700000 
 
 
 
 
8. 2105522/00030 Select Granular Borrow (cv)   
 
 
2105522/00030 
Average Variance 65% 
Range 1 (CY) 70-1700 
Range 2 (CY) 1700-41000 
Range 3 (CY) 41000-1000000 
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9. 2211503/00050 Aggregate Base (cv) Class 5 
 
 
2211503/00050 
Average Variance 51% 
Range 1 (CY) 75-1150 
Range 2 (CY) 1150-18000 
Range 3 (CY) 18000-280000 
 
 
   
 
10. 2232501/00040 Mill Bituminous Surface (1.5")   
 
 
2232501/00040 
Average Variance 113% 
Range 1 (SY) 300-2850 
Range 2 (SY) 2850-27200 
Range 3 (SY) 27200-261000 
Range 4 (SY) 261000-2500000 
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11. 2232603/00025 Milled Rumble Strips   
 
 
2232603/00025 
Average Variance 99% 
Range 1 (LF) 2600-14700 
Range 2 (LF) 14700-83000 
Range 3 (LF) 83000-470000 
Range 4 (LF) 470000-2650000 
 
 
 
12. 2301511/00010 Structural Concrete   
 
 
2301511/00010 
Average 
Variance 17% 
Range 1 (CY) 75-190 
Range 2 (CY) 190-490 
Range 3 (CY) 490-1250 
Range 4 (CY) 1250-3200 
Range 5 (CY) 3200-8300 
Range 6 (CY) 8300-21500 
Range 7 (CY) 21500-55500 
Range 8 (CY) 55500-144000 
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13. 2356505/00010 Bituminous Material For Seal Coat   
 
 
2356505/00010 
Average 
Variance 48% 
Range 1 (GAL) 500-8900 
Range 2 (GAL) 8900-155000 
Range 3 (GAL) 155000-2700000 
 
 
 
 
14. 2360501/23200 Type SP 12.5 Wearing Course Mixture (3,b)   
 
 
2360501/23200 
Average Variance 18% 
Range 1 (TON) 70-220 
Range 2 (TON) 220-690 
Range 3 (TON) 690-2100 
Range 4 (TON) 2100-6600 
Range 5 (TON) 6600-20700 
Range 6 (TON) 20700-65000 
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15. 2401541/00011 Reinforcement Bars (Epoxy Coated)   
 
2401541/00011 
Average Variance 22% 
Range 1 (LB) 3400-20800 
Range 2 (LB) 20800-127000 
Range 3 (LB) 127000-777000 
Range 4 (LB) 777000-4662000 
 
 
 
 
16. 2501511/20180 18" CS Pipe Culvert   
 
2501511/20180 
Average Variance 52% 
Range 1 (LF) 8-130 
Range 2 (LF) 130-2200 
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17. 2501511/90242 24" RC Pipe Culvert 
 
 
2501511/90242 
Average Variance 54% 
Range 1 (LF) 8-220 
Range 2 (LF) 220-6200 
 
 
 
 
18. 2501511/90302 30" RC Pipe Culvert   
 
 
2501511/90302 
Average Variance 46% 
Range 1 (LF) 6-95 
Range 2 (LF) 95-1500 
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19. 2501603/00124 Lining Culvert Pipe (24")   
 
 
No relation was found between unit price and quantity for this item. Therefore, all bids are considered in a 
single quantity range 
 
 
 
 
20. 2503541/90122 12" RC Pipe Sewer Design 3006 
 
 
2503541/90122 
Average Variance 64% 
Range 1 (LF) 12-750 
Range 2 (LF) 750-47400 
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21. 2554501/02038 Traffic Barrier Design b8338  
 
2554501/02038 
Average Variance 10% 
Range 1 (LF) 100-1250 
Range 2 (LF) 1250-15900 
 
 
 
 
22. 2554603/00080 Tension Cable Guardrail  
 
2554603/00080 
Average 
Variance 19% 
Range 1 (LF) 1000-8300 
Range 2 (LF) 8300-69000 
Range 3 (LF) 69000-575000 
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23. 2582502/11104 4" Solid Line White-Paint  
 
2582502/11104 
Average 
Variance 35% 
Range 1 (LF) 700-1650 
Range 2 (LF) 1650-3930 
Range 3 (LF) 3930-9300 
Range 4 (LF) 9300-22100 
Range 5 (LF) 22100-52600 
Range 6 (LF) 52600-125300 
Range 7 (LF) 125300-295000 
Range 8 (LF) 295000-700000 
  
 
 
 
24. 2582502/31104 4" Solid Line White-Poly Preform (Ground In)  
 
2582502/31104 
Average 
Variance 15% 
Range 1 (LF) 110-620 
Range 2 (LF) 620-3500 
Range 3 (LF) 3500-19800 
Range 4 (LF) 19800-110000 
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25. 2582502/41104 4" Solid Line White-Epoxy  
 
2582502/41104 
Average Variance 17% 
Range 1 (LF) 750-1200 
Range 2 (LF) 1200-1900 
Range 3 (LF) 1900-3100 
Range 4 (LF) 3100-5000 
Range 5 (LF) 5000-8000 
Range 6 (LF) 8000-13000 
Range 7 (LF) 13000-21000 
Range 8 (LF) 21000-34000 
Range 9 (LF) 34000-55000 
Range 10 (LF) 55000-89000 
Range 11 (LF) 89000-145000 
Range 12 (LF) 145000-235000 
Range 13 (LF) 235000-380000 
 
 
 
  
26. 2582502/42104 4" Solid Line Yellow-Epoxy 
2582502/42104 
Average Variance 15% 
Range 1 (LF) 600-1100 
Range 2 (LF) 1100-2000 
Range 3 (LF) 2000-3700 
Range 4 (LF) 3700-6900 
Range 5 (LF) 6900-12000 
Range 6 (LF) 12000-22000 
Range 7 (LF) 22000-41000 
Range 8 (LF) 41000-76000 
Range 9 (LF) 76000-140000 
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27. 2582502/42204 4" Broken Line Yellow-Epoxy   
 
2582502/42204 
Average Variance 14% 
Range 1 (LF) 75-120 
Range 2 (LF) 120-200 
Range 3 (LF) 200-330 
Range 4 (LF) 330-560 
Range 5 (LF) 560-950 
Range 6 (LF) 950-1600 
Range 7 (LF) 1600-2700 
Range 8 (LF) 2700-4500 
Range 9 (LF) 4500-7600 
Range 10 (LF) 7600-12800 
Range 11 (LF) 12800-21700 
Range 12 (LF) 21700-36800 
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